ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURAL HISTORY IN ASIA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC

ISLAMIC SPECTRUM IN JAVA

ROUTLEDGE

TIMOTHY DANIELS

HOFSTRA

UNIVERSITY

ISLAMIC SPECTRUM IN JAVA

Anthropology and Cultural History in Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Series Editors:
Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern
University of Pittsburgh, USA

This series offers a fresh perspective on Asian and Indo-Pacific Anthropology. Acknowledging the increasing impact of transnational flows of ideas and practices across borders, the series widens the established geographical remit of Asian studies to consider the entire Indo-Pacific region. In addition to focussed ethnographic studies, the series incorporates thematic work on issues of cross-regional impact, including globalization, the spread of terrorism, and alternative medical practices.

The series further aims to be innovative in its disciplinary breadth, linking anthropological theory with studies in cultural history and religious studies, thus reflecting the current creative interactions between anthropology and historical scholarship that are enriching the study of Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. While the series covers classic themes within the anthropology of the region such as ritual, political and economic issues will also be tackled. Studies of adaptation, change and conflict in small-scale situations enmeshed in wider currents of change will have a significant place in this range of foci.

We publish scholarly texts, both single-authored and collaborative as well as collections of thematically organized essays. The series aims to reach a core audience of anthropologists and Asian Studies specialists, but also to be accessible to a broader multidisciplinary readership.

Recent titles in the series

The Anthropology of Morality in Melanesia and Beyond
Edited by John Barker
ISBN 978 0 7546 7185 5

Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia
Edited by Ildikó Bellér-Hann, M. Cristina Cesàro, Rachel Harris and Joanne Smith Finley
ISBN 978 0 7546 7041 4

Caste, Occupation and Politics on the Ganges
Assa Doron
ISBN 978 0 7546 7550 1

Islamic Spectrum in Java

TIMOTHY DANIELS
Hofstra University, USA

ASHGATE

© Timothy Daniels 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.

Timothy Daniels has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.

Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
Suite 420
101 Cherry Street
Burlington
VT 05401-4405
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Daniels, Timothy 1960-
Islamic spectrum in Java. -- (Anthropology and cultural history in Asia and the Indo-Pacific)
1. Islam and culture--Indonesia--Java. 2. Java (Indonesia)--Civilization--Islamic influences.
I. Title II. Series
959.8'2'0088297-dc22

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Daniels, Timothy 1960-
Islamic spectrum in Java / by Timothy Daniels.
p. cm. -- (Anthropology and cultural history in Asia and the Indo-Pacific)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7546-7626-3
1. Islam--Social aspects--Indonesia--Java. I. Title.

BP173.25.D35 2009
306.6'97095982--dc22

2009011258

ISBN 978-0-7546-7626-3 (hbk)
ISBN 978-0-7546-9719-0 (ebk.V)

Mixed Sources
Product group from well-managed forests and other controlled sources
www.fsc.org Cert no. SA-COC-1565
© 1996 Forest Stewardship Council
FSC

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
MPG Books Group, UK

Contents

List of Figures and Map *vii*
Series Editors' Preface – Modernity and Islam in Java *ix*
Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart
Acknowledgments *xv*
A Note on Transliteration and Spelling *xvii*

Introduction 1

1 City of Culture, Tourist Objects and Difference as Fetish 15

2 Locating "Islam" Between Thin Veneer and Normative Piety 35

3 *Dukun*, *Kyai* and *Ustadz*: Healing along the Spectrum 55

4 Social Drama, *Dangdut* and Popular Culture 81

5 Muslim Puritans, Cultural *Dakwah* and Reformation 95

6 Student Theatre, Social Critique and Equalization 115

7 *Maiyah*, Communitas and Common People 133

Conclusion 157

Glossary *169*
Bibliography *173*
Index *183*


Kuliah Khas Bersama :
DR. SALIM
TIMOTHY P. DANIELS
Professor of Antrhopology
Hofstra College of Liberal Arts & Sciences
Hofstra University, NEW YORK
SELEPAS MAGHRIB
28 JULAI
2022
K H A M I S
MASJID ALWI
KANGAR
"Sharing My Experience"
PROmedia TAJDID
Suara Sunnah
LIVE

List of Figures and Map

Map 1.1 Map of the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta (Map by author) 17

1.1 Javanese Muslims making offerings at sacred Cepuri site (Photo by author) 24

1.2 Palace servants carrying *gunungan* during *Gerebeg* (Photo by author) 26

2.1 Groups seeking *tenaga dalam* at southern beach (Photo by author) 43

3.1 Ustadz Fadlan's assistants treating male patients (Photo by author) 76

5.1 Javanese ritual specialists making prayers at *sedekah laut* event (Photo by author) 104

5.2 *Santri* performing *selawatan* at traditional festival (Photo by author) 105

5.3 Amien Rais campaigning with *pangkur jenggleng* performer (Photo by author) 110

6.1 Teater Gadjah Mada performer in *Alang-Alang* (Photo by author) 122



Series Editors' Preface

Modernity and Islam in Java

Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart
University of Pittsburgh

Timothy Daniels' appropriately named study takes its readers on an informative journey across a wide spectrum of themes in contemporary Yogyakarta. Indonesia as a whole is well-known in anthropological writings generally and often features in political discussions as an example of how democracy, development and Islamic religion function together in an ethnically-diverse state. On another front, the great and layered diversity of ritual practices that find their place in the mosaic of history and custom in different parts of Indonesia has also been fruitfully explored by many scholars, including anthropologists, historians, and linguists. Dr. Daniels' monograph is therefore particularly timely and relevant, since it combines discussion about politics, religion, state policies, and popular customary practices.

Scholars today generally agree that the term "modernity" requires a good deal of unpacking. In particular it is recognized that there are many locally specific and diverse manifestations of historical change that often get referred to in these terms. Amongst many other authors, Dorothy Hodgson has explored this theme in an edited collection on "Gendered Modernities" (Hodgson ed. 2001). She distinguishes between Modernity (with a capital "M") and modernity or modernities (Hodgson 2001: 3). Modernity in the former sense, she writes, is a project dating from the eighteenth century in Europe, with a teleological agenda for intended social improvements based on the spread of industrial capitalism and cultural concepts of time and discipline going with it. "Modernization" as a scheme for development clearly belongs to this ideological formation of Modernity. And the project of modernization has deliberately been spread to many parts of the world and has been adopted by governments as policy, often influenced by international organizations and institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, "modernity" as a term (with a lower-case "m") refers to the whole complex of locally particular activities, partly informed by the ideology of improvement, but partly influenced by local traditions, perceptions and situations. It is this complex of modernity, in a society influenced also by the idea of Modernity, that Dr. Daniels has undertaken to analyze in the present monograph. The more specific a "modernity" becomes, the more it corresponds to what we ourselves have called the "contemporary" (Strathern and Stewart 2004:

2), in which the aspirations of the people studied form an important part of the exposition. It is in this sphere also that Dr. Daniels' book is situated.

One prominent context in which the diversity of modernities is frequently exhibited is in the spheres of religion and custom, reaching over to themes of how sickness and misfortune are dealt with in hybrid ways that reflect the complex layerings of historical change and historical consciousness. Dr. Daniels deals with themes of this sort in his chapters two and three. He points out that the activities of "healers" in Yogyakarta are shown there on television programs as examples of alternative medicine, and are said in some of these programs to have roots in Islamic ideas. Daniels refers here to the work of Steve Ferzacca (Ferzacca 2001), "Healing the Modern in a Central Javanese City", also based on field research in Yogyakarta. Ferzacca's work can be read in historical tandem with Daniels', since they overlap in terms of the topics and their field location, and Ferzacca, as the title of his book indicates, explicitly deals with what was locally seen as "the modern". Ferzacca refers to an institutional "cloak of modernity" which "often turns out to be a thin veil" hiding a much greater complexity behind the scenes (Ferzacca 2001: 60). In probing more deeply Javanese ideas about illness and health (pp. 78 ff.), he stresses the importance of the Javanese idea of *rasa* as a "philosophy of embodiment" (p. 80) which one may characterize as life substance that flows between people and in the landscape as a "fluid life force" (p. 81). He further notes that this idea of *rasa* is located "within a humoral context of shifting equilibriums and disorders that mark the compatibility of substances" (p. 82). Ferzacca elaborates on idea of flows and winds in a later section of his book (pp. 112-138). These are ideas, along with their Islamic-related sources, that are explored in detail also by Carol Laderman (1991). (See also Stewart and Strathern 2001 for the comparative use of the idea of humors and substances applied to Oceanic contexts; and Strathern and Stewart 1999 for an exposition on curing and healing as well as humoral ideas in popular Papua New Guinea cultural settings.) These comparative references may help to further frame Dr. Daniels' discussions in his chapter three, where he notes that since the time of Ferzacca's fieldwork there has been a greater prominence of discussions among the people themselves regarding what is to be seen as Islamic and what is un-Islamic in practices of healing. Like Ferzacca, Daniels concentrates on case histories, and finds healers seeking to accommodate criticisms of their work couched in Islamic terms by assimilating their performances more to certain ways seen as normatively Islamic. This kind of context, of course, about what is or is not Islamic is replicated in many other parts of the Islamic world, and is handled differently according to which branch of Islam is operative at a given time and in a given place. Similar debates are characteristic of disputes over time between Christian church organizations regarding accommodations with local customs. In one volume we have previously co-edited, contributors have considered contested aspects of rituals in Islamic contexts, particularly those where Sufism is present, for example in Rajasthan and Bihar, among the Tuareg of West Africa, and in Northern Nigeria, with particular attention paid to the roles of women and practices directed towards the tombs

of "saints" (Stewart and Strathern 2005). The volume also includes an essay on Qur'anic recitation contexts in Indonesia (Gade 2005) and one on shrines of Imams in Shi'i contexts (Takim 2005). In our Preface and Introduction to this collection of essays we stressed the importance of examining sensibilities via expressive genres such as songs (Stewart and Strathern 2005, p. xii), and pointed to the incidence of "urban/rural and elite/popularist power struggles" (p. xvii). Such contests can obviously occur in large city contexts as well as impinging on rural areas (for an example of the latter from Turkey see Onder (2007); of course the situation in each place must vary in accordance with the accepted role of religion in the polity as a whole, and the relative strength and direction of state policies in terms of how "the nation" is to be identified.

Similar considerations to those sketched above apply in contexts where Christianity is adopted. Another of our co-edited volumes looks at this matter by means of studies on the indigenous groups of Taiwan, comparing these with studies on Pacific Islanders from the South-West Pacific (Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands) (Stewart and Strathern eds 2009). In this volume we and our contributors outline and analyze the complex configuration of intersections between cosmologies and histories, the imposition or introduction of Christianity often being followed by local adaptations and innovations in which new forms emerge and establish themselves and a continuing dialogue with "official" forms persists without final resolution. Many different kinds of adaptation occur, in which an officialized element is given due respect. For example, in one of our own field areas, in Mount Hagen, Papua New Guinea, one interlocutor told us that nowadays with Christianity the ancestors have to ask God's permission before they can make people sick (and thus receive sacrifices of pigs) – God being seen as not only a supreme authority but also the arbiter of morality, and ancestors having previously held this position as the guardians of the moral cosmos. Analogously, one of the healers studied by Dr. Daniels explained to the fieldworker that patients came and conversed with him and his words went into their ears and, with Allah's permission, helped them to feel better. In this way, Custom and God are reconciled.

The case of sorcery may reveal more ambivalence. Experts in dealing with the effects on victims of putative hostile sorcery attacks themselves, as Dr. Daniels explains, undergo training to strengthen their supernatural powers, including the practice of fasting, presumably to discipline their bodies and maintain their bodily boundaries. One well-known practitioner apparently suggested that *santet* sorcery could be used as a "quasi-legal sanction" in a context of undeveloped legal mechanisms for redress and local dispute settlement in civil cases. Dr. Daniels comments that ideas of cosmological order are also involved here. Under some circumstances sorcery might be used to restore such order if it had been disturbed. Similar considerations may apply to some traditional contexts in places such as Papua New Guinea. Related to this point, however, is the point that sorcery attributions, like those of witchcraft, are often difficult to verify, or cannot be verified at all, since they themselves belong primarily to the realms of rumor

and gossip (see Stewart and Strathern 2004). In that case, counteraction against imputed acts of sorcery (or witchcraft) belongs essentially to the world of the imaginary and thus could not easily be brought into the ambit of law. In the case cited by Dr. Daniels, however, the plaintiff had a complaint against an identified person and the question was simply whether the *santet* sorcery could properly be used to punish that person for their imputed wrongdoing. The answer was not clear, and it is evident that such issues fall into an arena of uncertainty. Islamic cosmology, however, appears to allow for the existence of spirits created by Allah that can be invoked in the practice of one kind of *santet*, the *halus* form, as Dr. Daniels explains. In this form the sorcerer is supposed to appeal to invisible spirits to carry out his wishes. In another form (*keras*), the sorcerer is said to put harmful substances into food or drink. Healers are declared to know ways of dealing with both forms. This kind of substratum of popular ideas links the ethnography to many other areas of the world in which varieties of sorcery and witchcraft are spoken of as practiced (see again Stewart and Strathern 2004, e.g. pp. 1-28).

Such highly local concerns are often sharply distinct from the versions of religious ideology and ritual practice that are harnessed to state-building or nation-building concerns of intellectuals, reformists, and politicians. Johan Fischer has examined the role of Islamic revivalism among Malay Muslims coincident with the growth of a consumer middle class. He identifies a "ritual economy" (Fischer 2008: 13) in which the Malaysian state bureaucracy both attempts to devalue certain Islamic practices and at the same time seeks to establish consumerist standards of "proper Islamic consumption" (Fischer, ibid.). The state authorities in Malaysia entered into this field of conduct in order to combat the claims of a local Islamic revival movement, Arqam, which advocated strict *halal* rules for consumption and were reported to have marketed a wide range of products nationwide under this label (*halal*), as well as promoting ideas of *dakwah*, "salvation" (Fischer, p. 13). The Malaysian state authorities, on the other hand, have promoted a variety of reformist approaches arguing for standard interpretations based on the acknowledged sacred texts and a reduction in ritualistic activities. These state authorities promulgated their policies against "the influx of mystically-inclined ideas, especially from Sumatra and Java in Indonesia" (Fischer, pp. 14-15). Sufi mystical orders, *tareqat*, in Malaysia were among the targets of state politics. Such orders are often seen as subversive because of aspects of secrecy in their organization and membership (ibid., p. 15). State authorities, also pursuing a course of nation-building and modernity via the emergent middle class, have appropriated to themselves the legitimization of *halal* products and have engaged in the process of ritualizing the bodies of their citizens through the consumption of commodities, primarily foods.

In general, one of Fischer's statements in his article seems to apply well to the context of Yogyakarta within the Indonesian State:

"Islam in Malaysia, or more accurately the social and moral meanings of the properly Islamic, is contested and there are competing attempts to incorporate

it into state institutions, but also into a multitude of everyday practices such as proper ritual conduct" (p. 16).

It is one of the notable strengths of Timothy Daniels' wide-ranging study that he has sensitively explored the many domains in which processes comparable to those sketched by Fischer in his *Journal of Ritual Studies* paper are unfolding in Indonesia today. "Islam Spectrum in Java" will take its place as a distinctive work among the growing ranks of studies that examine the evolution of Islamic forms and their dialectical interplay with other forces in different societies around the world.

Note

A. Strathern and P.J. Stewart (Strathern) are a husband and wife research team who have spent many years as long-term researchers working on a variety of topics in a number of different geographical locales, including the Pacific (especially Papua New Guinea), Europe, and Taiwan. They have published extensively (over 35 books and over 175 of articles) and widely. For a list of relevant examples of their work visit their website (www.pitt.edu/~strather/sandspublicat.htm).

References

Ferzacca, Steve 2001. *Healing the Modern in a Central Javanese City*. For, Medical Anthropology Series, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Fischer, Johan 2008. Nationalizing Rituals? The Ritual Economy in Malaysia. *Journal of Ritual Studies* 22(2): 13-22.

Gade, Anne, M. 2005. Motivating Qur'anic Practice in Indonesia, pp. 41-72. In, *Contesting Rituals: Islam and Practices of Identity-Making.* Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern, eds For, Ritual Studies Monograph Series, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Hodgson, Dorothy (ed.) 2001. *Gendered Modernities. Ethnographic Perspectives*. N.Y.: Palgrave.

Laderman, Carol, 1991. *Taming the Wind of Desire*. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press.

Onder, Sylvia Wing 2007. *We have No Microbes Here: Healing Practices in a Turkish Black Sea Village*. For, Ethnographic Studies in Medical Anthropology Series, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Stewart, Pamela J. and A. Strathern 2001. *Humors and Substances: Ideas of the Body in New Guinea*. Westport, Conn. and London: Bergin and Garvey, Greenwood Publishing Group.

Stewart, Pamela J. and Andrew Strathern 2004. *Witchcraft, Sorcery, Rumors, and Gossip*. For, New Departures in Anthropology Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stewart, Pamela J. and Andrew Strathern (eds) 2005. *Contesting Rituals: Islam and Practices of Identity-Making*. For, Ritual Studies Monograph Series, Durham, N.C: Carolina Academic Press.

Stewart, Pamela J. and Andrew Strathern (eds) 2009. *Religious and Ritual Change: Cosmologies and Histories.* For, Ritual Studies Monograph Series, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Strathern, A. and Pamela J. Stewart 1999. *Curing and Healing: Medical Anthropology in Global Perspective*. For, Ethnographic Studies in Medical Anthropology Series, Durham N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

Strathern, Andrew and Pamela J. Stewart 2004. *Empowering the Past, Confronting the Future, The Duna People of Papua New Guinea*. For, Contemporary Anthropology of Religion Series, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Takim, Liyakat 2005. Charismatic Appeal or Communitas? Visitation to the Shrines of the Imams, pp. 181-203. In, *Contesting Rituals: Islam and Practices of Identity-Making.* Pamela J. Stewart and Andrew Strathern, (eds) For, Ritual Studies Monograph Series, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press.

AJS & PJS
Cromie Burn Research Unit
March 2009

Acknowledgments

This book has emerged from numerous ongoing relationships with people in the US and Indonesia. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to all of those people.

The research for this book was supported by a Fulbright postdoctoral grant. I thank the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES) and the American-Indonesian Exchange Foundation for administering the research grant and for facilitating my acquisition of a research permit from the Indonesian government. I also thank S. Donatirin, the Vice Consul for Information and Cultural Affairs, and the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) for their support. I am highly grateful to Gadjah Mada University and its Centre for Social and Southeast Asian Studies (CESSAS-UGM) for serving as my institutional sponsors. Dr. Bambang Purwanto, head of CESSAS, was also helpful providing me with some initial information and contacts. I thank Bambang and other colleagues at UGM for organizing seminars and discussing various aspects of my research.

In Indonesia, I am so very grateful to my many friends, contacts, and interlocutors for sharing their ideas and feelings about a broad range of issues, many of them quite personal and unflattering. I thank various officials of the Yogyakarta palaces and government offices for facilitating my presence at several festivals, celebrations, and tourist events. I thank Emha Ainun Nadjib for welcoming us and providing my wife and me with transportation to several local *Maiyah* events. I am grateful to Mas Pra Yogi for his kind support and friendship and to Mbak Farida for sharing her home and time with us on several occasions.

In the US, I would like to thank the late Clifford Geertz for his insightful comments about my research and that of other recent ethnographers of Java. I also thank my colleagues Daniel M. Varisco, Markus Droessler, David Banks, and John R. Bowen for their critical commentaries on some parts of this book. I am grateful to the kind support of Cheryl Mwaria, Sharryn Kasmir, Christopher Matthews, Joanne Taylor, Warren Frisina and other colleagues at Hofstra University. I would also like to thank Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart, the series editors, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this book. Special thanks go to Alex and Geoffrey of the Hofstra Faculty Support Center for their technical assistance. I am also grateful for the loving support of my mother, Lillian Baugh Daniels, and my younger brother, Nicholas.

I thank my wife Farichah for her support, insights, and persistent criticism. She was and is an essential companion on this journey. I also thank my Indonesian in-laws, Mas Iwing, Uncle Ri, Bu Roh, Bu Domiri, Mbak Nuning, Mbak Dete and many others for their kind support and sharing. I also want to extend my special thanks to my late mother-in-law, Ibu Yati Kusmaidah, for her kind thoughts and prayers.

Dedicated to my late mother-in-law, Ibu Yati Kusmaidah,
Who prayed this research would come to fruition

A Note on Transliteration and Spelling

Indonesian and Javanese words are spelled in most cases the way they are in these languages following the official convention of the Republic of Indonesia set in 1972. Almost all of my respondents spelled Indonesian and Javanese words according to this convention, except for writing names and quoting from sources utilizing earlier conventions. In these exceptional cases, I also adopt the spelling choices of my local interlocutors rather than national conventions. For instance, the [oe] in the name Moeslim and the [ch] in the name Farichah had been changed to [u] and [kh] respectively in the official convention, but where my interlocutors kept following the earlier forms I follow their usage. Arabic words are spelled the way they are in local Indonesian usage and sometimes this varies according to the education of respondents. For instance, I usually write the Arabic words *shirk* and *shari'ah* as *syirik* and *syari'ah* according to Indonesian convention. However, the reader should keep in mind that [sy] in Indonesian is pronounced as [sh]. Similarly, [c] in *Cak, macapat, Pancasila*, and all other Indonesian words is pronounced as [ch]. In many cases I also provide information on the original spelling in Arabic, especially for key terms that have a broad significance for Islamic studies in general. Overall my transliteration method emphasizes local usage directing the reader's attention to local meanings and conceptions.

Introduction

As one of the poorer countries in the region of Southeast Asia, postcolonial Indonesia has normally been, in this rapidly globalizing world, at the disadvantaged end of relations with more powerful countries in the region and in the West. Natural resources, such as oil, gas, coal, lumber, tin and gold regularly flow across Indonesian borders heading toward more wealthy nations and into the coffers of transnational corporations. On the other hand, consumer goods, capital investments and loans flow into Indonesia from wealthier countries, transnational corporations and lending agencies perpetuating unequal global relations all too common in early twenty-first century global capitalism. Poverty and the plethora of social problems stemming from it are rampant in Indonesian society. Many compete to escape from absolute poverty through selling their labor cheaply to transnational corporations such as Nike, Adidas, Bata, Mattel and Coca-Cola. Others move across international borders seeking work in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia.

In addition to commercial products, capital and human flows, cultural values, norms and concepts stream into Indonesia along political circuits, radio waves, television, film and other mass media, including postmodern communications pathways and networks. Many television commercials, programs, and cable stations such as MTV, come prepackaged with values and lifestyles from more economically developed societies. Moreover, many Indonesian news programs adopt labels and categories reflective of perspectives and world views of more dominant players on the world stage. For instance, Palestinian fighters formerly labeled by Indonesian news reporters as "warriors" have begun to be routinely labeled as "terrorists" nowadays, eliding whatever moral legitimacy their violent tactics were seen to hold in the past. Of course, these and many other cultural flows are not accepted wholesale in all segments of society and local actors often reinterpret, refigure and contest their meanings. Many Indonesian Muslims also want to change the position of their country in the global economic system. Working from a local base in the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*, DIY) in the south-central part of Java, the most populous island of the Indonesian archipelago, I strive to examine the variety of local projections of desirable futures, whether democratic, Islamic, populist, or a range of combinations of such ideals.

In a world characterized increasingly by conflict, in which widespread opposition to globalization is being expressed, often in violent terms, the deficiency of perspectives that assume local people in poorer societies have to accept the dominant values, concepts, and world views of people in more dominant nations is most

evident. It is essential that we recognize, as analysts, observers and policymakers that many people in societies across the world refuse to assimilate or adopt aspects of dominant global cultures holding fast to their ethnic and/or religious identities. In the face of such rejection it is too easy for many from western perspectives to castigate such responses, even before understanding them, as "fundamentalist" in contrast to the more friendly "cosmopolitan" responses (see Giddens 2000) or as inherently "undemocratic" and "uncivil" (see Ramage 2004; Hefner 2000). The fact is that people can, and do, draw upon a broad range of cultural resources to define and construct "democratic" and "civil" societies, and in Muslim-majority societies such as Indonesia, people often evoke interpretations of Islamic texts, norms, concepts, and principles not only to construct oppositional identities but also to formulate desirable futures, including tolerant and inclusive social systems, and images of the nation and state. Moreover, more accommodative political and traditional elites may call upon ethnic customs and cultural arts promoting a "secular"-based civil ideology and plural philosophy while reproducing structures of inequality. To competently tackle these complex issues of cultural politics, broad and culturally relative approaches to "religion" and "democracy" are required.

For this purpose, I use an anthropological definition and approach to religion. Bowen (2008, 4) provides a fine, broad definition of religion in two stages: first as "ideas and practices that postulate reality beyond that which is immediately available to the senses," and "second, for each society we study we ask how *these* people construct their world." This definition avoids overly narrow definitions of religion which rely upon distinctions of the sacred and profane or supernatural and natural or beliefs in spiritual beings which are not universally present in all cultures. The door is left wide open here for the ethnographer to rely upon local perspectives that stamp the form religion takes in any particular social context. Aragon (2000, 19) provides some useful areas for the ethnographer to look for when gathering information on how local people construct their world. She delineates three domains of knowledge and related practice: 1) the nature of the deity or invisible forces; 2) channels of ritual communication between unseen powers and the human community; 3) morality, social hierarchies, legal codes, calendrical taboos, gender roles and other values and norms. Lehman (1994) contributes significantly to this approach noting religion is an institutionalized "sociocentric" system of knowledge and practices with social relations at its very core. "Sociocentric" refers to how religion postulates a theory of ultimate reality which "sees the relations of human beings with the universe, their place in the universe, as continuous with social relations. And it allows social behavior and action to serve as ways of effectuating one's "cosmic' standing" (ibid, 3). That is, one's going to a ritual specialist making offerings to powerful spirits and forces or attending congregational prayers or contributing to charity and performing other "good" deeds affects one's position in the cosmos. Moreover, from the vantage point of such broad models "no specific behavior is precategorized as outside religion. Rather, those boundaries become an empirical question" (Aragon 2000, 19). For instance, based upon ethnographic data, the researcher may consider

various cultural arts, popular culture, such as Indonesian *dangdut*, and political events and discourse, such as public debates and legislation on the definition of marriage in the United States, to be within the purview of religion.

Although local perspectives are central to this definition of religion, it remains an analytic point of view and as such what it incorporates is not always coterminous with all, or any, local points of view about what is and is not religious. Some of the ideas and practices, the researcher considers to be religious local people may define as something other than religion such as "culture," "art," or non-religious beliefs and rituals. Similar to my experience in south-central Java, Bowen was confronted with divergent local views on whether some local ideas and practices were part of Islamic religion (Bowen 2008, 4). Islamic university students and local villagers held different points of view on ritual meals performed in villages asking ancestral spirits for assistance, with the latter incorporating them with an Islamic worldview and the former considering them to be improper according to Islamic principles. Moreover, the Indonesian government has imposed a narrow definition of religion, which has some resonances in local areas such as Yogyakarta, requiring a sacred book, a monotheistic foundation, exclusive boundaries, and that it be transcendent of ethnic boundaries (ibid:30). In accord with Bowen's work in Sumatra, I consider many disputed areas of culture as being part of religion and Islam in Java while taking such divergent views as an important aspect of social reality to be studied.

In addition this broad analytic definition of religion, the anthropological approach I adopt underscores the significance of context. Islam, like all other religions, is not a monolithic entity with the same limited and fixed set of ideas and practices wherever we find it. Islam does widely share some core texts, ideas, and symbols but these are given different meanings wherever Islam is practiced and shaped through complex mixtures of local, national, regional and global factors. In other words, trying to understand Islam in Indonesia from merely a study of core Islamic texts or from what Islam appears to be in the Middle East will not get you very far (see also Varisco 2005). Nevertheless, when considering global or transnational factors as an additional level of analysis, clearly some ideas and practices flow into Indonesia from Malaysia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia for instance, and at times these take on an authoritative character. Yet, these flows, however influential, never determine the general character of religion in Indonesia which has a strong local flavor made from a multiplicity of local cultural resources, diverse historical contacts, and political-economic conditions.

Finally, the anthropologically approach I take in the following chapters attempts to realize "a mature theory of religion" integrating historical, psychological, sociological, and "semantic"—taken here to mean symbolic and cognitive—which Geertz (2001[1972], 15) states has yet to be discovered. While many researchers have effectively combined historical, psychological and sociological perspectives, fusing symbolic and cognitive approaches has remained elusive. This problem precipitated a special issue of *American Ethnologist* on symbolism and cognition, in which Colby, Fernandez and Kronenberg (1981) review these two dominant

perspectives in cultural anthropology and discuss convergences, both actual and potential, between them. Some ethnographers focused upon symbols, loosely defined as public units of meaning or codes, and stressed that the main task of anthropology was to discern local meanings (Geertz 1960, 1973; Turner 1969). They argued that people respond to the same stimuli in different ways due to public symbols and interpretation. These studies produced some important culturally-sensitive analyses of social processes. Unfortunately this interpretive, symbolic anthropological, and symbolic interactionist turn towards mediating symbols and interpretations was hampered by its chief proponent's, Geertz's and Turner's, overt attempts to avoid cognitive anthropologists' concerns with the human mind. Thus, their theories relied upon observable public displays of symbols and paradigms and lacked a firm stance on acquisition, internalization, and distribution of knowledge. They produced some important insights about local meta-commentaries, polysemy of symbols, and rites of passage, yet the power of these theories were weakened by the lack of a theory of mind. On the other hand, early cognitive anthropologists of the 1950s and 1960s well equipped with a powerful theory of mind, Chomsky's competence model, proceeded to analyze classificatory schemes people need to know in order to identify instances of biological kinds, kinfolk, colors and so forth. These "semantic ethnographers" used several analogies from linguistics to analyze several other domains of human social life (Dougherty 1985). For example, the notion of distinctive features, used to analyze phonology in the domain of language, was used to construct models of emic distinctions made by cultural actors in semantic usage, such as, kinship terminologies and folk taxonomies (Goodenough 1951; Lounsbury 1964; Conklin 1969). Cognitive anthropologists have more recently inferred models, schemata, and theories from people's discourse and behavior (Hutchins 1980; Agar and Hobbs 1985; D'Andrade and Strauss 1992; D'Andrade 1995; Shore 1996; Lehman 1997).

Symbolic anthropology has been weakest in terms of its "microanthropology," conception and analysis of symbols and meanings, and cognitive anthropology has been weakest in terms of "macroanthopology," making connections between the details of thought processes and social contexts and broader social structures. I attempt to build on the corresponding strengths and weaknesses of each subfield, combining them to provide "thick description" (Geertz 1973) of polysemous symbols in government and palace-organized festivals and ceremonies, ritualized communal meals, visits to sacred sites, and healing performances, and to ascertain the social distribution of knowledge and formation of mental representations in various contexts. I use a cognitive approach to refine "thick description" and symbolic analysis by explicating symbolic mechanisms and bundling of meanings and notions comprising mental representations. Through combining these subfields, I also demonstrate more dimensions of the variety of mixtures of ideas and practices constitutive of the often sited Javanese "syncretism" than either subfield would alone. I blend interpretive and cognitive approaches to local categories such as *dukun* and *kyai* highlighting multiple meanings and

underlying knowledge and the way they are integral to altered public discourses in the *Reformasi* era. Moreover, my discussion and analysis of cultural politics of provocative popular dance styles, modern theater, and a new religious movement explores symbolic meanings, infers encyclopedic knowledge and constructions of mental representations, while not losing sight of the micro and macro contexts.

In addition, a mature theory of religion has to treat each dimension of religion without reducing it as a whole to any one dimension. Moving in this direction, I strive to treat Islam as a complex religious system serving numerous functions, including intellectualist or explanative, emotional, cathartic, social—both unifying and conflictive—and symbolic ends. Different chapters in this book emphasize particular dimensions more than others, but it should become clear that Islam is more than just a power tool used for political goals, though a concern with what particular ideas and practices mean in relation to structures of inequality runs throughout each chapter.

This culturally relative, contextual, and multidimensional conception of "religion" can be used as a refined descriptive and analytic tool to explicate local religious views and the ways they contribute to framing projections of desirable futures. Indonesian Muslims, like believers of other religions in other places and times, fashion religious realms in particular historical contexts and put them to various uses from personal piety to ideological and political contestations.

Similar to this anthropological approach to religion, I think it also essential to devise such a culturally relative tack when applying the concept of "democracy" in other societies as well as in our own. As Esposito (1996, 13-14) notes, democracy is a contested concept with competing definitions in the United States, and other western societies, as in Muslim societies. Debates between advocates of "liberal democracy," which emphasized individual rights and limitations on government, and "socialist"-oriented democracy, which emphasized "the popular will and collective structures of community," following the failure of the socialist-communist left, gave way to contests between advocates of "radical democracy" and "liberal democracy," in its neoconservative–market economy-oriented—or postmodern—multicultural pluralism-oriented forms (ibid, 36-7). "Radical democracy" is a critical and oppositional alternative which emphasizes the need for ongoing conflict to "reinvent government" in pursuit of democratic ideals. Along these radical democratic lines, Cornel West (2004) critiquing trends in American domestic and international politics, argues that three dominant dogmas, free-market fundamentalism, aggressive militarism, and escalating authoritarianism, are jeopardizing the future of "genuine democracy." In addition, a seven-person team of ethnographers conducting research in the state of North Carolina interpret that there is evidence for characterizing the US political system as "plutocratic" rather than "democratic" (Holland et al. 2007). Despite this internal debate and lack of consensus within the United States and western European societies, American political leaders represent and impose dominant definitions and models of "democracy" overseas, liberal democratic ones, emphasizing multiparty electoral politics, "civil society" or pluralistic growth of civic associations and

Western-style free press, individual and minority rights, and the free market (ibid, 18-19).

In step with the forward march of dominant United States imperial definitions, American scholars tend to assess Indonesian politics and socio-cultural dynamics in terms of ethnocentric standards. Ramage (1995, 2004) designates the "pluralist" and "nationalist" segments of the Indonesian Muslim community, the "traditionalist" Muslims, as most pro-democratic and desirous leaders of "democratizing" processes. In the introduction of his statement to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, July 14, 2004, as the Representative of The Asia Foundation, as "scholar-administrator," Ramage (2004, 1) states that this foundation

> has long sought to support the efforts of Indonesia's Muslim majority to strengthen civil society, enhance women's rights, ensure free and fair elections, support education reform, and to build tolerance and pluralism in this, now the world's third largest democracy, and the world's largest Muslim-majority democracy.

Here again, Ramage selects the "traditionalist" Muslims associated with Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest mass-based Muslim organization, as most pluralistic and committed to cultural diversity, pluralism, interfaith tolerance, and freedom of belief and ultimately to "democratizing" processes through supporting human rights, civil society, and opposition to Islamist politics. In his presentation of recent history, Muhammadiyah, the older, second largest and more "modernist" oriented Muslim mass organization, are newcomers to "democratizing " processes joining Indonesia's "mainstream, pluralist tradition of Islam."[1] Throughout his statement

---

1 My distinction between "traditionalist" and "modernist" Muslims refers to widespread patterns of cultural orientation and not to doctrinal or political differences. "Traditionalist" Muslims refers to the segment of Muslims in Indonesia that follow or at least accommodate local practices that have developed and been passed down to successive generations over the centuries of people embracing Islam and merging it with other aspects of local culture, including in some cases pre-Islamic belief systems and ritual and organizational formats. "Traditionalist" Muslims in Indonesia have had a long history of pursuing Sufi mystical paths *(tasawwuf*). In fact, Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the two founders in 1926 of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, defended the significance of Sufi and traditional scholastic *(pesantren*) practices in the face of reformist criticism (Zulkifli 2003, 111-4). "Modernist" Muslims, on the other hand, refers to the segment of Muslims in Indonesia that arose in the early twentieth century out of the wave of revivalism and reformism sweeping the Muslim world. K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah in 1912, like many other Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca during his time, was influenced by reformist thinkers such as Muhammad 'Abduh. The modernists sought to reform Islamic practice in Indonesia through removing many elements of syncretism and innovation that had developed over the centuries of implanting Islam in the region and to make educational and institutional progress. M.B. Hooker (2003, 232)

"liberal democratic" standards abound and "democratization" is assumed to be the process of supporting, striving to achieve, and implementing liberal democratic prescriptions (see also Neher 1994). As "scholar-administrator," not unlike his Dutch predecessors, Ramage (2004, 10-15) described his foundation's effective efforts at reforming educational institutions as part of the "democratizing" process, nipping "militant Islamist" tendencies in the bud.

Some other American and Australian scholars are more subtly in step with the imperial drum, taking greater cognizance of local cultural concepts and resources, while fitting them into the dominant frames of "liberal democracy" and "civil society." Eldridge (1997, 205-7) notes three broad understandings of "democracy" in contemporary Indonesian society, Western-style "representative" or "constitutional" format, deliberation and consensus (*musyawarah* and *mufakat*), and people's sovereignty (*kedaulatan rakyat*) which non-governmental organizations used to shape "their critique of dominant power structures and their agenda for change" although they are most comfortable with the latter two based in their core values. However, Eldridge (ibid, 222-5) concludes that these non-governmental organizations (NGOs), observed during the Suharto era, were "primarily local in orientation and relatively passive in relation to democratic reform in the political sphere" where "democratization" referred to free electoral politics, pluralism, openness for civil society organizations, and individual rights. Similarly, Hefner (2000, 2001) calls for a "civil Islam" drawing upon particular local values and concepts, which can fit into conveniently preexisting Western frames of "liberal democracy" and "civil society." In concert with Ramage, he underscores and promotes trends towards pluralism, inclusive and tolerant civil culture, and free market capitalism.

Cultural relativism is being cut short much too quickly here in order to make assessments of whether or not local ideas and religious and civic organizations are fulfilling particular, ethnocentric standards of moving towards democracy and civil society. Similar to scholarly support for dominant discourses during the colonial era, such as the "white man's burden" framework, many contemporary

---

argues that the distinction between "traditionalists" and "modernists" based on contrasting commitment to the opinions of classic jurists (*taqlīd*) or intellectual and personal religious interpretation (*ijtihad*) is increasingly untenable given evidence of religious decrees of these two organizations. In addition, mapping political orientations such as radical, moderate and liberal to these cultural or doctrinal orientations is not a simple matter (see Daniels 2007). Thus, my usage refers to the contrasting cultural orientations of these organizations and not directly to matters of doctrine or politics. These distinctions are broad but not monolithic; there are NU-affiliated people who are "puritanical" and Muhammadiyah-affliated people who are flexible in relation to local cultural traditions. These distinctions are also not static and as subsequent chapters will show they are subject to change in varying historical contexts. Similarly, "neo-modernists" is here used for new organizations with cultural orientations similar to Muhammadiyah. Azra (2000[1990]) asserts that the "traditionalists" are more modern in terms of ideology than the "modernists" who are only modern in their practice. This issue is discussed in Chapter 5.

scholars are again conveniently abridging cultural relativism in service of imposing "cosmopolitan" ways of life upon natives of the "periphery." Little account is given to locally envisioned, alternative models of society and frames of future relationships with global capitalism. In this book, I take the position of pursuing cultural relativism a moment longer to ascertain what local interpretations and values posit about public cultural forms and what they mean for desirable futures. Moreover, discarding the assumption that locals have no option but to accept global hegemony, I look to the various ways people are responding to persisting Western imperial influence in the age of globalization. Some reject the concept of "democracy" outright, while others look for and deploy local cultural resources supportive of their conceptions of "democracy" and "civil society." Some of these local resources are based in traditional ethnic philosophies and values, historicized tolerant approaches of legendary Muslim saints, and people's interpretations of Islamic texts such as the Holy Qur'an and *hadīth* (recorded statements and practices of Prophet Muhammad). Indeed, as Khaled Abou El Fadl (2004) points out, there are many convergences between Islamic theology, jurisprudence and philosophy with the core precepts of "liberal democracy." I attempt to broaden his insights by taking this discussion out of the theoretical realm and placing it into the realm of practice, and by leaving open the possibility that Muslims in Indonesia may also find a meeting ground between Islam and other conceptions of democracy, including "radical democracy." Moreover, I seek to amplify not only local projections of desirable futures within Indonesian society but also within global relations and communities.

In accord with broadening the scope of cultural relativism, I avoid from an analytic perspective, the concept of "democratization," with its typical liberal democratic underpinnings, in favor of a less loaded concept for critically assessing the effects of impinging social and cultural facts upon the lives of everyday people. In particular, in addition to sensitivity to local ideas, models and interpretations, I make my own assessments of the relationships of public cultural forms and diverse local interpretations to structures of inequality. Some cultural forms and the ideas, representations, and meanings they entail reinforce particular patterns of social inequality, whereas others tend to challenge such patterns. Other cultural forms may reinforce some structures of inequality while challenging others. Indeed, contemporary anthropologists often interpret people's use of public cultural forms, such as rituals and festivals, as reproducing, transforming and/or contesting structures of inequality. In defining "equalization" as processes of weakening, undermining, and lessening hierarchical formations, I attempt to systematize an assessment of the direction of change. For instance, Elliston (1999) not only explicates local ideas about substance-based personhood but also interprets Melanesian ritual activities involving transfer of semen from older to younger males as reinforcing structures of age and gender inequality. From my analytic perspective, processes of "equalization," however they may be framed in local terms—"civil, Islamic, modern"—involve a movement in the direction of leveling structures of inequality, easing unequal social access to power and

resources. This concept of "equalization" provides us with a well-informed "outsider" perspective on local productions and projections of desirable "futures" which does not automatically react to local framing and spin them within Western ideological perspectives. This delicate balancing act—attempting to assess the effects of cultural forms while refraining from evaluating local ideas as more or less "democratic"—is one I set out on as an engaged ethnographer.

Now, why do I relate these anthropological approaches to Islam and democracy in Indonesia to public cultural forms? One could assume that I am following in a long line of anthropologists conducting research in Southeast Asia who take "the ubiquity of publicly displayed cultural forms" as providing "the region its distinctive aura" (Bowen 1995, 1048). To the contrary, I don't think this is the case. Publicly displayed cultural forms are widely present in many societies in other regions, including in our own Western societies, and anthropologists of Southeast Asia have tended to study them in large numbers due primarily to what has been happening in the academy at the time of their studies as well as the influence of existing literature and tradition in the field. Instead, the primary reason I am connecting a focus upon Islam and "democracy" with public cultural forms is threefold. First, given the new openness and freedom of expression of the Reformation Era,[2] public cultural forms such as ceremonies, festivals, cultural arts and popular culture are important areas to look for emerging forms of identity, reinventions of the nation, and reconfigurations of relations between religion and the state. Second, public cultural forms embody messages and discourses that both the anthropologist and local people can and do read and interpret in a number of ways. In fact, they hold a multiplicity of meanings for a variety of people placed throughout society, and as such, they can be important barometers for measuring perspectives and opposing views. Third, they have an accessible location being organized and attended by particular groups in society, from which the researcher can observe the participation of different groups and social strata noting who uses these cultural forms for what purposes and what effects.

In fact, my tack of making interpretations of local interpretations of cultural performances follows an analytic methodology well-established in structuralist, symbolic and cognitive perspectives. Similar to Clifford Geertz (1973, 448), I treat public cultural forms as local "metasocial commentaries" or interpretations local people make about themselves and their own society. In addition, Geertz interprets divergent local interpretations of cultural forms, such as Javanese funerals, as indicative of broader social and cultural patterns. I refine this analytic method by inferring mental representations as embedded in meta-social commentaries and other local interpretations. Another new twist this work provides is to consistently link my interpretations of interpretations to a critical conception of

2 The Reformation Era takes its name from one of the major demands and slogans of mass protestors, "*Reformasi*," that ushered in the last days of the Suharto (New Order) regime. This slogan seemed to sum up many of the hopes for broad-ranging, multidimensional changes many people and groups sought and yearned for in this dynamic era.

equalization and negotiating globalization. Considering diverse local Muslim interpretations of cultural forms in conjunction with culturally relative notions of religion and desirable futures and a discerning notion of equalization can illumine contemporary dynamics between ideological Islamic frameworks and competing positions and hopes for the future in the age of globalization and early twenty-first century capitalism. I found that Muslims from across the spectrum of Islam in Java use Islamic concepts and principles to criticize Indonesian society in support of Reformation and multi-dimensional change and to produce a range of ideological positions on desirable futures and modes of interacting with globalization.

This book uses ethnographically-based description and analysis to highlight the relations between interpretations of public cultural forms, Islam, and equalization, while paying close attention to historical contexts. I conducted ethnographic research in the region of south-central Java from September 2003 to July 2004, during which time my wife and I took up residence in the urban neighborhood of Yogyakarta in which she grew up. Entering this field site with many contacts, friends and relatives, from the social networks of my wife, from a local Javanese background, facilitated the development of rapport with some people. On the other hand, I also inherited the hostile, distant, and less-than-friendly relationships of my in-laws; thus, my kinship and affinal ties both opened up and closed off intimate relations with people. Nevertheless, I tried to develop relationships with many others in contexts outside of the urban neighborhood (*kampung*) where we resided. I made detailed observations of government and palace-organized ceremonies, celebrations and rituals, cultural and/or religious associations', small groups', healer's and individual's rituals, popular cultural arts, and a new religious movement's artistic "revival" sessions. I also conducted hundreds of interviews and discussions with people from various walks of life, including palace officials, government civil servants, students, workers, vendors, teachers, cultural artists, religious scholars, neighborhood residents, villagers and religious movement followers and elders. In addition to ethnographic observations and interviews, I also collected and analyzed organizational documents, newspaper articles, and Indonesian scholarly texts. I made a brief return visit to Jakarta, the national capital, in 2006 and met with and interviewed several members of NGOs and leaders of national Muslim organizations and political parties. I also had an opportunity to observe the monthly *Maiyah* event, *Kenduri Cinta*, in Jakarta.

Throughout my periods of research in Java, I negotiated several identity relationships with people which shaped my experiences in the field, including processes of data collection. My wife's friends and relatives and others at-large related to me as a "foreigner", "African", "American", and fellow "Muslim." When I told local people that were not familiar with me that I was an "American researcher" they would often interrogate the "American" category perceiving incongruence between the dark-skinned person before them and their idea of a prototypical "American." Some would tell me that I was from some African nation and others would add "South" to "American," imaging a place where there are more non-white people. After I insisted upon my "American" identity, many would ask

where my family was from before moving to America. When I told them "Africa," their curiosity was often satisfied, but some people, especially middle-aged adults and elders, would then conclude that I was a "Negro," a common category in local history books. Many local Javanese perceive "Negroes" and "Africans," much like they do dark-skinned Indonesian ethnic groups such as the "Papuans" of Irian Jaya, to be backwards and uncivilized. I found this prejudice and racism to be widespread, though more of a provincial sort than the entrenched institutionalized kind in the United States.

Unlike the "Papuans," my blackness was inflected by my "American" and "Muslim" identities. Of course, there is a range of friendly and unfriendly feelings about "Americans" in Indonesian communities, but in most cases this category carries associations with modernity and development, much lauded centerpiece concepts of Indonesian postcolonial government projects. But even more than my "American" categorization, my "Muslim" identification facilitated the formation of relationships with a broad range of people, on the streets and in schools, businesses and mosques. I feel that my identity as a Muslim provided me access to experiences, contexts and conversations that would be difficult for non-Muslim Americans to attain. However, my Muslim identity did not protect me, any more than it did my wife, her relatives and other local people from the dangers posed by corrupt officials, thugs, and sorcerers. If anything, my "African" and "American" identities may have made it more dangerous for me. I explore some of these dangers in chapters two and three.

I have attempted to orchestrate these complex and interrelated social identity relationships of kinship, affinity, friendship, locality, race, nationality and religion, while maintaining my critical position as an *involved* researcher and interpreter of cultural performances and perspectives. I feel invested, as I hope the reader does, in the outcome of Indonesian efforts at social and cultural transformation and fashioning a desirable future. As mentioned earlier, I try to enliven a culturally relative posture toward local ideas about "Islamization", "Islamic states", "democracy", "civil society" and so forth, while also assessing courses of social and cultural change.

The second postcolonial government of Indonesia, the New Order regime (1965-1998), produced cultural forms emphasizing nationalist and development ideals. In post-New Order Indonesia, a period of increased openness in which many groups are calling for changes, one could query whether state-organized cultural forms are beginning to be transformed and to carry new meanings and projections of desirable futures. Chapter 1 attempts to answer this question addressing palace and government organized ceremonies, festivals, and celebrations together with dominant notions of Yogyakarta as a city, considering whether they continue to reproduce the New Order conception of "Unity in Diversity" and what meanings they have for regional leaders. I begin to provide ethnographic evidence for a critique of previous approaches to Islamic religious diversity in Java, a matter further developed in the second chapter. It also discusses some diverse local interpretations of these events and projections of desirable futures they entail or

suggest. I assess the connection of these government and palace-organized events to processes of equalization from local to global levels.

Many ethnographers of Java, and to some extent other Muslim regions in Indonesia, suggest that local interpretations of cultural forms and projections of desirable futures can be assigned to broad categories of Muslims. This is the subject of Chapter 2, in which I argue for a more nuanced method of relating Muslim interpretations and projections in relation to religious orientations. This chapter picks up on the issue of Islamic religious diversity, evident in ethnographic description and local interpretations of public cultural forms in Chapter 1, and reconsiders the polar perspectives of Clifford Geertz and Mark Woodward that describe this diversity in terms of syncretism with animism and Hindu-Buddhism or in terms of normative Islamic piety and Sufi variants. It argues that broad ethnographic data suggests a position somewhere in between these two extremes. This chapter also analyzes the difficulty in using the multivalent categories *abangan*, *santri*, *priyayi*, and *kejawen* to describe the spectrum of Islam in Java, and discusses their shifting meanings and contestation in past political contexts and current cultural and political processes. Diverse Indonesian Muslims are shown to produce a broad spectrum of projections of desirable futures with varied uses of "religion" and secular ideas.

Chapter 3 further extends this discussion of religious diversity to an examination of a variety of healers. This chapter emphasizes the cases of five healers associated with the categories of *dukun*, *kyai haji*, and *ustadz*, labels with meanings beyond the domain of healers but indicative here of broad locations on the spectrum of Islam in Java. As Brown (2005 [1989]) points out, it is often difficult separating the benevolent, therapeutic side of the shaman from the "darker" anti-therapeutic side. The same person may be healer and sorcerer. Exploring this ambiguous dimension of local healers, I discuss some of the dangers they pose for locals and foreign ethnographers, and the cultural and political realms in which they operate. The healing performances of a neo-modernist *ustadz* represent an exorcism of the physical, social, and political body of the cosmic disorder fomented by "un-Islamic" practices and beliefs. This chapter demonstrates that while Sufi-oriented and *salafi*-oriented healers and discourses converge in their criticism of traditional Javanese *dukun*, they disagree on the contours of proper Islamic healing and models for Indonesian society.

In Chapter 4, I examine social and ideological conflict surrounding the emergence of Inul Daratista as a national pop star and *dangdut* as the most popular and highly-televised cultural art form. I consider the contrasting images of the nation and futures expressed by Inul's supporters and opponents and what the elevation of *dangdut* means for the post-New Order contest between these different projections of desirable futures. It also addresses the cultural politics of using *dangdut* in the 2004 election and its relevance to processes of equalization.

Muhammadiyah, one of the large Islamic organizations critical of Inul-style *dangdut* performances, has begun to debate taking a new position vis-à-vis local cultural forms in an effort to appeal to more grassroots Muslims. In Chapter 5,

I probe recent debates in the modernist Muhammadiyah quarters over divergent interpretations of local east and south-central Javanese public cultural forms and the concept of "cultural *dakwah*." I consider to what extent the varied positions about "cultural *dakwah*" within Muhammadiyah indicate projections of *syari'ah* directed and inclusive, multicultural futures. It also presents Muhammadiyah researcher's attempts at using a Moroccan philosopher, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri's modes of reasoning to loosen strict *syari'ah*-oriented interpretations of local cultural forms and discusses possible effects of the fuller implementation of this concept on processes of equalization.

Chapter 6 covers modern, professional and student, theatre and the themes they use to produce social and political critiques of Indonesian society. It examines the apparent lack of ideological formation in pre-Reformation Era plays and the convergence of several topics theatre groups frequently address in the current period of change. These theatrical performances are shown to not only model some varied visions for the nation, consistent with particular ideological formations, but also some broad shared visions that traverse these formations.

In Chapter 7, I consider a new Islamic religious movement, the *Maiyah* movement, its history, ideas and practices. I describe how this movement has been able to sustain a strong sense of spontaneity despite several years of expansion, and some degree of code formulation and organizational formation. My cognitive and interpretive description of *Maiyah* movement concepts and practices reveals a fundamentalist-Sufi-radical-democratic movement and its projection of a transformed Indonesia.

Finally, in the concluding chapter, I discuss the diverse futures Indonesian Muslims express through their productions and constructions of the various cultural forms examined in previous chapters. The cultural forms I address in this text by no means represent an exhaustive description of the variety of such forms in south-central Java, much less Indonesia in general. However, my analysis of this limited set of cultural forms has allowed me to explicate a broad range of local and national interpretive frameworks and desirable futures. I also provide a summation of my critical assessments of the effects of these cultural forms and other factors, both internal and external, upon processes of equalization.

Chapter 1
City of Culture, Tourist Objects and Difference as Fetish

In the years since the fall of President Suharto, there has been an incredible opening of spaces for the expression and performance of ideas and feelings for a long time repressed and encapsulated within the New Order ideological format. New Order secular-nationalist political rhetoric entailed models consisting of bundles of interconnected concepts such as *Kesatuan* (unity), *Persatuan* (union), *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (unity in diversity), *Pembangunan* (development), and *Pancasila* (the five principles).[1] There was no shortage of public cultural forms during the New Order period, but the official forms tended to express the dominant ideological formulation of "Unity in Diversity" in which each social unit, usually provinces, were represented by its characteristic *adat* (or customary set of culture-traits) constructing a "mosaic" or "Taman-mini-ization"[2] of Indonesian national identity (see Pemberton 1994; Picard 1996; Hellman 1998, 2003; Daniels 1999). Moreover, local and regional officials used these idealized models of local cultures and corresponding public cultural forms as marketable tourist resources, "tourist objects". The greater openness, freedom of expression and hopeful public discourses reflects the potential for the growth of a more "civil" and "democratic" society, in which the access to resources will be more equitably distributed and utilized. What kinds of performances of cultural arts and ceremonies are being staged in this era and what kinds of ideas are being expressed in such performances? To what extent have new ways of representing diverse local cultures emerged from Reformation era perspectives and discourses? Is the "Taman-mini-ization" of Indonesian culture still embedded within local cultural arts?

---

1 *Pancasila* is the five principles of state: *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa* (belief in one God), *Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* (just and civilized humanitarism), *Persatuan Indonesia* (a united Indonesia), *Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksaan dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan* (democracy led by wisdom through consultation and representation), and *Keadilan sosial* (social justice).

2 *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (Beautiful Indonesia miniature garden) is a government and presidential-sponsored park, located on the outskirts of the capital, Jakarta, which was opened in 1975 during the rule of President Suharto. Indonesian regional and cultural diversity is represented through a series of culture traits such as houses and wedding attire designated as characteristic of each composite unit of the nation. Hellman (2003) gives a detailed description of this park and the New Order ideology it inscribes.

I will attempt to answer these questions through reflecting upon the dominant meanings of Yogyakarta as an urban center and palace- and government-organized public cultural events in the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta (DIY), the city and surrounding districts. I demonstrate that these events still tend to produce and express Javanese identity and *adat*, largely within in the New Order format of "Taman-mini-ization." In the case of the special territory of Yogyakarta, the traditions and customs of the palace, Islamized Hindu-Buddhist culture, often reproduced in district ceremonies, represent the "culture" and customary characteristics of the city and region. Taking account of local interpretations of public cultural forms alongside my own, I assess these events in relation to processes of equalization in local, national and global contexts. Contemporary challenges to the special position of the sultan, in both his sacred and mundane aspects, have led to a heightening of the significance of traditional meanings of the city and grand presentations of palace-centered ceremonies.

Yogyakarta, the Sacred Center of Tradition and Culture

Yogyakarta is the capital city of a special province of the same name, located in the south central part of the island of Java (Map 1.1). As a province, it is composed of one municipality and four primarily agricultural regencies: Bantul, Sleman, Gunungkidul, and Kulonprogo. The 2000 census reported the population of the DIY as 3,109,142 (BPS Statistics Indonesia). Most inhabitants are Javanese, but there are many Chinese dispersed around town living in predominantly Javanese urban neighborhoods and sometimes near their stores in the commercial district. There are also many students from across Indonesia who came to study in the highly regarded Gadjah Mada University or one of many other colleges and universities scattered over the city and outlying regencies. Students, renting rooms in people's houses and dormitories, contribute significantly to the local economy. In fact, due to the plethora of tertiary learning institutions and the large number of students, often crowding the streets with motorcycles, Yogyakarta is often considered a "center of education."

Nevertheless, Yogyakarta, like many other pre-colonial Malaysian and Indonesian cities, found its center in the sultan's palace, royal family living quarters, central squares, and the main mosque rather than the port, marketplace or educational institutions. Evers and Korff (2000, 115-116) note that this pattern is an "Islamized and Malayanized image of the Indian city of ancient Southeast Asia" in which palaces and religious institutions served as "sacred centers" defining the city. These cities, in their Indic or Islamized forms, are microcosms of broader cosmic realities, "exemplary centers" uniting the polity with the cosmos. This pattern holds particularly for the interior cities of central and east Java linked in the past to Hindu and Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms sustained through tax and tribute from surrounding agricultural lands, whereas the port cities of the northern coast, even those with palaces, were centered in the markets and large groups of merchants and traders (Koenjtaraningrat 1975, 20-22; Fryer and Jackson 1977,

Map 1.1 Map of the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta

201-2). In Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Solo), its royal counterpart, a short distance to the north, the sultan's walled palace, royal residences, north and south squares, and main mosque formed the urban core with a traditional market and commercial district nearby, just off from the center.

Evers and Korff (2000) argue that multiple centers, organized around religious, commercial, nationalist, and modernist urban zones, now exist in many Southeast Asian cities. Nowadays, this sacred palace-based center is joined by several other urban centers with their own cultural meanings. In Yogyakarta, a short ways down the road from the northern square of the palace, there are commercial and nationalist centers. This road from the palace becomes the renowned Malioboro

Street, a favorite spot for shoppers, vacationers, and youth. This commercial center includes the traditional market (*Beringharjo*) where people haggle with vendors over prices, along with several shopping malls, stores, banks and hotels. In front of these businesses, on both sides of the street, you find vendors selling crafts, *batik* clothing, T-shirts and numerous other items, and tricycle rickshaw (*becak*) drivers soliciting or delivering passengers. McDonalds, Burgher King, California and Kentucky Fried Chicken shops, Dunkin Donuts and other transnational chains give this commercial center a global flavor. Prostitutes, beggars, and "street children" contest dominant definitions of these spaces in their own way as they go through their daily routine of trying to eke out a living. Between the palace and the heart of the commercial district, we find some buildings with nationalist meanings such as the Great Mansion (*Gedung Agung*), where Indonesian presidents stay when they visit Yogyakarta, and the March 1st Mass Struggle Monument Plaza which commemorates the mass uprising in opposition to Dutch forces attempting to reassert colonial dominion after the Second World War. The Vredeburg Museum and Societet Militer, cultural institutions with exhibits and performances under the control of the military, as well as military and police offices are located nearby. Many of these nationalist buildings were formerly Dutch administrative structures. A little further up Malioboro Street, interspersed with the commercial businesses we find some more buildings with nationalist meanings: the provincial legislature building, the Governor's complex and tourism offices. There are some other government offices and commercial districts distributed about town but none are ensconced within an area with the mass appeal of Malioboro Street with its vendors, traditional market, shopping malls and concentration of youth and foreigners. Indeed, the proximity of this street to the main Yogyakarta palace (Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat), a major tourist attraction, and its frequent use for public spectacles, parades, festivals and the like, make it a magnet for people looking to spend some free time.

Consequently, it has become a major protest center for activist organizations wanting to attract attention getting their message out to lots of people. Prior to the Reformation Era, armed forces of the state blocked off this route to demonstrators, but after Sultan Hamengku Buwono X, the present sultan and governor, "descended" amongst the masses leading a mass demonstration and rally, it was opened to protestors, though not without police and military supervision. Demonstrators tend to stop in front of government buildings such as the provincial legislature, governor's offices, the Great Mansion or in the north courtyard of the palace to hold rallies with bullhorns. Because this is a very busy commercial zone with lots of traffic and people, demonstrations tend to slow everything down, often leading to lots of stress on all sides, with police and military troops forcing demonstrators into one lane or off the main road. These commercial, nationalist, and sacred palace centers are contested spaces, which because of their other meanings are attractive places to stage protests. People also consider Yogyakarta a "center of protest," even a barometer for the political pulse of the nation, and a think-tank for developing movements and leaders.

However, it's not the commercial, nationalist or protest meanings of the city that lay the foundation for its definition in the minds of masses of residents and Indonesian tourists but it is still the palace-based ones. There is a widespread local notion that the palace is the center of "tradition" and "culture," at the very heart of town in the minds of locals. Even when I asked people to show me the spatial center of town on maps, they insisted the center of town was the palace, irregardless of the fact the map indicated otherwise. People's mental maps contain an image of the city with the palace in the center of a line running from the Southern Sea, through the City Monument (*Tugu*), to Mount Merapi. The Southern Sea and Mount Merapi are special spiritual zones inhabited by powerful beings, the Queen of the Southern Sea (*Ratu Kidul* or *Nyai Roro Kidul*) and the King of Mount Merapi (*Sunan Merapi*), that have mystical relations with the Sultan, located in the center of this mental map. In local mythology, each of the rulers of Mataram is married to the Queen of the Southern Sea, after the first of the royal line entered into a pact with her. Therefore, not only is the palace the standard-bearer, representative of the highest most civilized element of Javanese culture and center of perpetuating Javanese traditions, but it is also the center of the cosmos between two powerful poles of mystical forces.

The sultans of the kingdom of Mataram, the last of several highly centralized Islamic kingdoms in the region from which the current sultan descends, were once divine rulers, powerful both politically and mystically. They were reduced to sacred rulers of ceremonies and traditions under Dutch colonial rule. "The modicum of self-rulership that was conceded to them resulted in the paraphernalia, in the folklore of kingship. They became masters of ceremonies presiding over a cultural spectacle (Mulder 1998, 73)." Hamengku Buwono (HB) IX, considered a hero of the Indonesian independence movement, was rewarded with the perpetual Governorship of the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta. This marked the return of the Yogyakarta line of sultans of Mataram to political power, though under the new post-independence nationalist government. HB IX also served as Minister of State for Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs and Vice-President of the country for a time under President Suharto, holding his position as Governor simultaneously. His son, HB X, the current sultan, inherited this position of formal political authority and threw himself into the presidential race of 2004 seeking to be nominated by Golkar, the old government party, but failed to garner sufficient support in other parts of the country to maintain a bid for president. Once again, these sultans are politically powerful divine leaders, "exemplary" centers perpetuating Javanese traditional culture and connecting the polity to the cosmos. However, current national, Reformation policies calling for greater regional autonomy, which has taken on a local form of transferring more control for local regency resources to the regencies themselves, weakens the authority of the sultan-governor. In addition, many political organizations and parties have called for the position of Governor to become an elected position as in other provinces, and modernist Muslim groups continue to argue that beliefs in his divine character are not properly Islamic. In this context, of decreasing sacred

and mundane power, the sultan and his noble relatives and titleholders along with the local government and supporters are calling forth the power of tradition and beliefs emanating from the sacred center to perpetuate a beleaguered traditional ruler in a modern globalizing era.

Traditional Ceremonies, Celebrations and Tourist Objects

The municipal Department of Culture and Tourism, together with other government departments and independent businesses, organized *Pekan Gemilang Yogya*, a week of public festivities, from the 1st through 7th of October, 2003, celebrating the 247th anniversary of Sultan Hamengku Buwono I (Pangeran Mangkubumi) founding and moving into the Yogyakarta Palace. This year was the first time this elaborate celebration took place; in previous years, the government celebrated, on a much smaller-scale during the month of June, the post-independence formation of the municipality of Yogyakarta. The shift in meaning, laying greater stress on the history of the Yogyakarta Palace, was not widely explained to locals who still tended to view it as the "anniversary of the city." Bamboo light posts and lanterns lined many streets and set many neighborhoods aglow, as many locals participated in the government-promoted festival of lights. Commercial sales on Malioboro and Solo streets, a horse-drawn carriage parade, and an exhibition of historical pictures and films of Yogyakarta added to the public presence of this year's celebrations. Yet, the heart of cultural performances rested in the roughly fourteen cultural arts stages arranged in various municipal sub-regency units (*kecamatan*), the innovative *Wayang Kulit* and *Ketoprak* (leather puppet and traditional drama) collaboration in the March 1st Mass Struggle Monument Plaza, and the magnificent pinnacle *Malam Pekan Gemilang Yogya* (Climactic Night of the Week of Illuminating Yogya), on the final night of the celebration in Mandala Krida Stadium.

The cultural arts stages spread across local urban political units featured several musical, dance, and theatrical performances, including *campursari* and *dangdut*, *wayang kulit* (leather puppet shows), *karawitan* (Javanese singing), traditional Javanese dramatic stage performances, and classical Javanese and Balinese dances.[3] Leather puppet shows, gamelan and traditional Javanese singers, and the theatrical and dance performances exhibited the blending of cultural elements from Hindu and Islamic sources, in body movement and speech about "gods and goddesses" (*dewa* and *dewi*), which are still an aspect of religion in Java (see Geertz 1960; cf. Woodward 1989). Similarly, the *wayang kulit* and *ketoprak* (genre of stage plays with historical and mythological themes) collaboration, involving over

3 *Campursari* and *dangdut* are two highly popular cultural forms. *Campursari* was recently developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s through a creative fusion of traditional gamelan instruments with modern drums and electric guitars. *Dangdut* is an older form which emerged from the fusion of Malay music with Indian and Arabic elements. Both of these genres of music will be discussed further in Chapter 4.

one hundred local artists who combined a leather puppet show with a traditional Javanese dramatic art form, enacted a story from the Hindu epic, Mahabharata. Many scholars have argued that the Hindu elements in the Mahabharata and Ramayana epic stories have historically been interpreted within a fundamentally Islamic worldview (see Woodward 1989, 215; Amin 2002, 100). While this is accurate for some of my local interlocutors, for many others these epics and their symbolism still hold Hindu Javanese meanings.

The *Malam Pekan Gemilang Yogya* embodied and expressed the focus laid upon the "Sri Sultan" (His Highness) in this new historically-based event, as Sultan Hamengku Buwono X and his entourage were seated in the center of the stadium and contingents of local citizens arrayed according to local political units stood before him wearing traditional Javanese attire. Gamelan and marching bands performed, but the central attraction was the contingents of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Pakualaman[4] palace guards on foot, horseback, and elephants and the *pusaka* (sacred heirloom), horse-drawn carriages of the palace which rolled in and around the interior of the stadium.[5] This event, with few foreign tourists present, was a magnificently staged expression for locals of the centrality of the increasingly challenged, charismatic leaders of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta. Government civil servants and officials often broadcast the goal of staging events like *Pekan Gemilang Yogya* and customary ceremonies which utilize various cultural arts as a way of "*melestarikan budaya lokal*," perpetuating local culture. Here, as at other times, they are sending the message that perpetuating the centuries-old palace is perpetuating local culture.

Many of the events organized or aided by regency-level Cultural and Tourism departments also entailed a focus upon sacred heirlooms and charismatic figures, although these events held more directly religious meaning, from my analytic perspective, than *Pekan Gemilang Yogya*, incorporating other symbolic elements and actions laden with invocations of supernatural beings and powers and opportunities to affect one's cosmic standing. For instance, the "customary Javanese New Year ceremonies" *Kyai Daruno-Nyai Daruni*, in Kulonprogo, and *Mbah Demang*, in Sleman, involved rituals performed at sacred sites of *pusaka* or processions carrying *pusaka*.[6] Kyai Daruno is believed to be a follower of

4 Pakualaman, ruled by the Paku Alam, is the minor palace in Yogyakarta which broke off from the main palace and was appointed its own separate regency under Dutch colonial rule.

5 *Siraman Pusaka* or Heirloom Cleansing ceremonies are performed both in public and within the closed quarters of the palace in order to maintain the supernatural power of these symbols of royal authority. These rites honor and pay homage to *pusaka* (heirlooms) such as magical daggers, swords, spears, musical instruments and water bowls (Darban et al. 2002, 119).

6 *Kyai* and *Nyai* are high titles of respect for males and females respectively. *Kyai* is also used for inanimate objects and plants that are regarded with high esteem, such as sacred heirlooms and some ancient trees around the palace. These titles are often shortened

Diponegoro, who, fighting the Dutch in the nineteenth century, thrust his spear into the ground, where a shrine has been built in the village. Every year on *Selasa Kliwon* or *Jumat Kliwon*,[7] especially auspicious days in Javanese astrology, during the month of *Suro*—the first month on the Javanese calendar which corresponds, and is often equated, with Muharram on the Islamic calendar—a government-facilitated procession of local villagers winds up at the sacred shrine of Kyai Daruno's spear. They make offerings at the site, sprinkle flowers on top of the spear, and organize a *slametan* or communal feast.

Before guests and residents were served the food of the *slametan*, food rife with symbolic meanings paraded to the site through the village, local residents with traditional Islamic training led and performed religious recitation, chants and singing. *Tahlilan*, recitation of several verses from the Holy Qur'an and prayers were made for the well-being of the community, a major concern of many Javanese New Year events, and *selawatan al-berzanzi*, traditional Javanese chanting of praises to Allah and Prophet Muhammad, and *kasidahan*, traditional religious singing accompanied by hand drums, were performed during the heart of the ceremonies. Later in the afternoon, *jathilan*, a popular form of dancing to Javanese rhythms, often with leather horse props (*kuda kepang*), was staged with dancers going into trance and performing all sorts of spell-bounding actions. Few of the local villagers attended the *tahlilan, selawatan* and *kasidahan*, but they amassed in large numbers reveling in the exciting actions of the *jathilan* dancers in trance opening young coconuts with their bare teeth and climbing trees.

Similarly, people carried sacred heirlooms of *Mbah Demang* in a procession and congregated at a sacred well to collect water to bathe in for the New Year. According to some local beliefs, Mbah Demang, an influential *kyai* during Dutch colonial times, made this well with his sacred spear and bathed in the water obtaining supernatural powers to help people. A large group of *jathilan* dancers with horse props and torches led the procession of Paku Alam palace guards, sacred heirlooms, *kendi ijo* (green clay pitchers containing sacred water), and a *gunungan* (a conical structure composed of vegetable products on this occasion) to its final destination where thousands of local people crowded on the sides of the road. After official ceremonies, people scrambled to *ngalap berkah*, obtaining blessings from grabbing goods off the *gunungan* and securing rice and money thrown out to the masses.

These two "customary ceremonies" are performed annually during the month of *Suro*, like many others in DIY and Central Java, for "peace, tranquility, health, and economic wellbeing" out of apprehension (*keprihatinan*) over getting rid of bad fortune and bringing in the good, according to traditional Javanese beliefs—"*kejawen*" or Javanism—adhered to by many local Muslims, Catholics, and

---

into the forms *Kyi* and *Ki and Nyi* and *Ni*. *Ki* and *Ni* are also used for unmarried persons. *Mbah* is a title of respect for a leader or champion of a cause.

7 *Selasa Kliwon* and *Jumat Kliwon* are the conjunctions of Tuesday and Friday on a seven-day calendar with *Kliwon* on a five-day Javanese calendar.

Protestants. On the eve of the first day of *Suro*, "*malam satu Suro*," there was a flurry of ritual activity in the region. At the foot of Mount Merapi, *Festival Suran* Kaliurang[8] organized by the Department of Cultural and Tourism along with a local multi-religious Javanese cultural organization (Paguyuban Memetri Budaya Panghesti Jawi), a day of ritual offerings at sacred sources of water, cultural arts such as *karawitan, wayang kulit*, and *jathilan,* and free alternative medicine was capped off with a procession of *gunungan*, *tumpeng* (a conical mound of rice), and several *pusaka* carried by members of the cultural organization who purified themselves with the sacred water from several sources. At the southern beach, Parangkusumo, the government Department of Culture and Tourism, staged a *ruwatan* ceremony to *buang sial*, getting rid of problems and bad fortune, along with *wayang kulit* and *campursari*. In Kulonprogo, following a procession with a *tumpeng* and some *pusaka* of Sultan HB IX and Kyai Manggolo Murti, the *bupati* and other government officials led a contingent visiting and praying at the *keramat*[9] gravesite of Nyi Ageng Serang, before taking a purifying plunge into Pemandian Clereng (KR 24 February 2004; KR 23 February 2004).

Meanwhile, at the Yogyakarta Palace, hundreds of people participated in the *Mubeng Beteng*, a silent march around the sacred fortifications of the palace led by Gusti Murdokusumo, a relative of the current sultan. Participants *puasa bicara* or take a fast from talking, making their own silent prayers, out of apprehension of the start of the Javanese new year. The Surakarta Palace performed its procession of sacred heirlooms followed by thousands of people who scrambled to *ngalap berkah* collecting the feces of seven white bulls which they believe will bring them blessings (KR 23 February 2004). During the month of *Suro*, there were several *Sedekah Laut* or *Labuhan* ceremonies in Gunungkidul and Bantul, organized by departments of government, OHD, a multi-religious Javanese cultural organization, and fisherman associations, in which prayers were made to *Tuhan* (The Lord, God) and *sesaji* or offerings were made to the Queen of the Southern Sea, requesting her help (KR 9 March 2004; KR 25 February 2004; KR 21 February 2004). These rites resemble the customary *Labuhan* performed by the Surakarta and Yogyakarta

8 Kaliurang is one of the main tourist destinations located at the foot of Mount Merapi.

9 The Malay word *keramat* is derived from the Arabic word *karāmat*, plural form of *karāmat*. *Karamat* refers to miracles that God works through a saint or allows to happen to him in popular Islamic beliefs in many societies (Hans Wehr 1994). For *karāmat* ascribed to some of the leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate of West Africa see Murray Last (1967) and H.A.S. Johnston (1967). In local Javanese usage, *keramat* refers to people, places and objects with special or supernatural powers. The practice of visiting *keramat* graves (*ziarah*) is discussed further in Chapter 2. Chambert-Loir (2002, 138-9) points out that many pre-Islamic sacred sites, such as stones near pools of water, have been assimilated into sites associated with Muslim saint's graves as part of the ongoing process of Islamization. This process may be at work with many of the sacred water sources mentioned here that are now associated with Muslim saints. Nyi Ageng Serang is a legendary queen of Mataram who sent Muslim forces to fight the Portuguese invaders in Melaka.

Figure 1.1 Javanese Muslims making offerings at sacred Cepuri site

palaces each year in which people attempt to *ngalap berkah*, hustling to grab the flowers, food and clothes tossed into the sea, interpreting "what comes back" as blessings returned from the Queen of the Southern Sea.

In addition to these organized events, many locals performed their individual rites alone or in small groups at *keramat* places believed to have special powers, such as gravesites of kings in Kota Gede, Imogiri, and Kediri, and places associated with kings, such as Cepuri near the Parangkusumo beach (see Figure 1.1), where people believe Panembahan Senopati, the first king of Mataram Islam, met the Queen of the Southern Sea while meditating entering into a pact with her.[10] This flurry of *Suran* activities reflects the widespread presence and continued significance of the mixture of Islamic and pre-Islamic Javanese beliefs and practices (see also *Ghoib* 2004, 21-27).

Similarly, the Yogyakarta Palace performs *Gerebeg* ceremonies on the occasion of three highly significant Islamic holidays, *Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha*, celebrations following the month of fasting and the climax of the Hajj respectively, and Prophet Muhammad's birthday, deploying a combination of Islamic and traditional Javanese

10 This myth embeds the Javanese pre-Islamic belief in founding ancestors (*cikal bakal*) who are exceptional human beings capable of contending with supernatural forces, such as local guardian spirits or spirit-owners of the land, and making alliances with them (see Chambert-Loir 2002, 140).

symbols. Prior to the main day of ceremonies of the two larger *Gerebeg*, *Gerebeg Besar* and *Gerebeg Mulud,* palace servants perform a ritual called *numplak wajik* in which a yellow substance, *konyoh*, a concoction made of ground rice and varieties of galingale and turmeric, is poured on a large mound of sticky rice before being distributed to spectators who rub it on their faces and necks. *Konyoh* is believed to preserve youth and provide protection against troubling spirits (Edi Sunaryo 1997, 71). During each of the *Gerebeg* ceremonies offerings are made and a procession of palace guards and officials and *gunungan* (see Figure 1.2) move through the palace and northern courtyard to Masjid Agung Kauman where palace religious officials (*penghulu*)[11] try to make prayers over the *gunungan* before the masses tear them apart struggling to grab as much of them as they can obtaining the magical powers (*ngalap berkah*) transported from the palace to improve their lives.

From 26-29 September, 2004, capping off a year full of traditional ceremonies, provincial, municipal, regency and palace representatives staged an elaborate celebration, Festival Kraton Nusantara IV, in which over forty palaces from all over the archipelago took part. On the first day of this festival, palace guards representing these past kingdoms paraded around the fortifications of the Yogyakarta palace, and on the final day, contingents from the city and outlying regencies—paraded down Malioboro Street finishing in the northern palace square—carrying symbols of each of their traditional ceremonies. For instance, a group representing the city presented a tradition telling the story of the Pajang Kingdom moving to Mataram Kotagede, and the Sleman contingent presented the *Bekakak* traditional ceremony, and from Bantul, *Rebo Pungkasan*, and from Gunungkidul, a large statue of the Queen of the South Ocean and *Sedekah Laut* offerings, and from Kulonprogo, *Bersih Desa* and *Pusaka* ceremonies.[12] There were sacred heirlooms, *gunungan*, colorful traditional Javanese clothing, and cultural arts galore. Local organizers and traditional Muslim leaders trumpeted the significance of these grand festivities as perpetuating local culture and identity in the face of globalization. Moreover, a well-known professor and advisor to the main Yogyakarta Palace told me that this festival is part of a larger campaign aimed at making the Sultan of Yogyakarta and

11 The palace guards and religious and administrative officials are some of the groups of *abdi dalem* or court servants of various ranks. Some court servants are also civil servants with jobs in government offices. Other court servants try to make a living through a variety of means, including driving *becak* (tricycle rickshaws) and selling palace or Yogyakarta souvenirs to tourists or having other family members operate small businesses. All of the court servants I have spoken with take great pride in being able to serve in the palace and look for *barokah* (blessings) from the palace rather than money.

12 *Bekakak* and *Rebo Pungkasan* are traditional ceremonies with processions of *gunungan* performed in Gamping, Sleman, Yogyakarta and Wonokromo, Bantul, Yogyakarta respectively. *Bekakak* also features a ritual sacrifice of human-like dolls. Government civil servants and locals organize these events during the month of Sapar on the Javanese calendar during which many locals are especially *prihatin* or apprehensive of cosmic dangers. *Bersih Desa* ceremonies to purify or exorcise local areas and ask for blessings are performed in many villages in Kulonprogo and other parts of the region.

Figure 1.2 Palace servants carrying *gunungan* during *Gerebeg*

his palace the center of the southern hemisphere bringing peace, tranquility, and a spiritual revolution to the world.[13]

The culture and tourism and palace office's schedule of events include numerous activities which incorporate symbolic elements that possess a blended quality embodying mystical, magical and traditional Islamic worldviews. If we consider this small sample, we can note several symbolic patterns and the cognitive structures they constitute. Many of them entail a focus upon *pusaka* and other *keramat*, places and objects which have supernatural powers, such as gravesites, spears, rocks or fields where ruler's sat in meditation, water sources, and palace fortifications. Participants hope to acquire some of the magical essence and power from these *keramat* which evoke numerous meanings, including past Javanese kingdoms, spiritual entities, legendary leaders and charismatic heroes, and the centrality of the palace. These powers are often thought to originate, or at least flow through, kings, royalty, and other charismatic individuals and spiritual entities. *Konyoh, kendhi ijo* and the sacred water these vessels contain are symbols of youth, purity, and safety. *Gunungan* and *tumpengan*, mounds of food and rice, are also polysemous symbols which evoke life, happiness, welfare, prayers of being under Allah's protection, and *Tauhid*, the Islamic monotheistic conception

13 The Festival Kraton Nusantara IV and most of these traditional ceremonies still revolve around what Mitsuo Nakamura (1983, 25) called the "cult of royal glorification."

of the oneness of God. *Gunungan, tumpengan, konyoh, kendhi ijo, pusaka* and other *keramat* are mediating units between supernatural or superhuman beings, such as *Ratu Kidul*, the sultans of Mataram, legendary folk heroes and ancestors, and ordinary human beings. Taken together, in their structural relationships, these units constitute a mental representation in which people can affect their "cosmic standing," *ngalap berkah*, *buang sial*, obtaining blessings of good health and material wellbeing from mediating categories carrying powers transmitted from supernatural and superhuman sources. Of course, when combined with Islamic cosmology, this mental representation incorporates Allah as the original source of these powers delegated to spiritual entities and special humans (cf. Woodward 1989). This mental representation indicates a convergence of many Islamic variants in central Java (see Chapter 2).

Indeed, these "customary ceremonies" exhibit a complex fusion of cosmologies and methods of ritual communication from Islamic and pre-Islamic sources which together constitute part of the spectrum of Javanese Islam (cf. Geertz 1960; Woodward 1989; Muhaimin 2006). Belief in dynamic sources of power, contained in objects and places, capable of being transmitted and obtained through ritual practices and beliefs in powerful ancestral spirits and spirits of water sources indicate pre-Islamic power- and spirit-based cosmologies. Although many locals, under the influence of Islamic cosmology, interpret *Ratu Kidul* to be jinn, some people consider her to be a *dewi* or goddess with a counterpart *dewa* of Mount Merapi, indicating a continuing mix with non-Islamized Hindu cosmology (cf. Woodward 1989, 220). Woodward construes Javanese literary figures, during the period of transition from Hinduism to Islam, as using Hindu mythological characters to deliver mystical Sufi messages. Similar to Woodward, Muhaimin (2006, 273), an Indonesian scholar, concludes that "Traditional Islam" has completed the removal and replacement of all other religious elements contrary to Islamic monotheism. Nevertheless, many of my urban and rural interlocutors, unlike palace intellectuals, consider these characters to be gods, goddesses or other supernatural beings. *Dewi* and *dewa* do not evoke Sufi notions for them, and practices of making offerings asking supernatural beings and sacred objects for help, and beliefs that such rituals are efficacious, has not been completely replaced with Islamic monotheism and traditional Islamic orthopraxy. On the other hand, many of their beliefs and practices are Islamic and they identify as Muslims (see also Chamim et al. 2003, 15).

My ethnographic data indicate that there is a range of mixtures of Islamic methods of ritual communication with Allah, prayers, *zikir* (Ar. Dhikr) and *selawat* (Ar. Salawat), with *sesajen* or offerings of flowers, food, clothes, and incense, and *semedi* (meditation) and (*ber)tapa* (asceticism) from Hindu and Buddhist cultural streams. Out of this complex assortment of ritual practices, local people point out that *sesajen* stems from the Hindu past in Java. Many say offerings are part of Javanese "tradition" and "culture" or that they are *kejawen*, a mix of Hinduism and Islam. Contrary to Woodward's interpretation of Islamized Hindu elements, locals, practitioners and critics, viewed offerings as the Hindu or pre-Islamic traditional

contribution to this blend. Moreover, the teachers and students at traditional Islamic schools, key centers of Sufism, do not practice *sesajen* and are quite critical of such practices. With meditation and asceticism there appears to be a much deeper fusion between Javanese Hindu and Islamic mysticism. Some Javanese Sufis sit or walk in silent "meditation" on the names of Allah or parts of the Arabic character for Muhammad and some perform extensive ascetic practices, including a variety of fasts that are not directly based in Islamic sources. On the other hand, under the influence of the contemporary Islamic revival, many local Sufis are drawing a sharper distinction between "proper" Islamic mystical practices and those with a tinge of Hinduism or Buddhism.

In terms of the dimension of religious knowledge encompassing social hierarchy, we can also note a combination of notions from an Islamic perspective of the rulers of Mataram as *sunan*,[14] sultans and caliphs of Allah, with the Hindu-Buddhist concept of the ruler as a "sacred center" and his kingdom as a microcosm of the cosmos. The Islamic conceptions in this mix have been flavored historically with Sufi mysticism projecting the "Sri Sultan" as closer or unified with Allah and in possession of divine inspiration and magical power (*wahyu*), which in many respects resembles Hindu and Buddhist conceptions of the ruler as one of the Hindu Gods (*devaraja*) or modeled on Buddha (see Lehman 2003; Woodward 1989; Reid 1993, 106). Moreover, the "Sri Sultan," like the Malay *raja*, was surrounded with "Brahmin-like" religious officials who advised him on implementing the law of the land (Shamsul A.B. 2005, 108).[15] However, the position of the ruler appears to be much more Islamized along Sufi mystical lines than the elements of cosmology and ritual communication considered above. Indeed, the notion of charismatic and supernaturally-gifted leaders is alive and strong amongst Sufi-oriented traditional Muslims. These religious notions have solidified and legitimated the position of Javanese sultans on top of the social hierarchy during the reign of their kingdoms and still contribute to the authority of the sultans within the postcolonial Republic of Indonesia, with the Yogyakarta Sultan and Paku Alam routinely appointed as Governor and Vice-Governor of the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta without going through an electoral process. Although some local people disagree with the representations embodied in palace and government-organized cultural forms, these events model a future for Indonesian society ruled by charismatic leaders or those like former president Suharto who can tap into sources of supernatural power. Moreover, they model a "*Pancasila* democracy," a secular-nationalist plurality in which Indonesians are connected through having their "customs" elevated over their "religions."

14 *Sunan* is a shortened form of the regal title *Susuhunan* and an elevated title used for some Muslim saints and some early Muslim preachers in Java.

15 Azra (2005, 7) notes that the Abbasid Sunni Muslim rulers adopted the absolutism of Persian political culture declaring their selves as the shadow of God on earth (*zill Allah fi al-ard*).

Some Local Perspectives on Traditional Ceremonies

My observations of local practices and structured interviews and discussions with, workers, students, retired elders, civil and palace servants, and others have indicated that "*kejawen*" or traditional Javanese beliefs are widespread in Yogyakarta and the outlying regencies of DIY. However, "belief" here does not infer any unique psychological state, an all or nothing assumption of total commitment or rejection of religious knowledge (Lehman 1994). Believers have varying degrees of commitment and conviction in religious knowledge. Many are fervent believers and practitioners. Many other local people who do not participate in "*kejawen*" practices still are committed to some extent to the underlying beliefs, sometimes out of fear that if they disavow these beliefs about *Ratu Kidul* or *Sri Sultan* for instance, some misfortune will fall upon them. Some have told me that they do not know what kind of being *Ratu Kidul* is, but she surely must exist, *something* must be out there in the south sea. Others believe that the myths about her and the sultans are mere "fairy tales" and many other traditional beliefs are just "superstitions."

Many of these disbelievers categorize "*kejawen*" beliefs and rituals as *kepercayaan* (customary, non-religious belief), distancing it from *agama* (religion) and moving it into the larger category of *budaya* (culture). In local discourse, echoing New Order cultural politics (see Hellman 2003, 13-30) *budaya* includes tradition and customary beliefs and practices inherited from one's ancestors, whereas *agama* is an organized system of beliefs with a basis in authoritative written sources. Labeling these religious beliefs as *kepercayaan,* moving it into the local category *budaya*, has the effect of lowering the state of cognitive dissonance between beliefs and behaviors that contradict other, perhaps more strongly held, religious convictions. For instance, the belief that one should only worship and go to Allah for help is in contradiction to the "*kejawen*" practice of looking to *Ratu Kidul* and *keramat* for assistance with life's many problems. The dissonance between these cognitive elements is lowered through viewing the latter practices and underlying beliefs as *Beliefs* that are only part of a "customary system" and not of a "religious" nature. One can still consider one's friends and relatives as Muslims even though they perform acts which are not consistent with one's understandings of Islam because "religious" meaning is denied for these acts (see also Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002, *xxv*). For other "*kejawen*" disbelievers this mode of lowering cognitive dissonance accomplishes little, because they are more critical of these practices, considering them as *syirik* (Ar. Shirk; making partners with Allah) and *musyrik* (polytheism). Indeed, one local Bu Hajja (title for an adult woman who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca) called the "culture" of Yogya "*budaya syirik*," and some students expressed the same highly condemning position in regard to local traditional practices. This is the typical position of more normative, modernist-oriented Muslims, whereas traditionalist-oriented Muslims tend to be more accommodating to local mixtures of "culture"' and "religion." These normative interpretations suggest projections of a more Islamized

Indonesian society, both with and without the national secular ideology, *Pancasila*. Furthermore, some local followers of traditionalist Muslim teachers and leaders consider "secularism" as allowing the mixture of "culture" and "religion" and not emphasizing "religion" over "culture" to the extent that it will remove "culture." Perhaps this stance partially accounts for the perception of Indonesia's Muslim majority as "moderate" or "liberal Muslims." These interpretations tend to lay greater stress upon a diverse secular projection of desirable futures consistent with the national secular ideology, although many traditionalist Muslim organizations actively strive to Islamize Indonesian society. On the other hand, followers of modernist Muslim intellectuals consider "secularism" to be the rational separation of "culture" from "religion" so that all "customary practices" will be devoid of religious meaning while "religious practices" would be interpreted as soundly based in textual sources. They envision that implementation of this approach would clear the path for an Indonesian society guided by a rational application of Islamic principles.

For many activist-oriented Muslim students, who appeared to be "lay anthropologists," "culture" and "religion" are tools that the elites use to serve their interests. They considered events such as *Pekan Gemilang Yogya*, *Gerebeg*, and *Labuhan* as providing support for the perpetuation of traditional institutions and relationships that have roots in Java's feudal past, and being opposed to the development of "democracy" in which leaders of DIY would be elected by, and accountable to, the people. These interpretations entail a radical socially transformed future for Indonesia, along the lines of Neo-Marxism or Islamic liberation theology or a combination of both. Indeed, we need to take these perspectives further considering relationships of these meanings and practices to structures of inequality and processes of equalization.

Traditional Ceremonies, Sacred Center, and Equalization

Local traditional beliefs and practices, holding deep symbolic and cognitive meanings and serving many other purposes, also reinforce structures of inequality, local, national and global. The almost completely local audience at these events is socialized with notions emphasizing the divine nature of the palaces and the aristocratic elites who own them and other large tracts of local land (cf. Geertz 1960, 6; Woodward 1989, 150). People are consistently reminded of the central importance of the palaces and their rulers to this ancient city and to the perpetuation of Javanese "high culture," as these rulers are increasingly challenged by calls for decentralization, gubernatorial elections, and the rationalization of Islamic beliefs and practices. Conservative "*priyayi*" intellectuals also give speeches and write articles in local newspapers arguing against any changes in the special status of Yogyakarta and its manner of selecting its governor and vice-governor. Although many villagers and residents of urban neighborhoods, including many highly educated people, support the status quo, growing numbers of students, Islamic activists, and "modern" educated residents desire change in the direction of free

elections for these political positions. Nevertheless, the struggle to bring this power to the people is an uphill one pitted against the steep opposition of traditional values and beliefs, embedded and reproduced in government and palace organized events that legitimize current political structures and procedures.[16]

In addition, these events contribute to the discourse of Yogya as a "cultural center," in which cultural assets, especially the more exotic, elaborate traditional ceremonies, are valued as "objects" and "assets" to develop tourism and businesses, small and large, linked to tourism (cf. Ferzacca 2001, 199). This discourse fixes Yogya as a "cultural" and not an economic "industrial" center justifying the continuation of the lowest wage scale in all of Indonesia. Workers in comparable industries in Semarang, a more highly industrialized city in north central Java, make much higher salaries. Many workers in businesses on Malioboro Street are making the regional minimum wage of 365, 000 *rupiah* or around 40-50 dollars per month, working ten to twelve hours per day with only one or two days off per month.[17] While many court and aristocratic elites who own factories and businesses linked to tourism, like hotels and craft shops, benefit materially from this arrangement, common people find it hard to survive and meet the material needs of their families.

Moreover, the stress laid on mystical and magical powers, produces a mystification of worldly social problems in which some poor people view the sources of *berkah* (or *barokah*; Ar. Barakah) as residing on top of the social hierarchy and believe that for them to improve their lives they need to *ngalap berkah*. These traditional ceremonies reinforce the belief in the power of mediating substances infused with beneficial powers and blessings to change the material conditions of life. People obtain and try to use these substances on or near their homes, businesses, and persons to deal with very real human problems such as a lack of needed financial resources, joblessness and poor health, problems linked to poverty and their low socio-economic positions. However, they are encouraged in these practices by wealthy and influential officials who also frequent sacred sites such as ancient graves seeking blessings and powers to reach their objectives (see Chambert-Loir and Reid 2002, *xv*). Even if participation in these events fail to bring the material ends hoped for some interpret that they have attained inner peace, happiness and tranquility which is more important than material goods. Indeed, the grip of traditional Javanese philosophy which stresses harmony, hierarchy, and submission to a preordained order of existence remains strong despite many struggles to break loose from it (see Mulder 1998).

16 However, we should not assume that Javanist practices throughout Java revolve around the palaces; many researchers have demonstrated that Javanists in East Java were culturally and politically removed from the palaces of south-central Java (Hatley et al. 1984; Hefner 1987; Beatty 1999).

17 The exchange rate during my fieldwork period was approximately 8700 RI per 1 USD.

The emphasis on "Javanism" and customary ceremonies buttresses "Java-centrism" and the hegemony of nationalist "*priyayi*" on local and national levels, while also extending unofficial recognition to the "religion" of many common people; official recognition having been denied to Javanist sects in 1979.[18] That is, "Javanism," involving the use of Javanese dress, language and "traditional" practices as markers for the production of a Javanese identity schema, represents the majority component in the dominant image of the Indonesian nation. As demonstrated above, many of the government and Javanese associations' events stress the perpetuation of Javanese "culture" and the heritage of classical Javanese empires. However, it should be noted that in recent years, under the influence of Reformation era policies aimed at being more inclusive towards Chinese citizens, the provincial government has recognized and participated in *Peh Cun*, a local Chinese festival with religious and historical significance for the Chinese community. The sultan and governor, HB X, attended this festival in June, 2004 giving a speech lauding the principles of inclusiveness and multiculturalism and criticizing former policies that discriminated against Chinese which he argued were inherited from the colonial era (see also Sri Sultan HB X 2003, 19-23, 41-5).[19] Nevertheless, this festival is submerged within a sea of traditional Javanese events. Stressing traditional practices which Javanese of various religious backgrounds can participate in and embrace serves to heighten the position of Javanese in the

18 During the 1970s, several Javanist groups formed organizations lobbying for formal recognition as one of the official "religions" of Indonesia. Such state recognition would allow Javanist believers to have this "religion" appear on national identity cards and to have their interests addressed by their own department of government. It would also exempt them, many hoped, from being labeled and treated as "heretics" within the Muslim community. However, in 1979, the New Order government denied their claims moving from initially declaring these forms of religion as unpatriotic and dangerous for society, to forming a department of "Kepercayaan" or "Customary Belief" under the Ministry of Education and Culture rather than Religion (Emmerson 1981, 165; Mulder 1998, 25). The government interpreted Javanist groups, like many other *adat* or traditional religious groups across Indonesia, as not fulfilling the state's formal definition of "religion," which requires a monotheistic foundation, a sacred book, and universality beyond ethnic group boundaries (Bowen 2008; Aragon 2000; Kipp and Rodgers 1987). In contrast, the following year a non-Islamic local religion of Ngaju Dayaks of Central Kalimantan called *Kaharingan* was officially recognized as part of the Hindu "religion" joining national administrative structures led by Balinese Hindus (see Schiller 1997). This was not to be the fate for Javanism or any other syncretistic religious systems formed through the mixture of Islam with local beliefs and practices.

19 Chang-Yau Hoon (2008, 28-48), focusing upon articulations of Chinese identities in post-Suharto Indonesia, notes Dutch "divide-and-rule" colonial policies eliminated Chinese assimilation into local society and New Order post-colonial policies repressed and imposed a constructed Chineseness as the ethnic "Other" to the valorized *pribumi* (indigenous) identity. The *Peh Cun* festival entailed expressions of hybrid Javanese and Chinese identities with many Javanese and Chinese performing lion and dragon dances together and with the incorporation of *ngalap berkah* elements into festival events.

national ethnic hierarchy. This representation of a particular type of Javanese culture, the court tradition, has been a major pillar of nationalist histories taught in schools and enacted in a variety of cultural performances (see Hatley 1993).

Moreover, the focus on *adat, budaya* and *kepercayaan* alongside a "pluralistic" *agama* or civil religion reinforces the national ideology of *Pancasila* which stresses an overarching belief in *Tuhan* that encompasses multiple religions. While embracing religion in this way, this ideology rejects the use of *agama* as a national ideology (see Adnan 1992). Thus, state "*kejawen*" events reinforce the continued hegemony of nationalist "*priyayi*" who have been able to maintain their supremacy even through the period of *Reformasi*, given the way this ideology constructs a bulwark against religious parties. Furthermore, many basic aspects of traditional Javanese philosophy such as familism, collectivism, unity and integrity, reverence for, and fusion with, hierarchical superiors, and the exaltation of tranquil harmony are replicated in the fundamental teachings of Pancasila ideology (Mulder 1998, 99-119). Sri Sultan HB X (2003, 46-55) recommends that many elements of Javanese philosophy be used in business management and political leadership integrating them with "modern" forms that conform to the demands of global capitalism. The palaces of central Java are not only the symbolic center of Yogyakarta and Solo, but they are also symbolic centers for the nation.

Finally, on a global plane, the utilization of "*kejawen*" activities as "tourist objects" marketable to Indonesians and foreigners commercializes particular local cultural assets facilitating the continued integration of Indonesia into the global capitalist system. Indeed, these events represent a position on the part of the government and palaces to accommodate capitalism striving to "develop" and "modernize" Indonesia. This process brings benefits to the elite marketers of "tourist objects" fetishizing cultural difference as a tool to attract visitors to witness the magnificent spectacles of local cultural assets, selected carefully so as not to emphasize "agama" or substantive qualities of cultures across Indonesia. Indonesia is brought into the world market through these events with "cultural difference" as a commercial commodity. This represents a peculiar form of integration into the global system in which more substantive cultural differences, say in terms of economic and political principles are foregone, accommodating the flow of models from the U.S. and other "western countries."

"Cultural difference" is stressed in these events as they are used as tokens and vehicles for expressing the value of maintaining local cultures in the face of global hegemony of the wealthy nations on top of the global hierarchy. These cultural resources had been used in a similar fashion responding to the dynamic changes and contradictions wrought by the modernity of late colonial society (Mulder 1998, 71-7). This is clearly not a form of cultural resistance as the more substantive areas of culture are accommodated, even assimilated, and these cultural forms are used as commodities, offering exotic differences, in the market place. However, today, unlike the cultural productivity of the late colonial period, these resources are being used to prop palace rulers increasingly viewed as outdated by people in a

diverse nation-state seeking ethnic and national identities and a more inclusive form of representation in the throes of globalization.

Chapter 2
Locating "Islam" Between Thin Veneer and Normative Piety

My description of the multiplicity of meanings and interpretations of symbols and activities associated with government and palace-organized public cultural forms indicates diverse Javanese religious orientations. Even active participants in Javanese New Years ceremonies such as those commemorating *Mbah Demang* and *Kyai Daruno-Nyai Daruni* draw upon a range of cultural resources. Palace officials and rural and urban *kejawen* worshippers utilize many partially Islamized Hindu-Buddhist and animist resources while Islamic boarding school graduates, performing *tahlilan* and cultural arts, apply resources rooted in the normative Sufi history of Java. Meanwhile, many non-participating local commentators utilize reformist ideas critical of magical and mystical traditions. Where do we locate "Islam" in this diverse spectrum of religious orientations of Java, and what is the relationship of these orientations to projections of desirable futures? These are the questions I seek to answer in this chapter.

Colonial administrators, European visitors, anthropologists and other outsiders have often located "real Islam" amongst a small minority of Javanese, those categorized as the "pious" believers, while viewing the majority as nominal Muslims. This perspective began to weaken in pre-World War II Dutch scholarship only to be reinvigorated by a prominent American anthropologist. In recent years scholars have considered a broader view of Islamic variants and processes of localizing this universal religion. Moreover, local Indonesians of various social backgrounds have contested locating Islam and the "real Muslims" with those of particular religious orientations. I consider some outsider and insider perspectives following a brief overview of the history of Islam in Java. I will present some additional ethnographic examples as well as reflect more deeply upon some in the previous chapter noting the diverse ways people perform and interpret these events. I also turn to analyzing the bases of complexity in these examples, in particular, the fact that the cultural categories labeling local variants have multiple and contested meanings and that there is a complex continuum of interpretations, practices, and variants of Islam in Java (see also Chambert-Loir 2002, 133; cf. Woodward 1989, 218). I demonstrate that applying fuzzy cultural categories to a fuzzy range of mixtures presents ongoing difficulties for locating "Islam" and its variants.

Finally, I consider the other question noted above, that of how to relate various religious orientations to political and ideological positions and projections. Outsiders and insiders have tended and continue to associate particular ideological

positions with categories of people based on religious orientations. I demonstrate that it is important to acknowledge the cultural resources of those of certain religious orientations so as to analyze how people manipulate them to formulate desirable futures; nevertheless, people of different orientations taking different routes come to similar positions on desirable futures. I also discuss the significance of locating "Islam" to processes of equalization.

Localizing Islam Amidst a Plural Array

By the time Majapahit, the last of the great Hindu kingdoms of Java, fell towards the beginning of the sixteenth century, the process of Islamization had been underway in the region for over two hundred years (Koentjaraningrat 1975, 20; Ricklefs 1974, 1-4; Reid 1993b, 173-86, 2000, 15-38). Demak, centered near the northern coast along the trade routes, was apparently the first Islamic kingdom in Java arising during the first half of the sixteenth century. Coastal urban trade emporiums throughout the region were becoming important centers for the spread of Islam—in both normative piety and mystical forms—which gradually penetrated the inland territories. In Java, these interior zones were for several centuries the location of Hindu and Hindu-Buddhist states that effected a popular merging of Hindu-Buddhist religion with local traditional religion. Local complexes of death rituals, ancestral worship, and beliefs in pervasive spirits and impersonal powers were combined by residents of these inland areas with Hindu-Buddhist mysticism, worship of deities, and the notion of a god-king possessing supernatural powers and refined manners. Mataram and other Islamic polities that emerged in the interior, in turn, merged Islamic beliefs and practices with pre-existing "animist"-Hindu-Buddhist syncretism. Many scholars speculate that it was the Sufi mystical form of Islam brought by Sufi orders (*tarekat*) and teachers into central Java that made it more acceptable to interior elites and commoners (see Geertz 1968; Ricklefs 2002, 1974, 7, 1981, 10; Reid 1993a, 83-107, 1993b, 173, 2000,19). Local people merged a range of Islamic legalistic piety and mysticism with already localized combinations of indigenous religion and Hindu-Buddhism. This history of synthesizing and localizing (see Mulder 2000[1996], 8) multiple religious streams, including a range of Islamic orientations, both Hindu and Sufi mysticism, Buddhism, and beliefs in ancestors, spirits and impersonal powers has produced a complex array of mixtures (cf. Muhaimin 2006).

Outsiders and insiders have consistently had problems locating "Islam" in such a diverse array. Many have placed "Islam" as a "thin veneer" or "surface overlay" with "real" Hindu or Hindu-Buddhist and animist beliefs lying below this false front. For instance, Augusta de Wit (1906, 201-2), a Dutch visitor traveling through Java in the early twentieth century, wrote:

> When asked, they reply that they do as their fathers before them, and as, therefore, must be right; unless, indeed, they merely smile, and offer the somewhat irrelevant remark that they are true Moslemin [sic]. This, indeed, every native

> of Java (save such few as have been converted to the Christian religion) profess himself to be. And, in a measure, the Javanese are Mohammedans [sic]; they recite the Mohammedan prayers and Confession of Faith, go to the Messigit—which is Javanese for mosque—when it suits them, keep the Ramadan very strictly; also, if they can afford it, they perform that most sacred duty of the Mohammedan, the Mecca pilgrimage, and, returning thence, live forever on the purses of their admiring co-religionists. But for the rest, one may apply to them Napoleon's dictum concerning the Russians—mutatis mutandis. Scratch the Muslim, and you will find the Hindoo; scratch the Hindoo, and you will find the fetish-adoring Pagan.

She uses those of the normative piety orientation, or at least those more observant of normative practices, as a standard of comparison for the "rest" who are at base "pagans." From this perspective, "Islam" has not penetrated deeply in the thoughts and actions of local people, except for a small few. They may tell you they are Muslims, if you ask them, but this artificial identification does not come with adherence to core principles, doctrines, and practices as those "truly" committed to this religion. Others explicitly use select Arab groups and practices as the authoritative model to assess how close Javanese come to or deviate from true "Islam."

Thomas Stamford Raffles, the British scholar-administrator, spent considerable time in Java and other parts of Indonesia in the early nineteenth century serving as a Resident during the Napoleonic wars when Britain administered Dutch colonial possessions. In his two-volume treatment of the history of Java, Raffles (1817, 2-5) also depicts most Javanese as only nominal Muslims lacking knowledge of Islamic doctrines and commitment to its precepts:

> The natives are still devotedly attached to their ancient institutions, and though they have long ceased to respect the temples and idols of a former worship, they still retain a high respect for the laws, usages, and national observances which prevailed before the introduction of Mahometanism [sic]. And although some few individuals among them may aspire to a higher sanctity and closer conformity to Mahometanism than others, it may be fairly stated, that the Javans in general, while they believe in one supreme God, and that Mahomet was his Prophet, and observe some outward forms of the worship and observances, are little acquainted with the doctrines of that religion and are the least bigoted of its followers…The Mahometan religion, as it at present exists on Java, seems only to have penetrated the surface, and to have taken but little root in the heart of the Javans. Some there are who are enthusiastic, and all consider it a point of honour to support and respect its doctrines: but as a nation, the Javans by no means feel hatred towards Europeans as *infidels*; and this perhaps may be given as the best proof that they are very imperfect Mahometans.

Here again, although Javanese have made formal declarations of their faith as Muslims and even observe some normative practices, they are still characterized as only Muslim on the surface maintaining actual commitment to pre-Islamic rules, manners and rites. Raffles holds up "bigoted" Arabs and other "fanatic" Muslims as a base of comparison to the normally "tolerant" Javanese. He goes on to give another example of how "imperfect" they are as Muslims, arguing that Javanese lend aid to Hindu worship and would easily return to Hinduism if it fit their goals. Similarly, Snouck Hurgronje, another scholar-administer and chief architect of the Dutch Islamic policy, consistently held up Arab Islamic knowledge and norms as a model to evaluate the degree to which Indonesian Muslims approximate "real" authoritative Islam (cf. Benda 1985 [1958]). He systematized the opposition between "custom" (*adat*) and "Islamic law" (*hukum*), frequently reducing "Islam," construed as a "largely alien ideal," to the latter (Roff 1985, 11). Nevertheless, Hurgronje initiated intensive study of Islam in Indonesian society and through his work and that of subsequent Dutch scholars earlier misrepresentations of Islam had been largely corrected by the late colonial period. Amry Vandenbosch (1941, 43) wrote: "Before careful study of Moslemism [sic] was begun it was thought that the Moslemism in the Indies was 'a garment with holes' through which Hinduism and the other religions were visible, but this is now known to be untrue." He goes on to discuss in broad terms syncretistic, mystical, modernist and heterodox Ahmadiyah variants in Java and Sumatra.

Clifford Geertz (1960), a prominent American anthropologist, gave a new twist to earlier colonial representations. He turned three local cultural categories into ideal types describing the religious system of Java associating them with different positions in the social structure. In his approach, *santri* are the "pious" or "purer" Muslims associated with trade and the market, *priyayi* are associated with the government bureaucracy and combine Islam, animism, and Hindu-Buddhism, with an emphasis on the latter, while *abangan* are associated with the village integrating these same religious streams as well but with an emphasis on animism. Geertz provides a detailed ethnographic account of the beliefs and practices associated with each of these religious variants. Once again, as in earlier Dutch and British accounts, "purer" Islam is located amongst a small community of more normative practitioners used as a standard to place the other variants that emphasize Hindu-Buddhism and animism respectively. Geertz depicted most Javanese Muslims as merely nominal, surface Muslims. He paid little attention to the diffuse presence of Sufi mysticism in Java asserting that it had been in decline since the *Wahhabi* purification of Mecca in the 1920s (ibid, 184). Many scholars have criticized Geertz's approach charging that it misuses local cultural categories and fails to make a clear distinction between social status and religious orientation, with *santri* and *abangan* being religious orientations and *priyayi* as an elevated aristocratic social status (see Kartodirdjo 1973, 116; Bachtiar 1973; Nakamura 1984; Huub de Jonge 1993). Although some educated Indonesians adopt Geertz's mode of describing religious variation in Java, there is a widespread distaste amongst intellectuals for his tripartite description and limited acknowledgment of "Islam"

in all variants. Nevertheless, as Geertz (1995, 57) himself notes in later reflections, I think there is continuing analytic value in his recognition of the plurality of cultural streams contributing to the religious system in Java and the relationship of religious variants to the social structure.

In stark contrast to Geertz and most other outside observers, Mark Woodward (1989), another American anthropologist, locates much more "Islam" in the plural array of religion in Java. In particular, Woodward correctly gives much greater recognition to the significance of Sufi mysticism in Java reinterpreting much of what Geertz considered Hindu-Buddhist and animist traditions as an indication of deeply penetrated Sufi mystical traditions. He considers Javanese Sufi traditions as an integral part of the worldwide history of Islamic mysticism, which has often been at odds with more legalistic dimensions of Islam. *Abangan*, *priyayi*, and *santri* are all located solidly within this broad Islamic tradition; he considers *abangan* and *priyayi*, construed as different social classes, to be mystics (*kejawen*) of the mystical variant which he calls "Javanese Islam" or *Islam Jawa*, and *santri* are of the normative Islamic or normative piety variant (ibid, 2). Indonesian intellectual circles have warmly received Woodward's work as correcting the mistaken image of most Indonesians as only nominal Muslims and giving greater recognition to the Sufi traditions. A local Yogyakarta-based NGO has even published an Indonesian translation of his book with a new preface written by Dr. Damardjati Supajar, a prominent professor of Javanese and *Pancasila* philosophy and advisor to Sultan HB X.

Nevertheless, I think that while Geertz underplayed Sufi mysticism and overplayed the continuation of Hindu-Buddhist and animist streams, Woodward tends to overplay Sufi mysticism and underestimates continuities of Hindu-Buddhist and animist elements. He argues Muslims have largely Islamized Hindu-Buddhist trace elements. Of course, Muslims in all social segments have re-interpreted many of these elements through Islamic lenses within processes of localizing Islam in Java, but they have not integrated all elements of former religious streams into the broad Islamic tradition. Some of them continue to indicate Hindu-Buddhist or animist thought in practice both in the views of many participants and local observers. Indeed, *kejawen* or Javanism is interpreted in a number of different ways locally, but a popular view of this variant considers it a mix of Islam with many traditional Javanese elements. As we observed in the previous chapter, this mixture has also had an impact on Javanese Catholics and Protestants. I argue for an approach somewhere in between the ideal types of Geertz and Woodward, conceding that Javanese Muslims have reinterpreted many elements of previous streams within the broad Islamic tradition while acknowledging that others have not been Islamized. Ongoing processes of Islamization appear more advanced in the urban areas amongst the palace and educated elites; however, Geertz's pluralist perspective has continued relevance especially for popular religion in the villages and urban neighborhoods. Woodward's insights, stemming from a fine analysis of court elite discourse and textual sources, continue to be highly significant. I try to

provide a more extensive ethnographic base from which to discuss the range of Javanese Islam, not taking it to be coterminous only with the mystical variant.

Public Cultural Forms and the Javanese Religious Continuum

Local people participate in numerous religious activities that they perform in a variety of ways and give a range of meanings and interpretations. I will consider a small but telling set of such activities here; namely, *ziarah*, trance states, and *slametan* (I. *selamatan*). *Ziarah* refers to the widespread practice of visiting sacred places such as graves, wells, riverbanks, and sites associated with goddesses, spirits, and charismatic figures. Some people come seeking help with a variety of life's problems from spiritual beings believed to be present or contactable through these special places. Traditional Javanese shamans often called "*dukun*" or "*paranormal*" visit places known to be haunted and inhabited by spirits, jinn, and demons forming relationships with these beings whose powers they call on for healing and sorcery. One shaman I interviewed, Pak Joko, had just rented an old house about which neighbors told many tales of odd occurrences including people losing consciousness and being possessed while in it. This shaman immediately began to make offerings meditating in a small room formerly used to store sacred heirlooms *(pusaka*). He soon made contact with the deceased owner of the house who now helps him heal people (see Chapter 3).

The graves of deceased family members and ancestors are key sites to visit to ask for their blessings and helpful prayers. During the month of *Ruwah*, the month preceding Ramadan, many urban and rural communities organize *Nyadran* ceremonies performed in and near cemeteries praying for deceased family members and asking for their forgiveness and assistance. In some neighborhoods, locals perform *Nyadran* rituals with a traditional set of offerings (*sesaji*)—especially with *apem*, symbolic of forgiveness[1]—whereas in other neighborhoods, like the one I lived in, Islamic school teachers and students performed *Nyadran* with prayers, Qur'anic recitation, and a short lecture without any offerings. People also visit their parents' graves and living family elders after the month of Ramadan to ask for forgiveness and their blessings. Although people visit graves at many other times when they are looking for help, the month of *Suro*, as we noted earlier, is one of the main times—many people are intensely concerned (*prihatin*) about the divine order of things—that there is a flurry of activity at the sacred graves of kings, saints and famous religious teachers. For many others, not so involved in traditional Javanese culture, visiting the graves of family members, ancestors, and religious figures and making prayers for them is rooted in the Qur'an and *hadīth*. They visit graves reciting chapters from the Holy Qur'an, especially Chapter 36, *Ya-Sin*, making prayers for the deceased, for the good of their souls in the Hereafter.

---

1 *Apem* are small, circular rice flour cakes. Some locals told me that the word *apem* derives from the Arabic word for forgiveness *'Afwun*. Many stories connect some Javanese saints with the practice of throwing *apem* during the month of Sapar in Central Java.

Some will also request that the deceased pray to Allah for them, avoiding asking the deceased for help directly which could be considered as *shirk*, making partners with Allah (see Woodward 1989, 217-8).

Others *ziarah* emphasizing supernatural powers accessible through contact with substances and objects at these sites. People frequent wells, springs, and old baths such as those near the ancient royal graves beside the Kota Gede Great Masjid and splash their bodies or submerge themselves in this water. Some people believe that there are lots of *rajah-rajah* or amulets and charms containing immense supernatural power in the water and by making contact with this water this power can enter their bodies providing them with superhuman abilities. These amulets, perhaps now invisible, were once visible objects or small containers with Javanese or Arabic writing on papers folded over and stuffed inside. The writing inside these amulets, which are posted inside the entrance of some homes, and in many other places, to protect the inhabitants from evil spirits, may be Hindu-Javanese mantra or Qur'anic verses or a combination of both with alterations to Qur'anic verses such as an interjection of a symbol representing a god or goddess within otherwise totally Arabic script. Still others utilize Arabic-derived terms like *ilmu*, *ilham,* and *wahyu* to explain their pursuit of supernatural powers at sacred places. *Ilmu* refers to mystical knowledge, and *ilham* and *wahyu* to divine inspiration and revelation or magical powers they are trying to attain. On auspicious times on the Javanese calendar, there are many people sitting and lying near the walls of sacred places such as royal graves, particular parts of the palaces and near sites where kings made contact with spiritual beings (see also Chambert-Loir 2002). People generally refer to this time spent camping out near these sacred sites as meditation or *semedi* but some people use the Arabic term *i'tikaf* which evokes the time recommended for Muslims to shut themselves inside mosques during the last ten days of the month of Ramadan seeking divine blessings on the Night of Power. On one of the last ten days of Ramadan, the Night of Power, Prophet Muhammad received the final revelation of the Qur'an, completing it. Many locals either model their search for these divine sources of power through meditative devotion on Prophet Muhammad and his Companions or the founders and sultans of Mataram. The latter achieved communion and affected a spiritual contract with the Queen of the Southern Sea through sitting in meditative states. For some divine revelation (*wahyu*) is reserved to prophets, but normal believers can seek knowledge and divine inspiration, preferably some posit, through studying Qur'an, hadith, and the writings of Islamic scholars, and performing obligatory and recommended forms of worship.

There is clearly a complex range of practices and interpretations involved with visiting sacred sites, from a focus on spirits, inanimate powers associated with objects, to a variety of mixes with Hindu-Javanese and Islamized concepts. Javanese Muslims draw upon these diverse practices and interpretations to construct a scaffold upon which to project a variety of desirable futures for Indonesian society. Javanist ritualized visiting performances model a system led by charismatic leaders capable of tapping into a wide range of traditional sources of power, including

royal sites associated with past Javanese Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic kingdoms. They also model a secular system in which "traditional customs" are tolerated and viewed as contributing to national identity, while normative religious prescriptions are separated from the state. Although there is much overlap in their pursuit of supernatural powers and no clear dividing line between traditionalist Muslim and Javanist performances, traditionalist-oriented Muslims tend to lay greater stress on Islamic sources of supernatural powers. Thus, their performances model a system led by a charismatic Muslim leader possessing abilities traced more directly to Allah or indirectly through mediating prophets and friends of Allah. Their models can be accommodated in a secular or religious system allowing for less restricted influence of Islamic knowledge. On the other hand, the visiting performances more constrained and mindful of normative precautions model a system led by the rules based in the holy texts, a *syari'ah*-oriented system. Performances of trance, ecstatic states, inner power rites and ritual meals also model this range of desirable futures.

Similar to visiting practices, trance or ecstatic states are important crossroads and points of convergence of religious interpretations and practices. Trances occur in many of the most popular forms of local cultural arts such as *jathilan*, *reog*, *angguk putri* and *badui*. *Jathilan* and *reog*, a similar form also found in central Java but more popular in East Java, involve dancers, accompanied with background musicians and singers performing traditional Javanese songs and hypnotic melodies, entering trances and doing exciting stunts. They climb tall trees, open and eat raw coconuts with their bare teeth, eat live chickens and chew glass. Members of *jathilan* groups have told me that spirits enter their bodies and possess the dancers (*kesurupan*). These spirits are of human and animal origins, causing the dancers to mimic their characteristics. *Angguk putri* and *badui*, which locals consider as more Islamic arts, performed with religious songs and chants, also involve performers entering trance states nowadays. Members of such troupes have told me that those in trance are either under spirit possession or in ecstatic states through recitation of *zikir* and *selawat*. One *badui* group had some of their dancers possessed by spirits and others in a mystical state of intense devotion and closeness to Allah. There is also a meeting of Hindu-Javanese and Sufi-Javanese forms of ascetic practices and mystical experiences. Some locals not only effect communion with spirits, but also achieve a union with the Divine Essence, understood according to Hindu-Javanese thought as a pantheistic sense of participating in the unity of existence (see Mulder 1998, 33) or in Sufi-Javanese thought as either closeness or oneness with Allah. Islamic monotheism (*Tauhid*) is oftentimes not central to interpretations of these mystical experiences. Some scholars suggest that there is a long history of combining Hindu and Sufi mysticism, and in all likelihood, South Asian Sufis brought Islam to Java introducing some ideas and practices *already*

Figure 2.1 Groups seeking *tenaga dalam a*t southern beach

influenced by Hindu pantheistic Devanta thought that promoted identification of the self with God (Zaehner 1960, 86-109; Woodward 1989, 215).[2]

There is a broad range of local practices directed towards attaining inner power (*tenaga dalam*) from martial arts and meditative techniques aimed at receiving inner power from the Queen of the Southern Sea (see Figure 2.1) to several ascetic practices (*tapa*), such as fasting, performing breathing exercises, meditation, and *zikir* such as reciting the names of Allah (*al-Asma'al-Husna*). Many of these ascetic and mystical disciplines indicate a complex fusion of Hindu and Sufi concepts and practices. For instance, I attended a weekly *zikir* session led by a middle-aged couple, both medical doctors, in which "Allah" and the names of Allah are repeated while focusing on different parts of one's chest. They asked participants to sit with their legs crossed and hands open, palms facing upward resting on their legs, while first the wife and then husband led *zikir* with a microphone in the front of the hall. Their voices were monotonic and soothing, reminiscent of Hindu repetition of *OM*, a sacred syllable, as they repeated the penetrating "*Allaaaah*" as refrain between segments of reciting names of Allah that attendees, following them, recited silently (see Chapter 3). The husband, Dr. Professor Asdie,

2 M.C. Ricklefs (2006, 226-34) argues that the mystic synthesis of eighteenth and early nineteenth century Muslim Java was characterized by doctrines of nonduality and monism rather than orthodox doctrines of duality and monotheism.

told me that they have noticed some people coming to their sessions in search of inner power but they turn them away just wanting people to focus on purifying themselves, returning to their original state of *fitrah* and becoming closer to Allah.[3] Many women in my neighborhood, participants in this *zikir* session have started their own group in which they recite hundreds of "*al-Fatihahs*," the first chapter of the Holy Qur'an.

Similarly, I participated in a "great religious instruction session" in a public auditorium at Gadjah Mada University organized and led by a local "Gus" (title for son of famous religious teacher), a popular leader of a religious/business association with alternative healers, religious choir, martial arts and *tenaga dalam* training, and health products' company under their management. In his phenomenal voice, relaxing and meditative, he spoke about the significance of purifying all of our *tubuh* (bodies—physical, spiritual, emotional and so on) and opening our *chakra* as we advance along the spiritual path of *kebatinan* (mysticism).[4] He referred to the traditions of Prophet Muhammad as providing the exact number of *chakra* one has to open along this journey of inner perfection. Stressing that everyone present should leave with less negative energy, he led us in reciting *al-Fatihah* and asked people to close their eyes and focus only on Allah as another man recited the call to prayer. Then, he asked people to recite a series of *zikir* repeating after him in low or strong voice as they saw fit, after which he asked people to hold their right hands palm facing outwards in front of them while another man on the stage recited prayers. Sufi brotherhoods proliferate in central Java with followers who participate in *Tahlilan* and other *zikir* sessions and meditative practices in which participants enter into trance-like states, at times swaying their heads from side to side, as only fragments of the *zikir* remain audible. On the other hand, some modernist Muslims criticize these sorts of practices, although they promote *zikir* as having positive benefits for purifying ourselves and strengthening our will to do good and avoid evil, they stress that one must remain conscious and not repeat *zikir* to the point of entering into trance states. The more "puritanical" neo-modernists are even more suspect of mystical experiences arguing that one cannot be sure of what causes them, perhaps even jinn and demons may lie behind them. In relation to models discussed earlier, these neo-modernist interpretations resonate with their projections of desirable futures which entail a widespread implementation of *syari'ah*, often involving some conception of an "Islamic state" (see Daniels 2007).

---

3 *Fiṭrah* derives from the Arabic root *faṭara* and refers to the "natural disposition or constitution with which a child is created" and "the faculty of knowing God and capability of accepting the religion of truth" (Omar 2003). These Sufi-oriented healers ("*terkun*" or *dokter/dukun* [doctor/shaman]) posit healing power in this return to a natural, pure disposition.

4 *Chakra* is a Hindu mystical and yogic concept of physical-spiritual centers along the road of spiritual advancement and liberation.

In addition to *ziarah* and ecstatic states, *slametan* (also called *kenduren* or *syukuran*),[5] the ritual meal performed for almost any sort of occasion or occurrence, indicates a complex continuum of practices and meanings (see also Beatty 1999). It also represents one of the areas of stark contrast between the perspectives of Geertz and Woodward, with Geertz (1960, 11-15) describing *slametan* as the core animist ritual of the *abangan* and Woodward (1989, 52, 94) as a ritual rooted in Sufi mystical concepts and traditions. The ethnographic data, as with other practices, suggests a mode of analytic interpretation somewhere in between or incorporative of these somewhat, extreme idealized positions. Indeed, I participated in several *slametan* in urban and rural contexts which generally reflected the broad pattern Geertz describes, consisting of one of the hosts making an introductory statement of the purpose of the ritual meal, Qur'anic recitation and prayers, symbolic food offerings, and food distribution to participants and/or neighbors. Yet, while some participants interpreted the meanings of these events as protection against the disturbance of spirits, other participants stress meanings elsewhere along the complex spectrum of Javanese Islam.[6] Javanese values and norms of promoting harmonious and orderly social relations, cooperation, and smoothing over differences in the spirit of *rukun* are underlain by a complex blending of cultural resources (cf. Mulder 1998, 61-3).

For instance, to my surprise, one of my neighbors invited me along with several other male neighbors to a *slametan* for the occasion of his daughter's wedding. A few months earlier, we had a dispute over some of my wife's cement mixing materials we left sitting in front of our house that he gave permission to one of his nephews to use. I just happened to be sitting in our front room doing some work when I noticed one of the men working on cementing his nephew's porch scooping sand from the bag. I asked him what he was doing and it eventually led to my neighbor and his nephew coming over to our house to explain that it was just a "misunderstanding." They offered to replace the sand taken but clearly preferred to just let things go at an apology, an option my wife, Farichah, also preferred since she feared causing a rift with these neighbors who have a great deal of influence with the thugs, bullies and corrupt government officials in the neighborhood. On the other hand, I felt they should replace the sand she bought

5 Many modernist or neo-modernist Muslims use the terms *kenduren* or *syukuran* for feasts with the same basic format as those called *slametan* to mark their orientation and position as different from those they consider *abangan* or *kejawen*. Others may do the same to seek a compromise with people in their social world.

6 Beatty (1999, 236-8) describes a Javanese Hindu-sponsored and led *slametan* with this same basic format, with Hindu prayers, attended by Hindus and Muslims in a village in Central Java. Although there were no Hindus participating in the *slametan* I attended in DIY, there were many Christians who participated, including several Javanese Catholics in the urban neighborhood where I resided. These Javanese Catholics tended to share similar meanings and interpretations of these ritual meals and other customary activities with those Muslims of "syncretistic" or "*kejawen*" orientations.

to fix the house she and her brother inherited from my late mother-in-law, Ibu Yati Kusmaidah. Farichah agreed to support my position although she feared they would try to attack us. They replaced the bag with a smaller one the next day and immediately stopped speaking to us spreading gossip that I was antisocial and uncooperative. Our activities in the community, sponsoring several ritual meals in the prayer hall, mosque, and in our home neutralized the nefarious effects of their slander but our relations with them remained tense and unfriendly although we gradually began to acknowledge each other publicly. The critical turning point in our relations was their daughter's wedding when the father's younger brother came over to our home inviting me to sit with the other male neighbors in the *slametan*. I was somewhat ill with the flu but I got dressed and joined the men sitting around the front room of his house with *sesajen*, including conical mounds of rice and trays of fruit and sticky rice, set in the middle of the mat. An elder ritual specialist, who often performs a role in local weddings and funeral rites, made the introductory statement representing the father stating the purpose of the event and led us in Qur'anic recitation and prayers for the couple about to wed and their families. Following the prayers, boxes of food catered from neighbor's houses were passed out to each of the men and later to other people in the neighborhood who were not present. We bid each other and the hosts peace and left. Farichah and I attended the elaborate wedding reception in a large hall the following day. After these events, our relations with them were markedly improved and at times, we engaged in friendly conversation. We were never the best of friends, even from the start, but we had smoothed over our rift.

Now, in terms of the meaning of such events for local residents, I must note that this family and most of the residents of this urban neighborhood rarely prayed or participated in any normative Islamic activities in the mosque or prayer halls. On the other hand, they were quite observant of many Javanese traditions and customs such as the elaborate series of rites performed in this wedding or in funerary rites on the third, seventh, fortieth, one hundredth, one thousandth day, and one year, after the passing of a family member. Their concern with *rukun*, smoothing over our differences and making an effort to have harmonious relations, is partially out of a desire to call upon community help and assistance but it is also about fostering a state of *slamet* (I. *selamat*) or well-being, happiness, peace and tranquility. For some participants, this simple rite with prayers, offerings, and communal unity wards off and pacifies evil spirits, serving to realize the state of *slamet*. People also feel concern about the existence of discord and disunity, especially at such times, which could lead to sorcery and supernatural attacks from spirits, ancestors, and gods. One local woman told me that there was a storm over her house during her wedding last year caused by *Ratu Kidul* because this "goddess" was unhappy with the color of her wedding attire. In many *slametan* I attended in the city and villages, participants offered *sesajen* to spirits, ancestors, and/or gods out of concern for staving off misfortune on occasions where they have a heightened concern for the cosmological order. These concerns stem from a complex combination of Hindu-Javanese and Sufi-Javanese concepts and principles. Some people's interpretations

of the meanings of these events emphasize a sense of peace and tranquility rooted in the order of things, of existence itself, without referencing Islamic monotheism. Others underscore the "socio-mystical" benefits of facilitating unity and good relations among relatives, neighbors, and friends and of giving food to people; some even refer to the basis of these actions in the traditions of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (see Woodward 1989, 52, 94). Javanese, in evoking the value and norm of *rukun*, draw upon a diverse combination of cultural resources, including spirit beliefs, and Hindu and Sufi mysticism.

We can also infer this blending of cultural resources in the use of food symbolism. Many of the core foods such as conical mounds of rice (*tumpeng*), rice flour cakes (*apem*), and stuffed sticky rice (*lemper*) have multiple meanings, including *slamet*, happiness, prosperity, *Tauhid*, forgiveness, unity and togetherness that reflect various cultural streams. The use of symbolic foods varies with the different types of occasions, and most local participants could only explain a few meanings of these foods but they know that these ritual meals must always have particular kinds of traditional foods. Of course, experts of Javanese traditional culture were able to provide me with detailed exegesis of the symbolic meanings of these foods. Nevertheless, many local Muslims of various backgrounds have told me that some foods hold more Hindu-Buddhist meanings, coming from this cultural stream, while others are associated with the introduction of Islam. For instance, *nasi kebuli* (spicy rice made with chicken broth, cinnamon and cloves), whole chickens replete with head and feet (*ingkung*), and certain types of lamb are considered to be from Islamic roots, brought by the *Wali Songo* and/or from early Muslim societies. In fact, many Muslims affiliated with traditional Islamic institutions believe that some of these foods, especially *nasi kebuli*, have more potential of carrying *berkah* to the community. On the other hand, although many modernist Muslims also hold *slametan*, they are less concerned with the food symbolism and do not offer *sesajen*. Moreover, the purpose of their ritual meals are often different, more often they interpret them as being events to give thanks (*syukuran*) on some occasion and not so much out of a "negative" cosmological concern. They also tend to seek and interpret *berkah* in these ritual meals, not from the kinds of food or prayers over them, but from the prayers attendees make for the hosts and from the rewards from Allah for extending hospitality (*amalan*) to people.

In sum, local people's interpretations and practices of *ziarah*, entering trance states, and *slametan* indicate a broad continuum of religious variation. People have blended their beliefs in, and ritual interaction and communication with, ancestors, spirits, and gods with Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic concepts, doctrines and practices in a variety of complex ways. Although particular people across local society emphasize one or another points along this continuum, there are no clear cut divisions between one sort of blending and another; they grade into each other in many complex ways. Moreover, people change their convictions and commitments to particular beliefs and practices over time tightening or loosening their grip on particular cultural resources as they weave their worlds of meaning

and action (see Barth 1993). The ethnographic data recommend neither "Javanese Islam" as thin veneer or small normative segments, nor "Javanese Islam" as broad Sufi variant; "Javanese Islam" appears to be located throughout a complex spectrum of variants. Moreover, this description of diverse cultural resources and modes of interpretation along this Islamic spectrum provides a basis for us to understand various frameworks and projections of desirable futures including charisma-saturated polities, both Javanist and Sufi-oriented, plural secular systems with "religion" restrained and unrestrained, and polities with widespread institutionalization of *syari'ah*.

Abangan, Priyayi, Santri and Kejawen: Multiple and Contested Meanings

Outsiders and insiders have used various terms to delineate particular kinds of variants or streams of religion in Java, generally asserting that these account for distinct and discrete types. After having already demonstrated the weakness of such an assumption amidst the complex continuum of local religion, I want to proceed to point out several problems with the categories—abangan, priyayi, santri, and kejawen—used to designate such distinctions. While religious variation does exist, we need not reify categories used to refer to this variation as if they are reflections of some particular social and cultural realities. Rather, they are an integral part of social and cultural processes. The aspects of these and other, similar cultural categories fall roughly into four interrelated areas: semantic, geographic/regional, positional, applicability.

First, these categories are terms with multiple local meanings. Local people use a*bangan* to refer to lower-class people, the common folk who live in villages and urban neighborhoods. They also, similar to Geertz, use it to refer to their cultural orientation, considering *abangan* to be oriented towards customs and traditional beliefs and practices or towards synthesizing traditional beliefs, generally taken to be animism and Hinduism, with Islam. For many, the meaning of *abangan* is derived from its contrast with *santri*, defined as Muslims observant of normative Islamic activities, giving us the meaning of *abangan* as non-observant Muslims who do not pray, fast, or recite Qur'an. Similarly, people have used *kejawen* to refer to the system of Javanese traditional beliefs and practices associated with the *abangan* category, with animist, syncretistic, Hindu-Buddhist or Sufi Islamic connotations. People, locals and outsiders, have used *priyayi* to refer to upper-class nobles, aristocrats, and the bureaucratic elite. They also use it to designate people of royal heritage, the descendants of aristocratic nobles. People take *santri*, as noted earlier to be observant Muslims, and teachers and students of traditional Islamic schools. Some people extend the category more broadly including teachers and students from traditional and modernist Islamic institutions and for Muslims who have been affiliated with these institutions and are influenced by their emphasis on normative Islamic practices. Others make a distinction between *Kauman santri*, "puritanical" Muslims of the northern coast, and *Kejawen santri*, more tradition-

oriented, though observant, Muslims of the Java interior (see Koentjaraningrat 1975, 21-2).

Secondly, indeed, these categories do vary across geographical areas or regions on the island of Java. Insiders and some outsiders have noted the difference between *priyayi* in western Java and *priyayi* in eastern and central Java. *Priyayi* in eastern and central Java are often considered to be within the *abangan* category, despite class differences with villagers, because they share a similar syncretistic religious orientation rooted in many traditional Javanese practices, whereas *priyayi* in western Java, where normative forms of Islam penetrated more deeply into the interior in the early history of Islam in Java, *priyayi* are included within the *santri* category (ibid, 22). Similarly, *kejawen*, as characterized as the religious orientation of the *priyayi* and *abangan* in central Java, would only cover the beliefs and practices of *abangan* in western Java. However, the *priyayi santri* of the western region would still contrast with the more "puritanical" *kauman santri* of the northern coast and the more "syncretistic" *kejawen santri* of central and eastern Java. In addition, some Indonesian researchers have recently noted the different forms *kauman santri* have taken in relation to local culture on the northern coast and in central Java (Chamim et al. 2003).[7]

Thirdly, these categories play a significant role in socio-political processes of differentiation in which social actors from various social positions use them to produce their identities and those of opposing groups. The cultural characteristics that people assume these categories to entail are often charged symbols in a fluid and fluctuating contest between social groups with competing political visions and ideologies. Tensions between culturally differentiated social segments have a long history in Javanese society. For instance, Dutch colonial administrators generally strove to keep the aristocratic *priyayi* apart from the *abangan* masses looking at movements that brought them together with great suspicion (see Kartodirdjo 1973, 94-5). Due to their unity with Dutch rulers, *priyayi* often became the targets of religious movements led by *santri* in the second half of the nineteenth century when traditional Islamic schools and Sufi orders were growing rapidly in rural Java (ibid, 72). In this context, *abangan* viewed *santri* as protectors of traditional ideology and some of the more charismatic amongst them as messianic leaders. Nevertheless, Javanese villagers expressed their opposition to conservative, established religious institutions through both anti-Islamic *abangan*—often traced to the heretical Syekh Siti Jenar—and "puritanical" Islamic movements (ibid, 115-

7 Barbara Martin-Schiller (1984, 49-62) notes that although normative religious observances are high and Islamic identity is strong in a *pesisir*, north coast village, in Jepara, Central Java, religious practices appear in a highly syncretistic form in which "Islamic and pre-Islamic elements are integrated in such a way that there is no distinction between, in Geertz's terms, *santri* and *abangan* practices" (56). Indonesian researchers in their more recent research, discussed extensively in chapter five, demonstrated how traditional Islamic and pre-Islamic Javanese practices were heavily integrated in northern coast East Javanese villages.

7; 132-3). Religious movements of both streams produced their own distinctive forms of "deviant" beliefs and acts differentiating them from the established religious institutions. On the other hand, south-central Javanese *priyayi*, in the early 20th Century, out of a response to colonial "modernism," began to forge their identity as the protectors of Javanese traditional culture (Mulder 1998, 71-7).

Furthermore, in the early post-colonial period of the Old Order regime, researchers observed the tensions and processes of cultural differentiation between *abangan* and *santri* (Jay 1963, 77-100; Geertz 1960, 1973, 142-169). People of these categories were differentiating themselves in terms of clothing, forms of entertainment, cultural arts, and manner of performing public rituals, including the *slametan*. *Abangan* and *santri* both considered themselves to be the "real, true Muslims," and *abangan* called themselves "true Muslims" or "Javanese Muslims" in contrast to *santri* who they scornfully labeled as "Arabs" or *Muslimin* (Jay 1963, 83). *Santri* also began to degrade *abangan* with the label *Islam abangan* or "Red Muslims" evoking the communist-leanings of many *abangan* organizations (Koenjtaraningrat 1975, 21). These increasingly polarized forms of cultural differentiation were an integral part of local and national political struggle which eventually culminated in the bloody massacres of 1965 sweeping across Java and other parts of Indonesia. Secular nationalist *priyayi* mobilized *santri* to exterminate the *abangan*-based Communist Party, one of the largest in the world, issuing in the New Order Regime. Many of the elite maneuvers initiating this explosion of violence are still shrouded in secrets. Kahin and Kahin (1995, 217-230) suggest that US subversive interventions played a role in Indonesian politics in the mid-1960s as they did previously in the 1950s. Subsequently, the New Order regime *priyayi* elites also repressed *santri*-based organizations turning them away from politics and into cultural and educational organizations. President Suharto was skillful with playing the *santri* against the *abangan* whenever the occasion suited him.

Now, with the demise of the New Order regime and the emergence of a new spirit of openness in the Reformation Era, politicized divisions between the *santri* and *abangan* have resurfaced in a strong way. Initially, many groups with *santri* or *abangan* bases were united in the effort to unseat the long-time dictator and the New Order regime, but with success came a splintering of these groups into numerous mass organizations and parties competing for influence and power. Tense patterns of cultural differentiation are on the rise, evident in the controversy over Inul, a popular *dangdut* star, and *goyang* (see Chapter 4), and even in physical confrontations on the streets of south-central Java between "radical *abangan*" and "puritanical" Islamic sects. In addition, local people still contest the meanings of these categories and the cultural elements they are assumed to entail, all claiming to be "real" Muslims or "good" Muslims in different ways. Similar to earlier periods, some argue that *kejawen* is "Javanese Islam," while others argue that it is "outside" of Islam as it contradicts core Islamic ideas, principles, and practices.

Fourthly, not only do people disagree about the meanings of these categories, but even when they do agree in terms of the meanings, they often disagree about whether any particular person, group, or cultural form is an instance of *santri*,

priyayi, *abangan,* or *kejawen*. For instance, some of my neighbors, agreeing on the broad definition of *priyayi* as someone of aristocratic descent regardless of their present status, did not concur on whether particular families were *priyayi*. Changes in the post-colonial government opened up many opportunities for non-*priyayi* to fill positions in the civil service, and many *priyayi* fell upon hard times. Nevertheless, *priyayi* remains a strong claim to social prestige, even in predominantly poor and working-class neighborhoods, and many families write and print genealogies "demonstrating" links to royalty not only from the Islamic Mataram Kingdom but also from the Hindu Majapahit Kingdom. It is not uncommon to find genealogies (*silsilah*) claiming descent from Mataram on one side of the family and Majapahit on the other. Yet, local people may question whether such families are truly of this background based on the family not being refined and cultured (*halus*) enough or not having high-class connections. Likewise, locals, using a broad definition of *santri* as a person observant of normative Islamic practices, often disagree on whether someone is *santri* or *abangan*. This happens especially in cases in which the person in question prays, fasts, and intends to make the pilgrimage to Mecca but also performs some traditional practices such as *sesajen* looking for help from the spiritual beings at sacred places. People using the same definition of *kejawen* as a mix of Islam, animism and Hindu-Buddhism, disagree on whether traditional palace ceremonies, prayers over ritual food, and pursuits of mystical powers and knowledge are *kejawen* or not. For some the "Islam" in these activities outweighs and overrides the presence of other elements, whereas for others "traditional elements," practices not of "purely" Islamic origin or "innovative" religious practices locates them in Javanism. Of course, discourses and counter-discourses about the non-Islamic elements, *shirk* and *klenik* surrounding these activities fuels some of these disagreements.

In sum, semantic, geographic/regional, positional, and applicability aspects of these cultural categories militates against us using them to locate or dislocate "Islam" in local interpretations, practices and variants from an analytic perspective. That is, the multiple, regional and contested meanings, socio-political usage in dynamic historical contexts, and varying application entailed in the usage of these categories cautions us against taking them at face value. However, they are clearly important facets of social processes penetrating as they do to the very depths of diverse and competing values, perspectives, and visions for the future.

Islamic Variants, "Democratization," and Equalization

Many proponents of "liberal democracy," not unlike architects of Dutch Islamic policies, point to particular Islamic variants as more "moderate" and "tolerant," usually targeting the more normative piety oriented as more "bigoted" and less amenable to living peacefully with those of different points of view. Nowadays, two assumptions appear most prominent in such policies; first, the *abangan* masses are "moderate" and "tolerant" Muslims, and second, the traditional *santri* are more "progressive," inclusive and supportive of democratic reforms than

the "conservative" modernist Muslims. The first assumption overlooks the long history of anti-Islamic *abangan* movements that expressed intense animosity and intolerance for normative Islamic activities and institutions. These "radical *abangan*" sentiments and movements are arising again, posing a major threat to processes of liberal "democratization" as they serve to divide rather than unite common people. The second assumption largely ignores the strongly patriarchal and hierarchical tendencies amongst many traditionalist Muslim organizations and institutions. It has been some of the traditionalist-based parties and organizations arguing most vehemently before the general elections in 1999 and 2004 against electing a woman as president of Indonesia. In June of 2004, a group of traditional Islamic leaders (*kyai*) from NU issued a *fatwa* (authoritative religious decision) declaring it forbidden (*haram*) for the Islamic community to choose a woman as president of the country. It was the modernist-based parties and organizations, even though they were generally in agreement with this position who remained more focused on the politics of the candidates rather than on their gender (see also Platzdasch 2000, 337-8). In addition, many of the modernist and neo-modernist organizations criticize hierarchical "cults of personality" surrounding charismatic traditionalist leaders and try to avoid these patterns in their own organizations (see Chapter 5). Some observers feared NU would split, because many of its leaders and teachers did not agree with this declaration for ideological and practical reasons. Furthermore, many "pro-democracy" NGOs from traditional Islamic backgrounds, such as YASANTI, LKiS (Institute for Islamic and Social Studies), Solidaritas Perempuan Kinasih, and many in their networks, disagreed with this *fatwa* and consistently struggle for greater gender equality in Indonesian society. Similarly, some traditionalist Muslim intellectuals joined the Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*), formed in March 2001, which promotes a secular Indonesian state, freedom of thought and expression, and gender equality (see Ali 2005; Daniels 2007, 236). Clearly, the notion of "traditionalists" as "pro-democracy" and "modernists" as "anti-democracy" is oversimplified and inaccurate; there are pro- and anti-"democratization" forces within both of these broad Islamic variants. Tanthowi (2008, 17-19, 41-43) asserts that "traditionalist" NU and "modernist" Muhammadiyah are both moderating forces demonstrating commitment to tolerance and plurality in Indonesian society. Nevertheless, it has been this oversimplified dichotomy that has been emphasized in dominant discourse in the global context.

American and Australian political officials have redoubled their efforts to single out normative piety oriented Muslims, some of them influenced by reformist thinkers from the Middle East, in the global context of the "War on Terror," as the main threat to the spread of "democracy." Many Western politicians, scholars, and journalists have charged some modernist and neo-modernist groups with having links to "terrorist organizations" and labeled them as "terrorists," "extremists" and "radical Islamists." Even though the singling out of normative piety variants existed as a cornerstone of western Islamic policies before the events of 9/11, it has become more pronounced and aggressive following the United States'

government responses to these events. These policies are contributing to the increasing isolation of modernist and neo-modernist organizations and limiting their participation in the democratic process. Isolating and restricting these groups from freely expressing their views and exercising their rights, closing off avenues of political discourse and debate, can lead to the proliferation of more violent methods of political action.

Moreover, these hegemonic policies of isolating and restricting modernist Muslim segments of society, serves to perpetuate a conservative, anti-equalizing alliance of traditionalist "*santri*" and "*abangan*" with "*priyayi*" and military elites. This alliance forged primarily through a commitment to secular nationalist ideology cast in opposition to modernist and neo-modernist values of implementing Islamic principles more extensively in Indonesian society reinforces the continued dominance of aristocratic and military elites. In the name of nationalism and the national ideology, *Pancasila*, this alliance has kept the control of vital Indonesian resources in the hands of a small group of cronies. Much like the alliance of modernist and traditionalist Muslims with the aristocratic and military elites in the mid-1960s, used to squash the "*abangan*"-based leftist movement, this coalescing of forces, in 2004, isolates a significant segment of common people and indicates the granting of political consent and legitimacy to the politico-military elites. Political leaders have replaced the unifying call of anti-Communism with the call of anti-Islamic extremism. In both cases, these campaigns erected a bulwark against a new alliance, a potentially equalizing alliance, from emerging.

For a short time at the beginning of the Reformation Era, such an alliance was emerging with broad unity amongst traditionalist and modernist Muslims, syncretistic- and secular-oriented Muslims, and eventually, even some segments of aristocrats. This temporarily left the military forces in stalemate, forced to stand by while their long-time autocratic leader stepped down, until a new alliance of forces consolidated in opposition to the growing influence of modernist organizations. These forces appeared galvanized by the fear and uncertainty surrounding several Indonesian bombings and the politics of the "War on Terror." There is a growing trend of political and cultural polarization of traditionalist and syncretistic-oriented Muslims from modernist Muslims. Building a new equalizing alliance will require the bridging of this growing rift between people of these Islamic variants.

Although some normative piety oriented organizations responded by demonizing "the other" (see Ahnaf 2004; Jahroni 2008), prominent modernist organizations tried to avoid isolation and move closer to the masses of Indonesian people of various orientations. For instance, Muhammadiyah began efforts to erase its "puritanical" image getting more involved in local cultures in areas where they have largely been commenting from the sidelines (see Chapter 5). In addition, Amien Rais, former president of Muhammadiyah, in his campaign for the Indonesian presidency as the PAN candidate, engaged several forms of local culture trying to connect with locals in central and east Java. Although these attempts have had more influence with the educated elites, they are a beginning. Some modernist and traditionalist mass organizations and NGOs have also begun

to work together on several reform issues where they have common interests. Perhaps more than anything else, for a new equalizing alliance to emerge there needs to be more inclusive concepts of what "Islam" and "good Muslims" are locating them in a less oppositional fashion within all of the variants of Javanese Islam.[8]

8 Al-Ghazali (2002), the famous eleventh century Islamic scholar and Sufi, responding to the strife and mutual condemnation of different schools of thought during his times, argued for tolerance within a broad boundary of Islamic belief including all who believe that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His Messenger. Those who attribute lies to Prophet Muhammad or otherwise reject his prophet-hood are outside the limits of Islamic belief as a result of this Unbelief or *Kufr*. Otherwise, a broad range of different interpretive perspectives and practices, including rationalists, traditionalists, mystics, Shiites, and philosophical speculators were not to be declared outside of Islam.

Chapter 3
Dukun, *Kyai* and *Ustadz*: Healing along the Spectrum

In the previous two chapters, we have seen a range of local Muslim interpretations of government-organized festivals and ceremonies, and practices of *ziarah*, trance states, and *slametan*. Here, as we turn our attention to Muslim healers, I also demonstrate a complex Islamic spectrum in Java. These healers, labeled locally as *dukun*, *kyai*, *ustadz*, amongst other categories, do not represent distinct types; similar to *abangan*, *santri*, and *priyayi*, these categories are integral to, and fluctuate within, dynamic social and cultural processes. Local people, including the healers themselves, negotiate and contest these categories and meanings associated with them. However, knowledge underlying these categories may be changing more slowly. Rather than utilizing *dukun*, *kyai* and *ustadz* as ideal types, I approach them as a way of looking at the plurality of healers and local views about them. Although some of them may appear to be rather heterodox or orthodox to insiders and outsiders, I consider them all to be within Javanese Islam.

Javanese Muslims, like Muslims elsewhere, of various orientations share a belief in *alam ghaib*, the realm of unseen and supernatural entities, forces and powers. The concept *ghaib*, forms of which appear sixty times in the Qur'an (Omar 2003, 413), is viewed as a fundamental aspect of Muslim belief, since the existence of Allah, angels, jinn, the Afterlife and other unseen realities are accepted without empirical verification. While I was conducting this research in Yogya, two of the most popular kinds of television programs were *dangdut*-related and *paranormal* or occult phenomena shows, including those about healers. In one such nationally televised program in 2003, an "*ustadz*" argued strongly in favor of "alternative medicine" stating that it has roots in Islam. He said that "Allah has not sent down people that just remain sick and do nothing when they are ill…but Allah, The Most Glorified and Exalted has sent down direction and guidance for people to seek healing … and they should seek healing from *pembacaan* and *jampi*." He described and promoted *membacaan*, as recitation of verses from Qur'an and prayers, and *jampi*, as activating medicinal substances by means of such recitation for the purpose of health and healing. Yet *jampi* in the broader Javanese context may involve praying, chanting, or reciting "magical" formulas over water or other materials to activate them for therapeutic or anti-therapeutic purposes. His broad but circumscribed definition of "alternative medicine" indicates the popular belief across Java in the efficacy of forms of healing outside of "biomedical" contexts and the framing of them in Islamic terms.

Indeed, a more public exposition of Islamic models for various domains of life, including healing, is a key aspect of post-Suharto discourse. Steve Ferzacca (2001, 223), situating his work in late Suharto New Order Indonesia, interpreted the significance of symbols of *kejawen* tradition within public healing performances and discourses as integral to the "moral panic" surrounding fears that state modernization and development projects were threatening "authentic" Javanese society and culture. As noted in chapter one, provincial government and palace-based discourses cast traditional Javanese philosophy and ceremonies within the rhetoric of modernization and development. This can be interpreted as one response to this moral panic. On the other hand, in the *Reformasi* era, this tradition-within-development discursive formation has been joined by a more open contest between various discourses which stress "Islamic" ways of ordering life. My examination of public healing performances indicates the growing influence of these discourses, especially normative Sufi and *salafi*-oriented ones, which delineate proper Islamic forms of healing from un-Islamic forms.[1] Although there is disagreement amongst proponents of these perspectives, they converge in their criticism of many local healers as fomenting cosmological and social disorder through their improper beliefs and practices. Some healers, associated with these increasingly stigmatized forms of "magical" healing and sorcery, have attempted to appropriate some normative Islamic ways of framing their practices.

I will focus upon five local healers and their healing performances together with discussion of my interviews with each of them and local discourses about their form of healing. First, I consider two local healers labeled widely as "*dukun*," an ambiguous local category associated with healing and sorcery. I also relate two of my personal experiences with the dangers of sorcery. Then I consider two healers considered *kyai* and/or *terkun*, the latter category is formed through combining the last syllables of *dokter* (medical doctor) and *dukun*. These two figures express a more normative form of Sufi-oriented healing, whereas the final healer practices a neo-modernist *salafi*-oriented form called *ruqyah*. Discourse surrounding these healers stress the ways proper Islamic models can restore physical, spiritual and social order.

Dukun, Klenik, and Cosmological Disorder

Farichah and I were riding our motorcycle on the main road running south from town into Kota Gede when we noticed a large sign on a building announcing "alternative medicine, medical and non-medical treatment." One day we decided to park out front and entered the large room inside the entrance. We met Pak Subandi and one of his three assistants and found them quite open for us to make

1 Jackson (2005, 48) describes *salafis* as "*the* protestant reformers of modern Islam" who "insist that all arguments go directly back to the Qur'an, the Sunna … and the way of the Pious Ancestors" (*salaf*) of the first three generations following the death of Prophet Muhammad.

observations and interviews. They had a large lobby area with a long front desk and seats, and a few treatment rooms in the back. Pak Subandi is in his early thirties and his three assistants that he trained were even younger. He is from a small village in Magelang, Central Java, but his father worked as a palace civil servant when Subandi was a child so he remembers attending palace ceremonies every year. A patient he healed of a persistent nasal ailment gave him this office as a gift three years ago. This patient went to China, Singapore and Australia before coming to see Pak Subandi who told us he healed him after treating him only once.

Patients are treated in the back rooms equipped with couches and tables or over the telephone. If they come to the clinic, Pak Subandi and his assistants gather information on their problems, medical or non-medical, and treat them through touch, massage, consultation and with plant and/or animal-based concoctions. Only a few clients came to the office when we were there, but several called for consultations over the telephone. Pak Subandi and his assistant told us that people can just send photos of themselves and they can heal them and solve their problems from a distance utilizing supernatural powers (*kekuatan ghaib*). Pak Subandi claimed that many more people would come in personally after the fasting month of Ramadan feeling less shy (*malu*) but that did not happen. They kept detailed "examination cards" on their clients with names, ages, occupations, problems, treatments, and results listed and stored in drawers. Pak Subandi said patients call to tell him they are healed.

Several types of medical and non-medical problems they treat and consult people for are listed on the wall in the lobby area and on flyers they use to advertise their alternative clinic. The medical illnesses included cancer, arthritis, high cholesterol, high blood pressure and AIDS, and the non-medical conditions included problems with family members, neighbors, careers, businesses, finding a spouse, various forms of sorcery (*guna-guna, tenung,* and *santet*), and bad luck. Pak Subandi performed *ruwatan*, traditional Javanese purification rituals, to get rid of bad fortune (*buang sial*). Both of his flyers stated that they specialize in "modern traditional treatment without operations using high quality traditional medicine without side effects or making you sick" and that the patient "must *percaya* and be *yakin* and *Insha'Allah* they will be healed." That is, patients must not only believe (*percaya*) but have certainty and deep conviction (*yakin*) and God willing they will be healed. These statements clearly draw upon Islamic symbols to legitimize his healing practices. *Yakin*, derived from *yaqīn*, is an Indonesianized-Arabic term which is often used in the Qur'an and discourse of local Muslim preachers for the level of belief Muslims should have in Unseen realities. The Islamic phrase *Insha'Allah* is often used by normative-oriented Muslims as a public expression of piety and humility, acknowledging that the ultimate power lies with God. Pak Subandi, who never used this phrase in our discussions with him or ones we heard him having with other people, was clearly appropriating this Islamic symbol to place his healing practices, generally viewed as *kejawen* and increasingly as *klenik*, within an Islamized worldview.

In my interviews with Pak Subandi, he also claimed Islam as part of his practice and distanced himself from some negative associations with the figure of the "*dukun*." When I asked him what kind of category fits him, *dukun* or *kyai* or *paranormal*, he said, "I do not like the label *paranormal* or *dukun* … because they are workers who are looking for a benefit from their work…but I just like helping people…people give food, cigarettes, clothes; someone gave me a car, but no one can give money…one thousand or one million is all the same; I do not accept money." He also told us that his healing style is a mixture of Islam and *kejawen*. He recites particular prayers from the Qur'an depending on what kind of illness or problem he is treating, and he also performs *zikir* or meditation. Pak Subandi asserted that "everyone has something pure in them…and they can *zikir* and meditate" to develop their inner abilities. After noting that these practices have a common foundation and purpose, he went on to inform us that he meditates daily, usually from eleven to twelve midnight because "the *ghaib* is moving around more at that time." He even goes to the hospital to pray for sick people; while the doctor gives them medicines he prays for them and "does not have any negative thoughts." This statement absolves him of any association with practitioners of sorcery.

Nevertheless, Pak Subandi informs us that his background, training and healing methods are primarily *kejawen*, which he explains simply means that "something has been passed down from Javanese ancestors." He said he inherited this healing practice from his father who was well known in the village for healing. Everyone has some supernatural abilities (*kekuatan ghaib*), but some more than others based on the time they are born. His parents spoke to a "Pak *Kyai* or Pak *Ustadz*," he said, when we became very ill at the age of three and this local Islamic figure told them that he would be fine and would heal himself. He watched his father heal people in their home and was already recognized as having healing abilities when he was only five years old. Subandi had already memorized lots of prayers and was able to meditate at this young age. His father, a low-level palace servant, forced Subandi and his brother to engage in several traditional Javanese fasts and submerged them in the local river to develop their inner powers. When he was ten years old, performing *puasa ngebleng*—fasting for periods of forty days drinking one cup of clear water per day—and spending long periods of time in the river, Subandi had lots of supernatural experiences when he meditated. After three days or so of meditating, a person appeared to him dressed in black clothes and asked him what his name was and read information from a book he held about Subandi and his family. Eventually, he put something which felt cool inside Subandi's forehead telling him that he could help people but not to ask for money. After that experience, every time he meditates, he meets this being whose name is Panji Winangun. Subandi consults with him about his patients and Panji Winangun informs him of the proper treatment and advice for them.

Pak Subandi trains his assistants and children using *kejawen* methods to develop their supernatural powers just as his father trained him. Although people are born with greater or lesser potential based on the exact time they are born, which can

be determined through Javanese astrology, he assured me that people can learn these healing methods but they must have "*keyakinan*" or strong conviction. He and his assistants meditate (*semedi*) in pairs being careful to remain silent; and they perform various kinds of traditional Javanese fasts (*bertapa*). Some of his assistants have special abilities for providing business consultation or advising people on how to find their marriage partners or treating victims of sorcery. Pak Subandi's eldest son, a five year old, is already fasting and has shown some special ability.

As we interviewed Pak Subandi he was on and off of the telephone treating people and consulting with them. On one occasion, we overheard a conversation he had with a local policeman. Pak Subandi informed the policeman that he had been helping someone become a local legislative candidate. The policeman told him about how he helped someone sell a lot of things worth over a billion Indonesian *rupiah* and complained that he did not receive any money for helping him. Pak Subandi suggested that he use sorcery (*santet*) on the person who he felt wronged him. His advice to this policeman appears to contradict his statement to us previously that he has "no bad thoughts." On the other hand, since he was obviously standing within earshot of us and was not speaking in a low tone, there is another possibility. He did not think he was suggesting anything inappropriate. The policeman told him that he had been treated unfairly; therefore, it would only be just to impose supernatural sanctions upon the perpetrator. We could interpret that people turn to supernatural sanctions in the absence of a reliable legal system; after all, many Indonesian policemen are known to be corrupt. In fact, many Indonesians avoid reporting crimes to the police because they fear losing even more than they did from the original crime. Thus, sorcery functions as a quasi-legal sanction in conjunction with a weak and unreliable system of formalized legal procedures. In this case, we even have such extra-legal actions being recommended to a policeman who is supposed to be an agent of the rule of law.

Although this functionalist interpretation directs our attention to some significant aspects of social structure, it requires further cultural analysis. From a traditional Javanese perspective, the cosmological order *rukun* had been disturbed and sorcery could be used to restore it. Even if the policeman or someone else in a similar case had a legal contract, actionable in a reliable legal system, the person may prefer to seek supernatural sanctions to correct what they see as a violation of the moral order. Forcing someone to comply with your interests through coercive state action may not bring the same sense of restoration of order. But, of course, in many cases people do not have actionable legal contracts, and the current legal system is not widely viewed as reliable. Moreover, many people feel wronged based on the perception that local principles of reciprocity have been violated and that they have been slighted in some manner. These facts give even greater value to seeking a perceived need of restitution through the use of sorcery. I don't know whether Pak Subandi and the policeman ever acted upon his suggestion. No matter how justified sorcery may be interpreted in any particular case, it is still done clandestinely and its practitioners lack general legitimacy. Similar to Pak Subandi,

the following healer used *kejawen* training and healing methods and potentially used his inner powers to restore a cosmological order others felt disturbed.

Bu Diah and her daughter, Fitri, who just graduated from Muhammadiyah University, introduced me to Pak Joko. They told me that he is a "*kejawen dukun*," and that there are many "*orang pintar* or *paranormals*" like him around Yogya. When they first accompanied me to his house in Gamping, Sleman, I conducted my initial interview with him and he invited me to come back on future occasions to observe his healing practices because people make appointments to see him in the evenings except for Sundays when he rests. He had a large yard in front of his house with several Muslim gravestones, candles and bamboo candleholders lying about. Bu Diah told me that Pak Joko was also a carver and sells masks and other wood works. Pairs of red masks with gruesome faces hung over both sides of the entrance and some others were scattered around the walls of his reception room. Bu Diah said some of them were *jathilan* masks.

Pak Joko was thirty-six and moved to this place in Gamping, Sleman in the mid-1990s. He has trained his brother and a few other assistants in healing. They treat people for medical and non-medical problems in the large room in the middle of the house, just in from the reception room. I saw him and his brother treat several people on the wooden floor using lotion and pieces of wood to massage various parts of their bodies depending on their ailments. He had been treating people for urinary and bowel problems and persistent headaches around the time I was visiting him. He massaged the feet and pressed some points on the head and neck of a young woman suffering from chronic headaches. He also moved his hand over her head without touching her using his inner powers (*tenaga dalam*) to penetrate her body. This was her fourth visit, she told me, and she has been gradually getting better. He gave her some advice about not straining her eyes and passed the young woman and her husband some herbs, *daun salam* (laurel-like leaves) and *asam* (tamarind) to use in hot water to soak her feet. I did not see him treat anyone for *santet* but he told me that he treats people suffering from it and told me a lot about it. He informed me that there are two kinds of *santet*: *halus* and *keras*. The *halus* form causes harm to people through the use of *roh halus* or invisible spirits, while the *keras* form uses food, drink, or other substances.

Like Pak Subandi, Joko tried to distance himself from negative associations with "*dukun*" and presented his healing practices as within Javanese Islam. On a few occasions, he told me that he does not charge people for his healing services and that he does it to help many of the poor people in Yogya who cannot afford treatment in hospitals, costly operations, tests, and medical consultations. Clients make donations and he uses some of the money to pay the men that work in his candle and bamboo candleholder business. He told me that many of these men were former *preman*, robbers, pickpockets, gamblers and heavy drinkers, like he himself was in the past. This work gives them a job when the government does not seem to be able to help them, he added. Pak Joko never directly challenged the "*kejawen dukun*" category Bu Diah placed him in and he told us that he did not use *zikir* to heal like many "*kyai*," however he did stress that he uses Islamic

prayers, fasts only in Islamic-style during Ramadan, and that he can only heal with the permission of Allah. Since he does not understand much Arabic, he told us he uses Javanese in his Islamic prayers and combines them with prayers from his ancestors. He treated the man suffering from bowel problems with *air doa* or prayer water he prayed over and sent his inner power into, activating the water with *jampi*, in this case, prayers, incantations, and inner power. Although he fasts in Islamic fashion during the fasting month of Ramadan, he hones his inner powers through performing several traditional Javanese fasts throughout the year. He often fasts for forty days eating only leaves or food with no spices or eating only rice and drinking water (*puasa mutih*). Since he needs the energy to engage in work for his craft business to support his family and friends, he only performs *puasa ngebleng*, drinking only water, for three days at a time. Pak Joko said, "I can be very active on these fasts but still deny myself lots of things in order to build my inner strength."

Pak Joko also develops relationships with spiritual beings that help him heal. After praying to Allah first, he proceeds to "focus on other beings created by Allah such as jinn, Satan, and other invisible spirits." In a building, with a steep traditional Javanese style roof (*joglo*) he rents down the road, he makes offerings to the spirit of the former owner of the house who now communicates with him and helps treat people. The spirit in the house used to be a titled servant of the Yogya palace, the "*demang*" or local district official of Gamping. A blending of Islam and Javanese traditions was also emplaced in the wall hangings at this "haunted" building. Ceramic crafts with Arabic characters for Allah and Muhammad were posted on the wall and a *rajah* amulet—containing funerary white cotton cloth with Arabic and Javanese writings, black sticky rice and the inner power of the person who made it—hangs over the entrance for protection. When he took me over to this building, he meditated in a small room this palace official used to store his sacred heirlooms. He sat facing the offerings of tea, coffee, bowls of porridge, one with brown palm sugar and one without, and some *kemenyan* incense. Pak Joko said, "I have been able to communicate with him and see him with my sixth sense although others cannot see him." He has seen him wearing the style of clothing people wore back in the time he was a local official. He said the spirit of the *demang* asked about me and knew that I was there and wanted to give me his *salaams* (greetings of peace) and I told him to give him my *salaams* as well. Unlike Pak Subandi, Pak Joko can sometimes see the *roh halus* with his bare eyes and not just when he is meditating.

In addition to praying, fasting, meditating to enhance his inner powers (*tenaga dalam*) and spirituality (*kebatinan*), he practices breathing exercises and traditional martial arts (*silat*) and submerges himself in water. He studied *silat* as a teenager which enhanced his physical and spiritual strength. Nowadays, he said, "I practice breathing techniques every night moving my diaphragm and building up and storing this energy so that I can heal people through massage." Many people have told me, including some students of "*kyai*" with traditional Islamic schools, that breathing exercises are the key to developing inner powers (*tenaga dalam*). After

learning *silat*, Joko studied massage, herbal medicines, and other healing methods from "*dukun* and *kyai* healing people." Like Pak Subandi, he also submerged himself and his assistants in water at the beach and in caves as one of their training methods. Pak Joko became known as a healer at the age of sixteen and moved to a few different parts of Yogya before settling down in his present home. People came from various parts of Yogya and outlying areas to seek healing with him, but only a few came several days a week. Some people came to Pak Joko seeking business consultation and the use of his powers to correct imbalances they see in the order of things.

On one occasion, a middle aged ethnic Chinese Christian man came looking for help with redirecting the flow of water in his rural neighborhood. He waited until Pak Joko was finished healing a few sick clients before working on his problem. This Chinese man told me that he wants to make a well on his land and Pak Joko can find the best location for it through supernatural means. Joko has a method of sticking bamboo rods into the ground to see the best spot for the well. A young assistant brought out a plant with the root still largely intact that they will stick down into the ground where he wants to make the well and it will redirect the flow of water. When I asked him why they wanted to redirect the flow of water, he told me that there are two wet rice fields on both sides of his house and their owners must be using lots of underground water. Pak Joko brought him a thick bamboo stump to push into the ground on his land and told him that they would look at how the water fills up in it later changing the course of the water from his neighbor's wet rice fields to his house. Although I never heard Pak Joko recommend the use of sorcery, these kinds of consultations, representing the interest of a client to the detriment of others appears to stem from the same sense of cosmological order and proper ways to redress disturbances of it.

I learned of the widespread dangers in Indonesian society from sorcery, magical potions and/or poisons years ago during my pre-dissertation research in South Sumatra. No one warned me. My dissertation committee members, two of whom experienced similar dangers in the field, seemed to want to keep the idealistic image of the anthropological project alive. Cultural anthropologists traveling overseas to conduct ethnographic research in societies other than their own is still often considered a necessary rite of passage for becoming a professional anthropologist. My Indonesian friends and contacts that were quite aware of the dangers as well seemed to not want to contradict a positive, friendly and beautiful representation of Indonesian society, an image often presented to foreigners. During the summer of 1997 I traveled to Palembang, South Sumatra to conduct pre-dissertation research on processes of rural to urban migration and cultural change. In order to gauge the extent of cultural change in the urban context, I planned trips to inland and upland parts of the province. After developing what I thought was pretty good rapport with a local civil servant, Pak Lakoni, with roots in one of the upland areas, I was invited to travel with him to his home village. My fictive elder sister (*kakak*), Romlah, later told me she had bad feelings about this trip but she did not say anything at the time. It was a long and arduous trip over wretched and treacherous

roads and bridges, some at quite high altitudes. I felt relieved to finally arrive in the upland coffee-growing ethnic-Daya village of my contact, Pak Lakoni. After around two weeks of quite productive research on the local dialect and kinship, marriage, and family practices, I was ready to return to Palembang, the provincial capital, where I was based. The night before I was scheduled to leave, I had dinner with Pak Lakoni at his brother's house. Soon after dinner I felt disoriented and my heartbeat became very faint. I went to sit in the room where I had been sleeping and tried to figure out what was happening to me. Pak Lakoni sat with his brothers and other close relatives and friends. He came to check on me a few times offering to massage my body. I heard him telling them that he should have used more of the substance in my water because my body is quite large. They began to chant some incantations in the front room. I thought of walking to the other side of the village, where I found residents to be less uncouth than those on this side, but I felt too weak to make it. I was afraid of falling asleep with whatever was circulating in my body and Lakoni and his partners waiting like predators, so I struggled to remain awoke until I took the bus in the morning.

I did manage to stay awake throughout the night and caught the bus to the regional capital and from there to Palembang. On the way back, Pak Lakoni told me that people in his home region have a black powder they have used for a long time on people holding positions or in possession of things they want. The substance makes people weaker and weaker and then they die. After we returned to Palembang, we went in our separate directions and I would have been happy not to ever see him again. However, in several days, he showed up at the locked front gate of the *kampung* house I was renting. He told me he was on his way to a funeral and wanted to let me know that there is an anecdote to the potion I was still suffering from. He could help me get it but I had to give him my computer, which he saw in the house before we left for his home village, and some monetary funds. I told him to stay away from me.

When I told my *kakak* and other Indonesian friends and my dissertation committee members what happened, it did not come as a total surprise to any of them. One of my committee members informed me that they use heavy-metal based poisons over much of Southeast Asia. Why wasn't this part of my pre-trip preparations? Two of my other dissertation committee members had previously suffered similar experiences in Indonesia and Melanesia. My *kakak* and other local friends now informed me that there was lots of sorcery and magical potions/poisons used on local people, telling me of several tragic cases. My *kakak* told me I should have seen a traditional healer in the region who knows the anecdotes to these substances. She and the neighborhood headman both offered to take me to see a healer, but I decided to see a Chinese doctor with a clinic in Palembang some friends recommended to me.

When I saw this doctor, he examined me and took a blood test. He said the test showed abnormal liver readings indicating that some toxins were in my system but he could not determine what they were. He gave me some carbon-based black pills to absorb some of the toxins from my body, although he thought it was too late. He

told me that you always have to take these tablets with you when you go to "hill people" areas because they are notorious for using toxic substances on people. "Do you believe in God?" he asked me. "Yes" I answered. "He is the only one that can help you now." I took the pills he prescribed for me to hopefully lessen the effects of the substance, but he was right, it was too late. I suffered the deleterious effects of the potion for around two months.

However, when I had a similar experience in early 2003 in Java, I responded differently. I had no doubt learned to be more cautious, but the significance of developing rapport and trusting relationships with local people often places the ethnographer in a practically powerless position. On this particular occasion, my wife and I sponsored a *Tahlilan* and *slametan* at our house for seven nights in commemoration of my late mother-in-law, Ibu Yati Kusmaidah. The *kyai* and many of his students from the neighborhood *pesantren* led prayers and *zikir* and the *kyai*'s wife and assistants prepared food for the communal meal. On the last night of this event, after eating and drinking tea with the *santri* and some neighbors, I fell ill. At first I was hoping it was just a minor stomach virus which is not uncommon, but the symptoms—a mysterious feeling of disorientation and faint heartbeats—were highly reminiscent of my experience in South Sumatra. We left Yogya as scheduled the next day taking the train to Jakarta. I got worse feeling hot, weak, and delirious. After we arrived at our friend's house in Jakarta, my wife called one of her close relatives, a student of a "*kyai*" healer with a *pesantren* on the outskirts of Yogya. My *kyai*-trained in-law told us to fill a glass with clean water and to just set it on a table and wait for him to call back. He called around an hour later and told us he had finished his Qur'anic recitation and prayers turning the water into *air doa*. It was ready for me to drink now. I drank it and within five minutes I felt that the mysterious illness had been lifted; I felt none of the worsening symptoms I had been experiencing since the previous night.[2] Some of our friends reminded me that I had to be careful of sorcery, emphasizing the protective powers of normative Islamic phrases such as *Bismillahirrahmanirrahim* (In the name of Allah, The Beneficent and The Merciful) which should be recited before eating or drinking anything. These experiences and numerous reports of sorcery, which I was now privy to having long ventured below the placid "surface" of Indonesian society, have demonstrated the widespread dangers of sorcery and poisonings in rural and urban contexts.

Much of this sorcery and anti-therapeutic action was thought to be the work of the "*dukun*." I have no evidence that most of these shady activities were undertaken by people who identified themselves as *dukun*. Many of the perpetrators may have categorized themselves as *paranormals* or *orang pintar* or other general categories for people with supernatural abilities. Many of them may have also been simply people at large like Pak Lakoni that want something someone else

2 Raymond L.M. Lee (2001[1987]) reports an "inexplicable" personal experience after receiving an amulet and drinking some *air jampi* (prayer water) prepared by a young Malay member of a *tarekat* in Malaysia.

has or want to get even with someone. On the other hand, I do have evidence that people associate sorcery, un-Islamic "magic," charlatanism and other practices with *dukun* and their ideas appear to run deeper than the label. As I noted earlier, Pak Subandi did not like this category for himself and Pak Joko also never adopted it even though he was introduced as such to me. Nevertheless, most people like Bu Diah recognized these two healers and others with similar methods as *dukun*. Some people have even told me that several healers presenting themselves, and recognized by others, as *kyai* are "really *dukun*." For instance, one "*kyai*," Mbah Kambali who used to have a student in the neighborhood where I lived in Yogya was viewed as a charlatan with very little Islamic knowledge by some of my interlocutors. This student and others visited his house, located in Lasem, Central Java and they worked on his land performing a variety of manual services without pay. He taught them some basic *zikir* most people know but never gave them any Islamic talks imparting any substantial Islamic *ilmu* or sciences on them. However, Mbah Kambali had an exceptional aura of supernatural powers about him; people were even told when he was around not to ask him any questions and only to speak to him if he spoke to them first. Many people thought he had the ability to know what was on people's minds so there was no need to outwardly utter them. His students were told that they would develop some of his *kesaktian* or supernatural powers from being around him working on his land. They thought that they would eventually be able to see spiritual beings, predict the future, communicate from a distance without any devices, and drive from Jakarta to Yogya, a roughly twelve hour trip, in one or two hours. Although many people, including my skeptical interlocutors in this case, believe these sorts of powers were available to their ancestors and are still available to people, they also think that they can only come with a firm basis in Islamic knowledge. Since they saw this "*kyai*" as a charlatan taking advantage of his "students" and their relatives and lacking in any Islamic *ilmu*, they told me that he was "really a *dukun*."

I infer from local discourse a schema of a person steeped in traditional Javanese knowledge and methods of obtaining supernatural powers which can be used to both heal and harm people. This schema contrasts with the related mental representation of a person knowledgeable in Islamic sciences and with some kind of social context, often a school, to impart this knowledge to students, and who derives supernatural powers and intercessory abilities from his closeness to Allah. This sort of knowledge underlies the category *kyai* used in relation to people, and some of these *kyai* are also recognized as healers. *Kyai* as we have seen earlier also has a more general usage for elevated objects, plants, animals, and people with special powers (see also Lukens-Bull 2005, 95). In fact, this is the main difference between local conceptions of human *kyai* and *ustadz*; the latter also possesses considerable Islamic knowledge and teaches but does not have a supernatural aura.

In the *Reformasi* era, the increasingly public emergence of normative Islamic discourse has extended some of the negative associations with *dukun* and altered the schema of this traditional figure. It is important to note that this normative

Islamic discourse targeting many traditional elements of Javanese culture, including healing, is not new and has been an important aspect of several decades of Islamic revival. This Sufi and *salafi*-oriented revival has criticized *dukun* as practicing forms of "magic" proscribed in Islamic texts with powers coming from Satan rather than the miracles produced by Allah through his prophets, messengers, and other representatives in the world. Charges of sorcery and making partners with Allah (*syirik*), deviating from Islamic monotheism, stemmed from such criticism spread through newsletters, booklets and religious talks.[3] However, this sort of Islamic discourse was more restrained during the Suharto period remaining relatively underground due to threats of state repression and counter charges of Islamic extremism and OTB (*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk;* seditious organizations without form). Following the fall of Suharto, a variety of Islamic discourses came to the fore contesting ideological images and courses for the nation. They became galvanized by the promise and possibility of a more public Islamic presence in Indonesian society. Not only were the effects of decades of Islamic revival upon traditional figures like the *dukun* intensified but charges of promoting cosmological disorder were extended and connected to social disorder. Their un-Islamic practices and ideas, cast as deviating from the proper Islamic order, were also construed as disrupting Indonesian society and contributing to its multidimensional crisis. The positive evaluation of *dukun* has gone down under these public charges and the turn toward greater emphasis on their un-Islamic character. Unlike in 1995, when several healers and their apprentices presented themselves to me as *dukun*, during this current project no healers did this. To the contrary, they tried to distance themselves from this category and behavioral expectations associated with it. Nevertheless, they are still recognized as fulfilling the mental representation of this ambiguous and potentially dangerous figure. Similar to Aguaruna shaman of the tropical forest of northeastern Peru, *dukun* are thought to be in possession of supernatural powers giving them the ability to heal as well as harm (Brown 2005 [1989]). Normative Islamic discourses of Sufi and *salafi*-oriented formations, converging in many of their critiques of *kejawen* healers, are not always in agreement about what is the proper form of "Islamic-based" healing.

3 The "liberal" Muslim reformers of the Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*), railing against orthodox fundamentalists, argue for less exclusivist conceptions of the Muslim community and less *syari'ah*-oriented perspectives. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (2003, 5), a prominent leader of this network, wrote: "I have a view taking this even further: every value of goodness, wherever it is found, in essence is also an Islamic value. Islam, like that presented by Cak Nur [Nurcholish Madjid] and many other thinkers, is 'generic values' which can be in Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, *Konghucu*, Judaism, Taoism, and local religions and beliefs and other [belief systems]. It can also be that the truth of Islam can be within Marxist philosophy. Because I think that it is not the form but the content." Later in the same work (p. 7), Abshar-Abdalla goes on to state, "Don't forget: there is no God's law, there is only *Sunnah* Tuhan as well as universal values which are owned by all of humanity."

Kyai and Terkun: Restoring Cosmological Order

Mas Edi, a former neighbor and friend of my wife's family, told me about Kyai Haji Asnuri, a very well known *kyai* who uses his inner spiritual power (*kebatinan*) to heal people. Mas Edi had to quit his job as a mechanic because his body started to feel cold and his feet numb. Initially, like many other people I interviewed, he went to several doctors and hospitals but after their failure to heal him he began to visit some *paranormal* healers. The doctors told him that he suffered from hypertension and nerve problems and gave him all sorts of medication which he has thrown out. When he went to visit Kyai Haji Asnuri, this healer knew what was wrong with him right away informing him that he had severed the nerve in his foot which he would heal over time. After a few visits he was healed. Mas Edi told me Pak Asnuri treats people that suffer from physical, mental, or sorcery problems and helps find lost and stolen things through looking into a glass of water. He usually accepts cigarettes from people who come to visit but it is up to people to give what they want. Mas Edi's description sparked my interest, so with his directions a few days later I set out to find Kyai Haji Asnuri's clinic in Dampak, Bantul, on the outskirts of the city.

I drove my motorcycle on the main road to Bantul and then on several small roads traversing beautiful, bright light green, wet rice fields, before arriving at Kyai Haji Asnuri's clinic with the help of some villagers, all of whom knew of him. Some women drying rice on the side of the road finally pointed out that Asnuri's place was the set of buildings across from the rice fields with all the cars parked out front. A young man serving as the parking attendant sits near the entrance and collects money from people before they leave. I parked my bike inside the gate and walked to the large waiting area where there were around twelve clients awaiting their turn to meet with Pak Asnuri. A few women were praying in long white tunics in the prayer hall in the back of the waiting area. There were small buildings to the left and right with "Kyai Haji MZ Asnuri" posted on them together with some Islamic symbols. His examination and treatment rooms were inside the building attached to the waiting area and the building behind it was the in-patient quarters where patients with mental and drug problems stay while they recover. I signed the guest book for a consultation joining a list of around forty for this Thursday morning. I entered "research" as my reason for coming and took a seat. The sign in the waiting area stated that he treats people from 9-4PM Sunday through Friday and Saturday he is off. There were no fees posted but clinic expenses were listed on a large board.

Pak Haji Asnuri came to the door to the waiting room wearing a sarong and no shirt beckoning people to come into his treatment room one person or group at a time and they would enter and at least partially close the door behind themselves. I saw people ahead of me placing packs of *kretek* cigarettes on his table and watched from the lobby as he treated people and used the glass of water to help them find things. It was my turn. He called me in from his couch. I entered the treatment room and introduced myself putting my gift of two packs of cigarettes with some

small *rupiah* bills attached on the table between us. There were already scores of cigarette bundles and bills strewn across the table. He sat and looked at me with his piercing eyes, sporadically eating some uncooked rice from a small container with a spoon. He called another man waiting for treatment in to join our meeting and announced he was closed for the day.

I pulled out my small notepad and tape recorder asking if I could interview him about his methods of medical treatment. Straight away he said, "I use *tenaga dalam* to heal people and there are those that do not believe I can heal people this way but there is always proof for those that do not believe. I use saliva from my tongue to heal people using *tenaga dalam* which comes directly from Allah, The Most Glorified and Exalted." He asked if I would like to see it and I said yes. He directed me to come and sit in the chair next to him so that he could give me an example and some proof. He stuck his finger in his mouth and rubbed some of his saliva on my left forearm and before I knew what he was doing he grabbed my left wrist with one hand and a small sickle lying behind him on the couch with the other swinging the blade forcefully down upon my forearm near where he had put his saliva. I was shocked and jumped up from the seat a little but not before the blade of the sickle came down on my arm. It struck my arm but did not penetrate it. He moved it back and forth across my arm, in a sawing motion, making a brush burn but it still would not penetrate my skin. He said, "can I do it or not." Feeling relieved but curious about why I wasn't missing a limb or at least bleeding, I asked if the blade was sharp. To demonstrate its sharpness, he used the blade to cut some of the young man's hair at the ends and it went straight through a large bunch of hair easily. He offered another example of his inner power and its efficiency taking some more saliva from his mouth with his finger and pressing it on the top of the hat on my head. Pak Asnuri grabbed a brick off his couch and asked me to walk out back with him. I followed him into the small alley behind his building where there were lots of pieces of broken bricks lying about. He asked me to turn around and kneel down facing the wall while he stood behind me holding the brick he apparently intended to break over my head. I told him I wanted to *watch* him do this feat but not on my head. I had quite enough proof already. He asked if I was afraid and I admitted that I was a little. We both laughed on our way back to his treatment room joining the two men sitting there. Pak Asnuri went on to give me some more proof anyway, placing some saliva on a peanut shell and asking me to try to break it open with my hand. I couldn't break it. He explained this was from his inner power which is based in the Qur'an, reciting the first two verses of Surah Al-Mulk (Dominion) and interpreting that his inner power is for *amalan* or good deeds mentioned at the end of the second verse. He added, "I am not arrogant or conceited and the treatment is free and the money that comes in is split between me and the parking attendants and used to pay the expenses listed on the wall."

He asked me to return to the seat beside him and began to demonstrate some of his massage techniques pressing the nerves in the inside of my third toe and then pinching the top of my right thumb both causing intense pain. Pak Asnuri said he expected this reaction because he was aware that I have high cholesterol

and people with this condition have this painful reaction. He used to be an expert masseur at an Islamic boarding school where he learned the art of massage and other healing methods. "But I did not learn the method of healing through *tenaga dalam* there. I was searching for this *ilmu* but no one taught it to me. It came to me when I was in Mecca, at Masjid Haram, and I asked for some *zamzam* water making prayers to Allah, The Most Glorified and Exalted, to bless me with some water which would bring benefits to me and my family and many other people." He added that he made these prayers in Arabic although they can be made in Indonesian, English or any other language.

Kyai Haji Asnuri asked the young man waiting for a consultation to sit next to him. He spoke to Pak Asnuri in a low tone telling him of the problem he needs assistance with. It was about trying to borrow money from a bank. He had all the requirements fulfilled except for one. Pak Asnuri pulled a pillow on to his lap, moving some of the things scattered around his couch. I thought I saw him grab a small round pellet-shaped object as he kept speaking to the man. Pak Asnuri asked him to hold his hands out in a supplication pose with his palms facing upward and then Pak Asnuri, reciting praises to Prophet Muhammad (*selawat Nabi*), held his right hand over the man's hands. Fluid began to drip from Pak Asnuri's hands into the young man's palms and he told him to rub it onto his face. Asnuri looked over to me and said "this is *obat fikiran*" or medicine for the thought and deliberation process. I asked him if it was water that dripped from his hands and he said he did not know what it was asking the young man if it was fragrant. The man said it was and stood up thanking Pak Asnuri and left.

Pak Asnuri was forty years old and grew up in Bantul. He attended Islamic schools from elementary through high school and learned many of his healing methods from watching several *kyai* healers. Some of them shared their methods with him but from others he "stole" their methods by observing them over a period of time. After studying healing at traditional Islamic schools for almost ten years, he opened up this clinic. Although his inner power came to him following his pilgrimage to Mecca, he continues to train himself to enhance his supernatural abilities. He often eats raw rice but falls short of performing a full traditional fast called *puasa geni* in which one only eats raw foods. While he eats bowls of uncooked rice, he eats other food cooked. However, many *kyai* do perform traditional Javanese fasts. He also exercises a lot to keep his energy level high, but does not practice meditation (*semedi* or *bertapa*) or offerings to spiritual beings. Indeed, Pak Asnuri draws on traditional Javanese symbols while trying to make it clear that his beliefs and practices are totally Islamic. At times he sings traditional Javanese songs while healing and later he recites Qur'an and *selawatan*. Amidst the jumble of objects on his couch where he sits there was always a gorgeous *keris*, a traditional symbol of supernatural power. Nevertheless, Kyai Haji Asnuri announced publicly before an audience of patients at his clinic that he does not use any invisible creatures like jinn to help him heal people. He also stated that he performs *ziarah* but does not ask for help at the gravesites which would be *musyrik* (polytheistic) and sought confirmation from the audience that this is

correct according to Islamic principles. He does not have an Islamic boarding school but he often gives *pengajian* and *mujahadah* (public spiritual sessions) on stages in large open fields in the area.

I came back to visit Pak Asnuri's treatment center several times observing his healing and consultation process. On my subsequent visits, he invited me to sit in his treatment room, and at times he came out and performed massage on several patients in the waiting area. There always seemed to be over fifty people coming to visit him, but Sundays were the busiest because more people were off from work. He massaged people with various conditions, including partial paralysis, sore stomach, back ache, bad kidneys, and fainting, sending some of them to his assistant in the physical therapy and operation room for more massage and herbal medication. I did not get to observe any of his internal operations but he made an appointment to remove a patient's kidney stones. While massaging some patients he would whistle and blow air from his mouth directing his inner power towards their sick bodies and they would scream in pain. Similar to Pak Joko, he would occasionally move his hand over some part of their bodies and they felt his energy often expressing pain. He treated mentally ill patients by breaking bricks over their heads; a method he said returns them to normality.

I also observed Pak Asnuri treat several patients suffering from sorcery. One of the victims of sorcery was a young woman from Sumatra studying at Gadjah Mada University. She came with her mother who informed Pak Asnuri her daughter had been suffering from some odd illnesses. He massaged her feet and held his hand up towards her and she screamed out *Astaghfirullah* (God forgive me) and *Allahu Akbar* (God is the Greatest) as her mother held her from behind. Pak Asnuri informed them that she suffered from a "non-medical" illness and told the mother to take her daughter to the bathroom and to see what comes out of her. Many people that suffer from sorcery report odd things coming out of their bodies. When they returned, he told them that they had to buy a *telur cemani*, an egg from an all-black chicken, and the young woman had to eat it before they come back for more treatment. Before they left, they wanted him to show them the person that sent the sorcery on her. Pak Asnuri used the glass of water he usually uses to reveal people that stole his client's belongings. He placed a *rupiah* bill under the glass of water, praying and directing his energy into it, and then showed it to the women. A person's face appeared in the glass, but the women did not know who it was. Pak Asnuri could only tell them that the person was also from Sumatra where they were from. Several other patients were victims of sorcery used by local people in Java, including another young woman who reported her illness arose after eating something at a *kyai*'s place. He prescribed *telur cemani* for all of them and told them they would have to come back for more treatment.

My discussions with some of Pak Asnuri's clients and with other traditionalist-oriented Muslims indicated that they viewed his performances as squarely within the orbit of Islam. Pak Haji Tarioko, a seventy year old, told me that Kyai Haji Asnuri's abilities were a "gift from Allah, a form of *ilham*." He continued, "Traditional healers like Pak Asnuri are like *wali*; they are knowledgeable in the

supernatural and with *tenaga dalam* but they are also knowledgeable with *agama*." Likewise, Mas Pramono, a forty year old, and Mas Maryanto, in his late thirties, stressed that Pak Asnuri has received a gift from Allah to help people with their problems. Pak Atiwiyono, a fifty year old client, expressed a strong conviction that Pak Asnuri is "definitely not a *kejawen dukun* because there are no *kejawen dukun* who are *kyai haji*." Kyai Abdul Hakim, a young teacher from Krapyak, known as the oldest *pesantren* in Yogya, told me that Kyai Haji Asnuri's kind of Islamic "magic" is not uncommon in the traditionalist Islamic school context. They used a method with "Al-Qur'an spinning around overhead and it finds out who stole something." He also informed me that there are some special *zikir* they teach at Krapyak *pesantren* which has medicinal uses but many of them are for caring for and protecting your own spirit.

On the other hand, many other local interlocutors were not so sure Pak Asnuri's practices were firmly based in Islamic teachings. Several of my friends that worked on Malioboro Street I showed my recordings told me that Pak Asnuri's method of healing with inner power was *klenik* describing him as a *kejawen dukun*. They categorized him together with healers that use their sixth senses to heal and practice the burning of *menyan* and recitation of mantras. When I probed further emphasizing that he was a *kyai haji* some of them became somewhat undecided on whether to locate him within the *kejawen dukun* category while others insisted that he was *musyrik* and his techniques such as finding things with a glass of water promoted *tahayul* or un-Islamic superstitious beliefs. Assistants of Ustadz Fadlan, discussed below, holding similar perspectives warned me about the dangers of visiting such healers because there are often lots of jinn around them that can and do possess people.

Doctor Professor Asdie, similar to many local *kyai* that prescribed *zikir*, *selawat*, and prayers, was more widely considered to be within Islamic healing practices than Pak Asnuri. Professor Asdie and his wife, Dr. Sumarsih, were both medical doctors, specialists in internal medicine and general practice respectively. They were both around sixty-three years old. Dr. Asdie was a prominent local doctor and head of the Internal Medicine section of Sardjito Hospital, the most high-tech hospital in Yogya. He finished his medical degree at Gadjah Mada University in 1969 and received additional training and certification in 1976. It was in 1977 that Dr. Asdie and Dr. Sumarsih transformed their medical practice after participating in a healing *zikir* session led by some elder doctors and *kyai* in Jakarta. After personally experiencing the healing effects of *zikir*, these two doctors began to invite several friends and fellow doctors to their home for *zikir* sessions. Following their spiritual experiences, including a spontaneous uttering of praises for Allah, vivid dream of heaven, and *wahyu*-like blessings in Qur'anic recitation and memorization, they opened their *zikir* sessions to the general public. Bu Hajja Tati, a frequent participant in these sessions and our neighbor, told Farichah and I about these *zikir* sessions describing Dr. Asdie as a "traditional *kyai* with an Islamic school in Sleman."

I attended and participated in their Tuesday afternoon *zikir* sessions on several occasions. They took place in a building located in the city not far from where we were living. Men and women took the staircase up the back of the building to the large hall on the upper level. After entering participants placed donations in large boxes, passed letters with prayer requests or questions to Dr. Asdie and Dr. Sumarsih, and sat on the floor, men and women on opposite sides in rows. There were always around twice as many women present than men, roughly forty men and eighty women. Dr. Sumarsih led the *zikir* session for the first thirty minutes directing participants to recite various names or attributes of Allah (*al-Asma' al-Husna*) while focusing their minds on the meanings of what they were saying and on various parts of their chests. Speaking in a very relaxing tone, she recited three names of Allah over the microphone telling us to focus on the left side of our chests, and then three more names focusing on the right side and then on the middle. Participants sitting with their legs crossed and hands on their knees palms up and open recited silently following her lead. Then after a short pause she uttered "Allaaaah" in an intense slow and resounding fashion and interspersed some prayers between segments of reciting names of Allah. Dr. Sumarsih passed the microphone to Dr. Asdie who led the second half of the session continuing with *zikir* for a while and then he read letters for prayer requests for sick and deceased people, children taking exams, adults looking for marriage partners, jobs, financial resources, and so on. Sweet tea was passed around to participants, while Dr. Asdie directed us all to recite *zikir* "*Astaghfirullah*" and "*Alhamdulillah*" (All Praises are due to Allah) and Surah Al-Fatihah and to focus with the same breath on our entire bodies from head to toe. Then we rubbed our bodies and using small prayers books recited Surah Al-Yasin. Before closing the sessions, Dr. Asdie gave a short talk answering people's religious questions and telling stories about patients' miraculous recoveries through spiritual transformation. He closed the session leading us in recitation of the *zikir* "*Astaghfirullah*" and "*Alhamdulillah*" and *selawatan Nabi*. Some people came up to ask him some questions or to make appointments to meet with him during his hours of consultation at the hospital or office before leaving.

When I interviewed Dr. Asdie I asked him what he thought of the term *terkun* (doctor-*dukun*), a category we both were aware some people apply to him. He responded telling me that "many people come to him needing to be carried…and sit down and talk to him and leave walking on their own and stronger…what I say enters their ears and goes to their hearts and with the permission of Allah they feel better and stronger and are able to do things they could not do before coming." Moreover, he feels that he is more realistic in his treatment of people; unlike *dukun*, he has the medical knowledge to understand what is wrong with people. In fact, all the people that used the *terkun* label to describe him meant it in a general sense recognizing that he is a medical doctor that also uses some alternative healing methods. When pressed about the applicability of the *dukun* part of the compound word *terkun*, they had to admit that he did not fulfill the image they have of this traditional Javanese shaman. Dr. Asdie went on to say he treats people suffering

from sorcery in the same manner and it does not take long to heal them. Once, he had a patient who had nails and razors throughout his body and after the treatment they were all gone. He stressed that he only uses *zikir* for healing all illnesses and no other methods. "Illness comes from a bad state in the heart and *zikir* cleans it and removes the dirt," he explained. He and his wife's directions for participants to focus on different parts of their chest were based in verses from Qur'an about a "substance" in the chest and about *nafs* which he interpreted as "our heart in an emotional and spiritual sense." It is not clear where this "heart" is he said "but this *nafs* is joined with the body." Their emphasis on *zikir* was aimed at returning people to a spiritually clean and pure state.

I told Dr. Asdie that it seemed like he was able to get *ilmu*, *ilham*, and *wahyu* so easily whereas other people visit *keramat* places like gravesites. He told me that these graves are often considered *keramat* because the people buried in them "struggled in the path of Allah" and the Qur'an states that people, like *Rasullullah*, *Sahabat*, and the *Wali Songo* are still alive … and so if people go to their graves with the right intent, to recite Qur'an and to pray for the person buried there…then the person knows who is coming to their grave … and they may receive some of the *ilmu* or *wahyu* of the person buried there with the permission of Allah." They may benefit from the *syafaat* (Ar. Shafa'at) or intercession of the person buried there. He went on to make a distinction from *kejawen* practices stating that "for people to look for *ilmu* from the person in the grave is *syirik*" and he warns people not to go with these intentions. Likewise, he turned people away from his *zikir* sessions that are looking for *tenaga dalam* and prayed for only serious people to participate in them.

I took one of my relatives, Mbak Ida, who thought she was suffering from sorcery for a consultation with Dr. Asdie at his hospital office. He asked what he could help her with and listened to her describe a series of physical, mental, and spiritual problems. Dr. Asdie wrote some notes and when she finished he listed several points of his analysis. His main points were that her medical examination indicated that she was physically healthy leading him to conclude that she must have a "mental problem such as a dirty spirit or heart," and recited and listed several verses from Qur'an emphasizing the significance of deep belief, conviction, and awareness of Allah. He advised her to face the reality of her misfortunes and turn them over to Allah which would leave her heart more peaceful and tranquil. He told us that she had to *zikir* and *selawat* to clean her heart, recommending that she visit a *kyai* in an outlying area in order to get a special *selawat* directly from him. Dr. Asdie knew this special *selawat* but insisted that she get permission from this *kyai* to recite it and that she must remember to recite the proper lineage of sources. He explained that this mode of transmission is based in the manner in which *Rasulullah* received verses of the Qur'an from the angel *Jibril* and passed certain ones on to particular Companions to memorize. This is common practice amongst many of the Sufi brotherhoods in Java. However, my relative, from a more modernist Muhammadiyah background, did not see why she had to follow these traditions of knowledge transmission and recitation of lineages.

Similar to Bu Hajja Tati, she looked to the *salafi*-oriented healer Ustadz Fadlan and his assistants for help. Bu Hajja Tati, who first informed me of Dr. Asdie, has been attending his sessions for several years and has organized a group of women in our neighborhood that hold *zikir* sessions in her house. She began attending Dr. Asdie's sessions when she had become very sick from the heavy stress on her job. He told her that her soul had gotten away from *Tauhid* and all she had to do was *zikir* and remember Allah and she would be healed. She followed his instructions and she was healed to the point that she began using *zikir* and prayers to help patients in the hospital where she worked. But her problems began anew, she said, after she made the pilgrimage to Mecca and returned noticing that her *zikir* were much more powerful than they had been before. She seemed to have additional power and strength with her hands shaking as she recited the names of Allah. Dr. Asdie interpreted that her heart was trembling with deep understanding and feeling of Islamic teachings causing her hands to shake. He recommended that she continue to *zikir* and she would feel better. However, Bu Hajja Tati went to visit Ustadz Fadlan where she said they have the methods to detect the presence of jinn. It was at Fadlan's she realized that a jinn had possessed her in Mecca and came back home with her. It had been faking to follow her *zikir* causing feelings of additional powers. These two cases of Mbak Ida and Bu Hajja Tati demonstrate the disagreement and contested interpretations between traditional Sufi and *salafi*-oriented healers, even though they both criticize *kejawen dukun* as clearly outside the bounds of proper Islamic practice and belief.

Neo-modernist Ustadz: Exorcising Spiritual and Social Disorder

It was not Mbak Ida or Bu Hajja Tati, but Mas Eko, an affine living in West Java, who first told me about Ustadz Fadlan. Mas Eko, a long-time student of a *kyai* healer in Central Java, told me that there was a "*kyai*" who uses a method of pressuring and pounding actions to drive jinn out of a person's body. He also gave us directions to Ustadz Fadlan's therapy center and the telephone number so that we could make an appointment to visit the center located in Kotagede, Yogyakarta. We later discovered that Pak Fadlan and his assistants treat patients at this Kotagede center on Friday and Saturday mornings and Tuesday-Thursday at his Islamic boarding school, Al Hikmah, in Boyolali, Central Java. On the third Monday of each month, Ustadz Fadlan gives a public seminar teaching people the "correct" Islamic perspective about the *ghaib* world. Farichah and I made several visits to his center in Kotagede observing and participating in the treatment process and interviewing healers and patients.

We found out right away that Pak Fadlan and his wife, who usually treats female patients, did not consider themselves *kyai* and were not referred to as such by their assistants or patients. My initial use of the label *kyai* was fortunately corrected by one of Fadlan's assistants before I met the "*ustadz*." Despite the fact that Pak Fadlan is quite knowledgeable about Islamic sciences and imparts this knowledge upon students at his Islamic boarding school and others in public

seminars and forums, they do not categorize him as a *kyai*. To the contrary, these *salafi*-oriented healers make consistent efforts to distinguish themselves from *kyai* and their students. Unlike the methods of traditional Javanist *dukun* and Sufi-oriented *kyai*, Ustadz Fadlan and his assistants consider their method of healing with Qur'anic recitation (*ruqyah*) and prayers as a purely Islamic form of healing rooted in Islamic texts.[4]

Ustadz Fadlan Abu Yasir was born in Kotagede, Yogyakarta in 1964 and attended a Muhammadiyah elementary school and Islamic middle and high schools. He studied Arabic at the I'bad Lughawi Institute for Arabic Language Education in 1987 and then attended the Muhammad bin Su'ud Qismusy Syari'ah University in Jakarta where he studied Islamic sciences, including *syari'ah*, *tafsir*, *fiqh* (I. *fikih*), *hadīth*, and the writings of early Islamic scholars (*salaf*) and contemporary Middle Eastern books on Islamic spiritual healing. Many of the texts he read on Islamic spiritual healing were translated from Arabic to Indonesian but some of them were in their original Arabic. These texts spell out the *dalil* or bases for spiritual healing methods in interpretations of Qur'an, *hadīth*, and early Muslim scholarship. Firstly, belief in the existence of jinn, Satan, possession and sorcery is not superstitious or un-Islamic belief but is rooted in Qur'an and *Sunnah*. Secondly, the healing effects of Qur'anic recitation, striking the body, and pressing nerve centers are supported by their interpretations of *hadīth*. Ustadz Fadlan, a frequent speaker on proper Islamic belief (*aqīdah*), began using these methods at his home in 1996 to heal people disturbed by jinn and sorcery. Later he became part of a network of *ruqyah* healers affiliated with *Majalah Ghoib* and the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS), a neo-modernist Islamic political party.

His therapy center we visited in Kotagede was a large house with one large carpeted room to the left of the main entrance which was used for men and another one further inside for women. There was a small reception room near the front of the house and a window to the right where patients sign in for therapy sessions and buy Ustadz Fadlan's booklets and tape cassettes used for therapy at home. PKS stickers were posted on the windows of therapy center. Men and women and children there for treatment were directed to the two large rooms and told to lie on the carpet facing Mecca and copies of the Qur'an were placed on their chests. Family members and friends sat outside on the porch and some peered into the male treatment room but the women's room was inside and not accessible without the healer's permission. Even though the women's bodies were covered with robes or long tunics, headscarves and sarongs, they were given an extra degree of privacy since these body coverings could potentially come undone during therapy. After the patients were prepared, the *ustadz*, either live or on tape cassettes, recited

4 Ustadz Fadlan (n.d., 4) distinguishes between two types of "*ruqyah*" in his therapy booklet. *Ruqyah syar'iyyah* is the "form permitted by *syari'ah*" that brings "protection, blessings, and compassion from Allah," while *ruqyah syirkiyyah* is the "form that entails elements of polytheism" that "invites Satan and those cursed by Allah, making one distant from Allah."

Figure 3.1 Ustadz Fadlan's assistants treating male patients

specific verses of Qur'an related to sorcery, Satan, jinn, and belief in Allah, over a large pot of water turning it into healing prayer water (*air doa*). Patients that reacted to the *ruqyah* by twitching, experiencing pain or screaming were treated individually by the assistants who pressed small wooden tools or their fingers into the nerve centers and/or struck them with their hands or with straw brooms (see Figure 3.1). The healers recited Qur'an, the call to prayer, and prayers and ordered the jinn to leave the bodies of the patients, continuing to press and strike parts of the body related to the problem. Many of the patients, men and women, would squirm, scream, and spit phlegm out of their mouths during the Qur'anic recitation. Following this group session, there was individual treatment for patients demonstrating some reaction during which the healers spoke directly to the patients asking their feelings and experiences, investigating their backgrounds, religious practices and affiliations.

Most of the patients were young men and women experiencing a variety of social, emotional, and mental problems such as intense anger, frustration, suspicion, and inability to properly perform normative Islamic practices. For instance, many patients complained of not being able to concentrate or recite Qur'anic verses correctly during daily prayers. One of the partners of married couples also complained of lack of interest in sexual relations or the inability of being aroused or attaining penile erection. Some complained of physiological illnesses which biomedical specialists were not able to detect and/or treat such as lumps that move to various parts of the body but do not appear under any physical examinations.

In the process of individual and group discussions these "pious" Muslim healers strove to convince the patients that the root of their problems lied in their former or current *kejawen* or heterodox mystical practices. For instance, many patients reported visiting *keramat*, taking purifying baths in water containing charms, practicing martial arts' inner power exercises, or seeking mystical powers through meditation or various methods taught in particular Javanist sects. Some also reported being filled (*diisi*) with *ilmu* or supernatural powers by their parents or other relatives. These *ruqyah* healers explained to patients that the additional inner powers they were told were "gifts" from Allah or via holy people buried at sacred graves actually come from being possessed by jinn. Furthermore, they were told that Allah only gives two kinds of additional powers: miracles given to prophets and messengers and "*karamah*" given to select people who strive to be close to Allah and struggle for the true principles of Islam. Patients are generally diagnosed with having suffered possession by jinn as a result of these heterodox practices or being victims of sorcery often originating from a *dukun* or *kyai* with whom they previously sought treatment. They were told, as I was during my interview with Ustadz Fadlan, that many *dukun* and *kyai* employ the assistance of jinn in order to treat patients and this causes spiritual ruin in the end. Ustadz Fadlan argued in a public forum on the supernatural realm at the Kotagede Masjid that Prophet Sulaiman's gift from Allah of leadership of jinn and several animals was a miracle. While not dismissing the assertion from a Sufi-oriented scholar on the panel that some *ustadz* who are pious could instruct jinn to go and call other jinn to Islam, Fadlan stressed that jinn must not intervene in human affairs because this contradicts the Qur'an. Ustadz Fadlan's assistants also warned patients to be careful of *kyai* healers that tell them to pray and make prayers but also to sacrifice a chicken or goat as a form of *amalan*; they are mixing *halal* with *batil* (Ar. *Baṭil*), the good with the bad.

Patients who did not report any such Javanist or heterodox traditionalist Muslim practices, but who reacted to the *ruqyah* and pressure applied to nerve endings and centers, were generally diagnosed as being victims of sorcery coming from jealous, envious and revengeful people in their social lives. These people were thought to have enlisted the aid of traditional sorcerers. On the other hand, patients with physiological complaints but no reaction were generally told that they suffer from some sort of medical problem and were referred to Islamic healers that use massage and herbal medicines. But they reminded people that their *ruqyah* method, unlike the syncretistic methods of *dukun* and many *kyai*, is the "prophetic way of healing" and so it is good for all kinds of illnesses.

Patients were given *air doa* before they left and told to come for more therapy sessions and to listen to Fadlan's *ruqyah* tape cassettes and recite verses and selected prayers from his booklets at home, because it often takes a long time to drive the evil spirits out of their bodies, especially if they suffered from sorcery or long-term possession. In addition, of course, they must discontinue all *kejawen* or heterodox Sufi practices and become attendant of normative Islamic worship. Some patients are recruited into PKS and many others become supporters. PKS,

a party strongly based amongst urban intellectuals, students, professionals, and activists, has a public platform dedicated towards cleaning up rampant corruption and improving Indonesian society through making its citizens more observant of Islamic principles and practices. These *salafi*-oriented healers are active seeking both spiritual and political order in Indonesian society.

Ustadz Fadlan's and his network of healers' criticism of Sufi-oriented healing and mystical practices does not go unanswered. One local *kyai* questioned the Islamic basis of their method of pressing wooden objects into nerve centers to elicit reactions and their broad interpretation that people are possessed by jinn. He asserted that they themselves may be possessed by jinn. A *kyai*-trained healer that observed their treatment methods and mode of diagnoses contested their perspective that all *tenaga dalam* methods of healing make use of jinn. He also thought that their method of indicating possession by jinn or sorcery was overly complicated and not as exact as the *bakam* method used by many *kyai* which involves making small slices in the skin and deploying vacuum cups to test the blood from patient's backs and interpreting the color of the blood as an indicator of health or illness. He felt that many people at Fadlan's therapy center with no reaction may be possessed by jinn or be the victims of sorcery and many with a reaction may not be.

Converging and Contesting Islamic Discourses

Islamic revivalist discourses, relatively muted under Suharto's regime, have found more public voices during the Reformation era. Sufi and *salafi*-oriented scholars, practitioners, and activists converged in their criticism of many aspects of *kejawen* beliefs and practices in general of which *kejawen* shamans represent a particular case. For instance, *dukun* practices of offering food, drinks, flowers, and incense to spiritual beings, using amulets and charms, reciting syncretistic Javanist mantra, and seeking inner powers from haunted places were relegated as un-Islamic. Such practices were discursively denigrated as originating in Javanese Hinduism and as contrary to the core belief of Islamic monotheism. Muslim reformers also criticized *dukun* as practitioners of evil forms of magic and harmful sorcery proscribed by Islamic texts.

As the cases of Pak Subandi and Pak Joko demonstrated, many traditional healers were trying to disassociate themselves from the negative behavioral expectations linked to the category *dukun*. These supernatural healers tried to stress the Islamic elements blended into their training and healing regimen and their benevolent desire to help people and do good deeds. They referred to the Javanese ancestral origins of many of their practices but never to the Hindu cultural stream. In addition, unlike traditional healers of the preceding decade, they tried to distance themselves from the category *dukun* and subsume themselves under more general categories such as *orang pintar* or *paranormal*. Nevertheless, their extensive *kejawen* knowledge and experience, perceived lack of Islamic knowledge, and continued use of many traditional elements in their healing

performances instantiates the behavioral expectations most of my interlocutors hold for *dukun*.

While the cases of Pak Asnuri, Pak Asdie, and Pak Fadlan demonstrate some of the convergent charges against *kejawen dukun*, they also exemplify a thread of differences and contests between Sufi and *salafi*-oriented healers and their public discourses. They did not tend to agree on what are proper Islamic healing methods and related spiritual pursuits. Whereas Sufi-oriented healers allow for a wide range of Islamic healing methods, including *zikir, selawat Nabi*, prayers, *tenaga dalam*-enhanced massage, and prescribed performance of *amalan*, *salafi*-oriented healers restrict Islamic healing methods to two types: spiritual forms that use recitation of Qur'an and prayers and *air doa* and physical forms that use massage and medication. While Sufi-oriented healers viewed many methods of attaining inner powers as permissible, *salafi*-oriented healers considered them to be forbidden. While Sufi-oriented healers interpreted many special spiritual powers as "gifts" from Allah, as *ilmu, ilham,* or *wahyu*-like blessings, *salafi*-oriented healers interpreted them as resulting from possession by jinn. Moreover, while Sufi-oriented healers reinforced traditionalist Muslim perceptions of them as individuals with *karamah* or even of being *keramat*, *salafi*-oriented healers did not project themselves as supernatural healers; hence their avoidance of the title *kyai*. Instead, the latter network of healers asserted that the power lies in their "prophetic healing method" based in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*.[5]

These divergent Islamic discourses also entail contesting visions for Indonesian society. Although both the Sufi and *salafi*-oriented perspectives represented here strove to replace the *kejawen* worldview often associated with legitimizing Suharto's long reign, they offer different Islamic-inspired ways of ordering life. Many Javanese thought that Suharto, born into a poor agricultural family, possessed a special form of charisma (*wibawa*) based in his perceived spiritual ties with a Majapahit king and ties through marriage to the Surakarta royal family (Saputra 2008). Javanese Sufi-oriented visions merged with these traditional views in respect to charismatic leaders; however, they projected leaders with Islamic knowledge who receive these exceptional spiritual powers from Allah and through the intercession of Muslim holy men. Moreover, they envisioned

5 Most Indonesian Muslim scholars follow the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence which is well-known for its emphasis on *qiyas* (analogical reasoning) as the main means of deriving legal rulings from the Qur'an and *Sunnah* (Khadduri 1961, 288; Kerr 1966, 66-79). In Islamic history, there has been an ongoing tension between esoteric and exoteric meanings and subjective and objective claims to truth. Many orthodox legal scholars, perceiving a threat from Sufi esotericism, "understandably sought to bolster the objectivity of the law in every way possible (Weiss 1990, 59)." Johansen (1996) examines similar religious discourses in contemporary Egypt focusing upon the leader of the *Muhammadiyah Shadhiliyya* Sufi order who negotiates the tensions between esoteric and exoteric orientations producing a public discourse both defending mystical pursuits and criticizing some traditional Sufi elements.

this leader as guiding Indonesian society closer to Islam while developing and performing good deeds. On the other hand, *salafi*-oriented perspectives placed less stress on charismatic leadership than on other characteristics such as piety, honesty, and trustworthiness. Furthermore, they emphasize visions of a more extensive implementation of Islamic rules and principles in society ushering in an order predicated on close adherence to *syari'ah*.

Chapter 4
Social Drama, *Dangdut* and Popular Culture

At the beginning of 2003, in the midst of a stalling reformation, a national controversy arose surrounding the new pop cultural star, Inul Daratista, and her dynamic and erotic performance style. Hailing from humble roots in East Java, she soared to national stardom upon the wings of her energetic new dance style called *goyang ngebor* or "The Drill" which she displayed on national television. On the heels of her popularity, *dangdut*, a long-time popular local cultural form amongst the lower social strata, broadened in its fan base encompassing the upper classes. Nevertheless, a broad array of forces aligned themselves against Inul and her new, highly visualized form of performance, attempting to restrict her appearances in local and national contexts. Indonesians were divided over what this emerging star, her body and style, meant and for a moment they sidelined many pressing problems as the debate raged. I will attempt to capture some of the social and cultural depth of this conflict applying a revised version of Victor Turner's (1974, 1987) concept of social drama.

Victor Turner contrasted "social dramas" from more harmonious "processual units" describing their constituent phases as: breach, mounting crisis, redressive actions, and reintegration. Instead of looking at these dramatic episodes as moments between largely harmonious social processes, I will examine them as parts of ongoing conflict and social contradictions that may only appear as more harmonious due to everyday theatrics of power, what Scott (1990, 426) called the "duress of the quotidian." Moving in this direction, I pay close attention to conditions at both ends of the social drama, before the breach and after the reintegration. In addition, within the drama itself, I will combine cognitive and symbolic approaches highlighting not only multivocality and communitas, but also the depth of cultural ideas, complex concepts that are evident in opposing perspectives. I will demonstrate that multiple interpretations of Inul's body, and by extension female bodies, and of her manner of dressing and dancing evoke contrasting forms of encyclopedic knowledge. This knowledge and the emotions it engenders produce forms of communitas for opposing segments of Indonesian society, a form of normative communitas for Muslim reformers and spontaneous/existential communitas for the masses of Inul supporters. Although my interviews and discussions with local people indicate a wide range of positions on Inul's performance style and reformist Muslim attempts to censor her, this social drama featured a strong opposition between institutionalized Islamic and anti-structural populist visions for Indonesian society. Before proceeding to discuss the extended

temporal field of the social drama, I will place *dangdut* in its local context alongside other popular cultural forms. In the final section, I will discuss some implications of this dramatic moment for equalization.

Dangdut Amidst Other Local Cultural Forms

The Department of Culture and Tourism and the Yogyakarta Palace often staged *dangdut* performances for mass entertainment at public events, including the night market of the palace-led *Sekaten*, as part of the celebration of Prophet Muhammad's birthday.[1] During *Sekaten* 2004, Ira Swara, one of three female hosts of a new nationally televised *dangdut* show, "DagDigDut," performed inside the elaborate walled and tented structures built in the northern palace square. Civil servants, business owners, and families and neighbors present *dangdut* throughout the region at nightclubs, amusement parks, tourism venues, and at weddings and other rites of passage. People have long been familiar with the erotic nature of *dangdut* performances in these local contexts. Whenever people have some time off, holidays and vacations, they can easily find *dangdut* shows that organizers and promoters make available for mass consumption. In fact, for *Lebaran*, one of the most meaningful and widely celebrated Muslim holidays following a month of fasting and soul-searching, *dangdut* was presented at numerous stages throughout the region. These sites included the popular tourist locations at Kaliurang and Parangtritis, Glagah, Trisik, Kulonprogo, Mangiran Bantul, Rawa Jombor Klaten—mostly mountain and beach sites—and at the privately owned amusement parks, Purawisata and Gembira Loka (KR 24 November 2003). It has become a tradition to seek out tourist and amusement sites for rest and relaxation with friends and family, many of whom *mudik*, return to their hometowns for *Lebaran*. In Grobogan, Central Java, permission to stage *dangdut* at three tourist sites for *Lebaran* was rejected by the local tourism office because they feared there would be so many people there that disturbances would take place (KR 24 November 2003).

For *Lebaran*, I went to the Gembira Loka amusement park and zoo, where, together with the Purawisata, there were five days of cultural performances featuring *dangdut* in an event titled *Pentas Dangdut Lebaran 2003*. There were two stages at Gembira Loka, one for *dangdut* and one for traditional cultural arts such as *jathilan* and *angguk putri*. The hypnotizing Javanese rhythms and singing rang out through the amusement park as fifty or sixty people stood around the fenced-in area where the spirit-possessed performers danced in trance climbing trees, fighting with swords, and opening young coconuts with their bare teeth. Locals know *jathilan, reog,* and their variants for these and other exciting feats, including chewing glass, which they call *atraksi* (attractions), expressing the mass appeal these old village "syncretistic" forms hold for people. People associated

1 Ceres Pioquinto (1995) conducted an ethnographic study of female representations in *dangdut* performances during *Sekaten* events in Surakarta (Solo).

these cultural forms with "*abangan*" because of traditional "*kejawen*" practices, such as making offerings before performances, spirit-possession, and visiting cemeteries and sacred sources of water in search of supernatural powers, to which the performers of these forms often adhere. For many spectators, *jathilan* holds no religious meaning or novelty since they often see it in their villages as entertainment for weddings, circumcisions, and graduations because it is much cheaper than sponsoring *dangdut*. Nevertheless, they are attracted to the strong emotions such as fear and amazement it inspires. *Angguk putri*, performed on this traditional stage on a different day, is one of the local cultural forms, like *kuntulan* and *badui*, which local people associated with "*santri*" because *selawat* and other religious songs traditionally accompany these dance performances (Kuntowijoyo, Kasniyah, and Abubakar 1987; Soetrisman et al. 2003) and they *did* not involve dancing in trance. However, this *angguk putri* group, exhibiting a recent pattern of change for many of the cultural forms associated with *santri*, did have several female performers go into trance and perform *atraksi* attempting to capture more interest from the masses. Nevertheless, few people watched these shows, compared to the thousands of people amassed to see the *atraksi* in the area where the *dangdut* stage was located. This popularity of *dangdut* as a public cultural form was one of the main reasons I turned to include it in this study contrary to my initial plans.

Hundreds of young men were crowded around the front and sides of this *dangdut* stage, some shouting and spinning around swinging their shirts, some dancing with their friends, even under the direct sunlight, and some had alcohol on their breathe as they pushed forward moving closer to the performers. These men gazed at the string of female *dangdut* performers wearing tight clothes and miniskirts and stretched out their hands to the women seeking to shake their hands after they came out on the stage. The interaction between the performers and males in the audience, shaking hands and chatting, sometimes saying "naughty" things, follows a pattern of flirtation which seems to have long been a part of this pop cultural form.[2] Their songs were about love, romance and enjoying life for the most part, and taken together with the music, exhibited this form's *orkes melayu* roots and its absorptive quality. This cultural form is similar to the Malay language in the way it is spread across the region, and like *bahasa Melayu*, which was a common market language before becoming national languages in Malaysia and Indonesia, *musik Melayu* was also *budaya rakyat*, the culture of the common people across the Malayo-Indonesian region. Malay performance arts, music and dance, have long absorbed Arab influence. However, *dangdut* appears to have emerged with its distinctive rhythms in the 1960s with several songs with Indian-style beats (Mona Lohanda 1991, 139-40). It has continued to absorb Indian and

2 Pioquinto (1995, 73-4) reports that in 1991 in Surakarta, seating for the audience created a boundary to direct contact between the audience and performers on raised stages in the *Sekaten* night market tents. There were no such boundaries in these *Sekaten*, Gembira Loka, and Purawisata events in Yogyakarta. Men stood around the stages in these venues and occasionally made direct contact with female performers.

Arab elements, and in the 1970s and 80s Rhoma Irama moved *dangdut* in the direction of mixing Western beats such as rock and jazz with *dangdut* rhythms (Mona Lohanda 1991,143). In the 90s and 2000s, *dangdut* is absorbing cultural flows from the United States and Japan, sometimes via Korea and Taiwan, who have also fallen under the influence of hegemonic American images of beauty and body style (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003).

Each of the female performers, besides wearing revealing clothing, swung their hips and gyrated in various sexually-suggestive ways precipitating excitement from the mostly-male audience, which was typical for local *dangdut* performers long before Inul Daratista emerged on the national stage with her *goyang ngebor*. Performers of many traditional cultural arts, such as *dombret*, *ronggeng*, *jaipong,* and *tayub*, from various regions across Java have also moved their bodies in erotic fashions and *campursari* and *dangdut* performers incorporate these movements into their *goyang* (see Pioquinto 1995, 80-1; Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 100, 199; Sumbogo 2003). However, before Inul became prominent, the *goyang* of most nationally televised *dangdut* performers involved swaying the body slightly to the music, and many people even considered this inappropriate at times. They tried to make their body movements fit the music and lyrics, whereas with Inul and those following her, highly visualized dance movements dominate performances regardless of music or lyrics (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 120-136). Nowadays, the "feminine aura" of *dangdut* has expanded in its expression of female sexuality. Many locals have told me that they perceive men who perform *dangdut* as being feminine, with the possible exception of the "King of *Dangdut*," Rhoma Irama, who sang many songs encouraging people to be mindful of religious values and norms. Locals considered most male *dangdut* performers to be like *waria*, third gender males, or at least "weak" men lacking in their masculinity.[3] The nature of their songs, about missing lovers or being heart broke and so forth, no doubt, contributes to this perceived contradiction of behavioral expectations for men. Yet, this symbolic association of *dangdut* with femininity has now moved further to put female sexuality on display in both local and nationally-televised contests, as each of these performers on the Gembira Loka stage, stuck out their buttocks or made grinding movements with their hips, at times evoking the *goyang* styles of many new national *dangdut* stars.

On another occasion, I attended a *dangdut* program called "Goyang Sehati" on the Purawisata stage during one of its "regular" Saturday night shows. Only this time, it was not the routine weekly event, as the *dangdut* program was promoted together with a *waria* beauty contest, *Waria Luwes Grandfinal 2003*. This was the fourteenth year that this entertainment promotion company has organized this contest and *dangdut* show. The *waria* beauty contest took place first with fifteen *waria* dressed in *sarong* and *kebaya* (traditional Javanese female attire) and twenty *waria* dressed in evening gowns stepped across the stage in high-heeled shoes to

3 The Indonesian category for male transgender and transsexual persons, *waria*, is formed through combining parts of the words *wanita* (woman) and *pria* (man).

the supportive shouts, screams, and applause from their friends, fellow *waria*, and hundreds of heterosexual men. There were many *waria* present from the area including the head of the *waria* association and some of them were wearing Islamic headscarves. In this social space, an entertainment venue, heterosexual men seemed to accept and enjoy the presence of *waria*, even dancing together in the same area in front of the stage later in the evening. I later interviewed a young headscarf-wearing *waria*, a student at UGM writing her undergraduate thesis (*skripsi*) on *waria* that I met at this Purawisata program. She told me that she is baffled by the way heterosexual men seem to accept *waria* as entertainers but look down on them and discriminate against them in the broader societal context. Indeed, Dorce, a *waria* who has had a sex-change operation, is a popular entertainer and hosts several shows on television, but *waria* still experience stigmatization as a sexual minority and find it hard to be accepted and included in society-at-large as anything other than entertainers and prostitutes. Perhaps people are also more accepting of them in a *dangdut* context, because of the sexual openness and sex trade that increasingly characterizes these entertainment venues.[4]

After the *waria* contest, the *dangdut* show began with the host introducing the first performer who was a male *dangdut* singer and the audience stayed where they were, a fair distance from the stage, for the most part as he performed. However, when the next performer, the first of a series of female singers took the stage, a flood of men moved from the sides and back to the area in front of the stage. Following the typical script, the female artists, mostly wearing tight pants stepped forward and shook the hands of several men and swiveled their hips and other body parts in popular *goyang* styles, while the heterosexual men, dancing beside *waria*, reveled in their sexuality.

Every television station now broadcasts *dangdut* shows featuring popular national stars, such Nita Thalia, Ira Swara, Anissa Bahar, and Kristina, following the controversial emergence of Inul Daratista on the national stage in early 2003. Most of these shows involve predominantly female artists performing in tight-fitting attire with backup bands, background dancers, and an audience. Some are broadcast live and others recorded, and some present only *dangdut* artists while others, like Inul's *Sang Bintang* on *SCTV*, regularly includes "pop" and "rock" groups as well. The female singers, at times accompanied by male singers, and mostly female background dancers, who are also generally dressed in short skirts

4 Chamim et al. (2003) discuss some of the performance arts such as *tayub* or *gambyong* in rural East Java involving female dancers performing sexually-suggestive moves in social settings associated with alcoholic drinks, gambling and prostitution. On 5 March 2004, the serial "Peristiwa" aired on TV7 presenting a documentary about *waria* in the traditional melodramatic theatrical form, *ludruk*, most popular in East Java. It stated that *waria* have been a part of these performances for forty-two years and that one *waria* can sexually service around twenty men per night. It showed *waria* from the troupe Warna Jaya, one of the roving *ludruk* groups dancing in *ludruk* style, while in the grounds around the performances *waria* sex workers serviced male customers.

and tops and tight-fitting attire, perform various types of sensual *goyang*. They are increasingly exploring mesmerizing feats of "physical technology," high energy grinding and acrobatics, to create a circus-like spectacle for onlookers (Simatupang 2003). Some shows even have women in the audience swinging their hips and grinding their bodies like the performers on stage. Other television stations broadcast them live from large entertainment centers with thousands of enthusiastic, mostly-male fans, crowded around the stage performing the usual rites. *Dangdut* performances entailing the foregrounding of sex, with the female body as spectacle, long present in Central Java, has gone national (cf. Pioquinto 1995, 60, 80). Many of the artists have their own distinctive styles of *goyang*, such as Inul's *goyang ngebor*, Anissa Bahar's *goyang patah-patah*, or Uut Permatasari's *goyang ngecor*[5] that are named, or Nita Thalia's, Ira Swara's, and Dewi Persik's which have not taken on names of their own but are also quite well-known.

The *goyang* named or not has become a symbolic object which has taken on a life of its own as a commodity in the world of marketing and advertising. A long list of Indonesian and foreign companies advertise their products, from motorcycles to hair shampoo, on commercials during *dangdut* programs, and some like Sarimi (instant noodle brand) have their own shows. The cost of advertising during these widely watched shows is relatively expensive and some of this money from the enhanced popularity of *dangdut* descends into the hands of the artists, many of whom have suddenly experienced radical changes in the material conditions of their lives (Tempo 27 October 2002, 128; Forum 30 March 2003, 52-57; Pioquinto 1995, 83-86). Similar to rap music, arising out of poor African American neighborhoods in the U.S. stigmatized as low-class culture before becoming part of national pop culture, *dangdut*, long popular with *wong cilik* (J. common people) has become a national pop form popular with all social strata, rich, middle class and poor. To understand the dynamics of the mushrooming of *dangdut* we need to look briefly at the controversy surrounding Inul Daratista.

Social Drama and Reformation Dynamics

Victor Turner's social drama (1974, 1987) framework can be used fruitfully to analyze the controversial emergence of *dangdut* on the national stage as described above; yet, we must consider the social conflict before the "breach" and following the "reintegration" of the crisis. Long before the breach, during the New Order regime, former President Suharto extended his authoritarian rule over cultural forms and Islamic organization, supporting forms that trumpeted his ideology and political messages and suppressing forms and organizations that seemed opposed to his interests. *Dangdut*, among other *abangan* cultural forms, was stigmatized as low-class, unrefined culture, and was largely restricted from the national stage

5 *Goyang patah-patah* involves a movement of the hips in a circular motion broken (*patah*) with stops at several points, and *goyang ngecor* involves hip swinging while standing on one leg.

except for Bang Haji Rhoma Irama, who "cleaned up" this raw pop cultural form with many songs containing normative Islamic messages. Rhoma Irama obtained extensive access to the government television station, TVRI, after leaving PPP (an Islamic party) and joining Golkar, the dominant, government party during the New Order era (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 313-321). Cultural artists that did not join up with government controlled organizations were not given access to television stations, which were all directly owned by the government or Suharto and his family members until the 1990s. President Suharto and Golkar organized artists such as Rhoma Irama using them to bring together public support for every general election. In 1975, the New Order regime formed a group of Islamic scholars, MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*), as a national container for these forces used to make authoritative Islamic rulings (*fatwa*) consistent with the perspectives and interests of the political elite (ibid, 322; M. B. Hooker 2003). People came to consider MUI as an institution providing an Islamic stamp to the wishes of the New Order regime. In the latter period of Suharto's rule, he also developed relationships with ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia), utilizing this modernist Muslim intellectual organization to strengthen his position with this sector of the Muslim community, as opposition to his authoritarian rule was growing stronger amongst the masses.[6] In the era of *Reformasi*, following the mass uprisings and protests which finally forced Suharto from power, many of the groups and individuals seen as supporting the New Order regime lost much of their credibility with the people.

Moreover, following the fall of Suharto, many groups formerly supportive of the New Order regime together with several Muslim elements of the reformation movement waged campaigns for "moral" change, not speaking to the macro-structural issues the masses felt to be most pressing. MUI, quickly reinvented as a reformist institution after Suharto fell, focused its attention on "moral" problems such as gambling, prostitution, narcotics, pornography, rather than on KKN (Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism), which was the main demand of protesters. Along these lines, MUI issued a *fatwa* in April of 2001 about pornography and pornographic activities, and in the same year, they forbade the importation and use of some Japanese products because they reportedly contained pork fat.[7] Other Islamic organizations and parties focused on the "moral" challenges posed by Christianization and Westernization and the fighting in Maluku and Poso between Muslims and Christians (ibid, 322-335). MUI also issued a *fatwa* in 2003 forbidding interest from banks. These morally framed issues gained much momentum in the post-9/11 context of the U.S.-led "War on Terror," with these interpreted as

6 During the last ten years of its rule, the New Order regime turned to give a more public, though limited, space for politico-jural expressions of Islam (see Hooker 2003, 20; Daniels 2007, 242; Tanthowi 2008, 13-16).

7 In October 2008, Indonesian lawmakers passed a highly controversial anti-pornography law supported by several Islamic parties, organizations, and the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (MSN 2008).

stemming from non-Muslim, western influence. Activist reformers attacked many nightclubs, catering to foreigners, across Indonesia. However, a backlash from other segments of Indonesian society began to take shape and grow stronger opposing the reformist discourse and approach to reformation. United States institutions funded many "traditionalist" groups arguing against the moralizing and anti-American discourse of the reformers (see Ramage 2004). Thus, when the conflict over Inul arose, there had been a standoff for some time between Muslim reformists and their detractors, both Indonesian and western, who had gained an upper hand with the presidential victory of Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The initial appearance of Inul on the live, nationally-broadcast show, "Digoda," on Trans TV, in January 2003 (FX Rudy Gunawan 2003, 3), in which she performed her exciting *goyang ngebor*, precipitated the "breach" wherein many Islamic organizations and institutions began to protest the openly sexual nature of her performances. Inul was already popular in local areas and video compact discs of her shows were circulating across the region, exhibiting many of her scintillating actions on stage. Her presentation style combines the sexy, athletic style from the west, especially the U.S., with the cute and lovely style from Japan. She says she derived inspiration for her *goyang* from watching MTV and subsequently tried to fit MTV-style dance to the music and tempo of *dangdut* (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 58, 67-109). MUI of East Java, in February 2003, declared that Inul's attire and dancing fell under their ruling against pornography and requested the government restrict her performances (ibid, 30). They also threatened television stations with punishment from laws restricting the press from airing "pornography" (Forum 11 May 2003). As the "mounting crisis" proceeded, MUI in Solo and municipal authorities in Yogyakarta also made moves to restrict Inul from performing in these cities, arguing that her clothing and *goyang* did not fit with the culture of these areas and would degrade the morals of people. Rhoma Irama, the head of PAMMI (Persatuan Artis Musik Melayu Indonesia), the Indonesian Malay Music Artists' Association, also argued that Inul must be stopped from performing and immediately forbade her from using any of his songs and those of other members of PAMMI. These "normative" Islamic voices expressed concerns about Inul's explicit flouting of Islamic norms of covering required parts of the body (*aurat*) and how her sexually provocative movements would arouse the *hawa nafsu*, lustful desires, of men in the general public leading to low morality and an increase in cases of rape. Rhoma Irama declared that struggling to boycott "*dangdut* ala Inul" is *jihad* (Forum 11 May 2003, 22). Some of my local contacts agreed with this criticism of Inul and applied it to other *dangdut* artists arguing that they should be restricted; yet, allowing for *dangdut* in a changed form. One neo-modernist Muslim activist told me that there is "no *dangdut* in Islam," expressing total opposition to it as a cultural form.

In the process of resolving the conflict, Inul met with Rhoma Irama to apologize for her behavior, reportedly kissing his knee and crying, but Inul rejected his demands and the requests of other religious figures arguing that her *goyang* was her unique style and refusing to change it. She said, "They can give me advice,

but they can't stop me singing or dancing the way I want to. I'm a Muslim, but I'm also an artist. I don't want to mix religion and art" (FX Rudy Gunawan 2003, 77). Rhoma Irama in turn continued to call for her suppression and a holy war against "*Inulisasi*," the spread of her type of performances in the music world and on television. On the other hand, the dominant mass media and masses of people, some forming fan clubs, supported Inul. Many of my respondents have expressed opinions that MUI and Rhoma Irama went about advising Inul in the wrong way and that they do not have a right to tell her how to perform. Most respondents to surveys supported Inul over Rhoma and many of them expressed the view that Rhoma is a *munafik* or hypocrite charging that he is guilty of the things he accuses Inul of and that he has a large sexual libido, having married more than one wife and having been involved in sex scandals (see Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 239-45). Furthermore, most people seem to consider *dangdut* to be art (*seni*) and/or entertainment (*hiburan*) and feel that religious principles and rulings should not intrude in these domains of cultural life. Others have expressed that *dangdut* is "*budaya rakyat*," people's culture, opposing attempts to undermine its connection with the people, and that people who participate in a *dangdut* show dancing together form a special bond and relationship.

Inul received immense publicity when Taufik Kiemas, the husband of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, appeared on national television swinging his own buttocks dancing with her. Moreover, she received support from former President Abdurrahman Wahid who met and held press conferences with her in which he argued that it was a case of "human rights" and Inul's freedom of expression had to be defended (Forum 11 May 2003, 33). Some of my local contacts echoed Gus Dur's position about human rights; even many of those who disagree with her style of dressing and dancing think that authorities should not force her to comply with religious rulings. In the "redressive" phase of this social drama, the courts did not interpret Inul's performance as "pornography" or "pornographic activity" and television stations have not been restricted from airing her performances. Emha Ainun Nadjib, a famous playwright, poet, and Islamic leader (see chapters six and seven), and other public figures began to make the call for people to focus on more important, substantive issues rather than continuing to bicker over Inul's butt and "body politics" (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 175-180). Not only did Inul evade formal court censure, but with "reintegration" Inul obtained two television programs, one musical show, *Sang Bintang* (The Star), and one dramatic series, *Kenapa Harus Inul* (Why It Has to be Inul), about her life and experiences. In fact, *dangdut* programs and "gossip" shows about *dangdut* artists spread like wildfire as television stations and corporations hustled to capitalize on the power of the *goyang*. Before moving on to discuss this "reintegration" further, let us look more deeply at some of the key symbols, notions, and projections of desirable futures that arose and were expressed during the mounting crisis.

In the midst of this social drama, the major disputed symbol was that of Inul's body, especially her butt and hips. Inul's tight-fitting body suits and gyrating movements with her butt sticking out, often facing the audience, has generated

strong responses on all sides. Most people view her body and movements as sexy and erotic, expressing positive or negative feelings about this. While many of her supporters revel in the enjoyment of physical arousal and excitement, drawing attention to how large and strong her butt is, those that view her sensuality negatively, argue that her form of attire leaves the female *aurat* open, insufficiently covered, thereby arousing lower and sinful human desires, *hawa nafsu*. According to their interpretations of Islamic concepts, reformists argue that people must keep the human body and its physical desires under control, regulated along the course of permitted satisfaction prescribed through the divine guidance of the Qur'an and the traditions of Prophet Muhammad. If these desires are out of control, they are susceptible to demonic temptation that leads to more immorality and forbidden, evil activities, such as fornication and rape. In fact, reformists interpreted Inul's presentation style as "pornographic" and entailing "pornographic actions" due to the way they flout Islamic principles of proper covering for the body and openly express sexuality. From this perspective, people interpreted her *goyang* as *goyangan setan* or "Satan's Dance." Similarly, some people, arguing from the perspective of traditional customs and "Indonesian" etiquette asserted that Inul's physical style was impolite in turning her buttocks towards the audience, considered extremely disrespectful in local cultures. For instance, in Java it is the norm for people to partially cover their backside with their arm and hand when turning their backs to people in social settings. Furthermore, from the perspective of traditional Javanese philosophy, the body (*tubuh*) is lower than the soul (*ruh*), brawn (*okol*) to brain *(akal*) and so forth, a cosmic hierarchy Inul inverts with her dominance of body over the soul. This perspective casts common people, *wong cilik*, as creatures living on the level of the body, while the aristocrats, intellectuals, and mystic masters live at higher spiritual levels in which they control their bodies with *akal* (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 173). In addition to evoking ideas about proper body covering, control of the body and channeling desires along permitted lines, and evil forces, reformists call upon other complex concepts such as *dakwah* (Ar. Da'wa; calling to Islam), *mubaligh* (person introducing Islam), *jihad* (holy struggle), and *umat* (Islamic community) that emphasize the imperative to properly promote Islamic standards. Clearly, the female body and Inul's dance and attire elicit encyclopedic meanings, all that people know about such matters, and not just lexical or dictionary meanings of these symbols (see Lehman 1978).

In contrast to these meanings along the ideological or normative pole, local supporters of Inul remain much closer to the "orectic" or concrete poles, largely elaborating upon the experience of sensuality, though nonetheless drawing upon encyclopedic knowledge. However, they do frame these experiences in terms of "creative dance," "art," "entertainment," performers making a living, and "people's music and culture." This perspective often places the significance of art and entertainment as an avenue for people to free themselves of frustrations, a space to be free from the stresses and travels of everyday life. It also relates the form of *dangdut* Inul represents to the "common people," meaning average village and urban neighborhood residents of the lower classes, constructing

a "grassroots" identity. Gus Dur and other intellectuals presented the more ideological interpretation supporting Inul's body and dance style, calling upon concepts of "human rights" and "freedoms" of artistic expression and so forth. These concepts provided a rhetorical and political frame for many of her supporters who were more concerned with, and focused upon enjoying life, submerged in the feast of sensuality. The sense of "communitas," a diffuse feeling of equality and oneness, for these common, local supporters, did not emanate from the concepts of rights, freedoms, and liberal democracy, but from the experience of Inul's "body language" and their intense dancing, entering into trance-like states of consciousness (Faruk and Aprinus Salam 2003, 187).[8] Inul facilitates potent feelings of equality through her public disregarding of normative behavior, turning her butt to the audience and performing her sensual moves in defiance of Islamic and Indonesian normative authorities. In one popular song, "*Goyang* Inul" (Inul's *Goyang*), written for Inul, she and other performers who sing it tell spectators, 'adult men and women, not to be surprised or mad when Inul dances, excuse it… one thousand one kinds of problems, just forget them and look at Inul's *goyang* as medicine to make you happy, healthy, and prosperous.' Most popular *dangdut* songs are about love, romance, problems in relationships, and defiantly about sensual *goyang* itself. Local participants elaborate on this deviant, anti-structural behavior through drinking, taking drugs, and pulling their shirts off and screaming in front of the stages.

This contrasts with the reformists sense of communitas produced and expressed through calls to the Muslim *umat* coming together to perform their duties of upholding proper morality, spreading Islam, and fighting against the forces of evil, men and demons. These campaigns and the intense feelings they bring forth create a broad, powerful sense of equality of all Muslims as humble servants of God, submerged in a community of believers. Reformists often express feelings that they are acting out of desires to change the dominant social and cultural patterns in the world that are supported by corrupt rulers and global forces. This reformist movement, led by highly structured groups, maintains a sense of normative and ideological communitas produced through its anti-structural ideas envisioning a space in which all fellow believers participate in struggling to realize Islam in the world. They project desirable futures in which the Muslim majority in Indonesian society will unite behind a campaign to formally institute Islamic laws. Proper public comportment and morality, an Islamized social order, will be upheld by state-institutionalized and enforced legal rulings. Yet, in contrast to the largely existential communitas of common people who participate in *dangdut* "happenings," reformist groups have "routinized" their anti-structural spirit of communitas within hierarchically organized groups and institutions which are already an integral part of the social structure. Indeed, the masses of Inul

8 Pioquinto (1995, 74) states that the "egalitarian nature of dangdut performances" was suggested by the way seating arrangement at the shows were "not mapped out to form or endorse prevailing social relations or power structures."

supporters project desirable futures in which everyday people will have better ways of making a living and improving their quality of life. They project visions of an Indonesian society where there will be more public spaces for expressions of people's arts, entertainment and equality, and release from rigid social hierarchies. Moreover, they tend to envision a society in which common people will be able to pursue their interests without being hindered by the "moral police" and religious enforcers. Some appear to believe that some form of a "liberal democracy," with protections for human rights, including freedom of expression, would be the best container for such aspirations.[9]

Widespread support for Inul continuing her *goyang*, the refusal of courts to issue any formal ruling against her, and calls from prominent public figures for the country to focus upon more important matters brought the redressive phase into reintegration. In the aftermath of this social drama, we can note that Inul, high-voltage *goyang*, and "people's culture" rose in prominence and normative Muslim authorities have lost, if they ever had, a great deal of respect and legitimacy in the eyes of many common Indonesians. Gradually events began to redirect these contrasting and opposing forms of communitas and the social segments experiencing and espousing them away from the issue of Inul and "body politics" and into other fields. The most significant field for the second half of 2003 and 2004 was the first general election in which Indonesians would directly elect their president and vice-president.

General elections in Indonesia usually entail acts of violence between opposing parties and their supporters. Civil and religious leaders and authorities, out of fear of a repetition of past violent scenarios, began to call early for a peaceful general election and organized prayer vigils around the country supplicating for one. Political leaders and mass media labeled the election "Pesta Demokrasi Berbudaya" or "A Cultured Celebration of Democracy," and political parties locked themselves into a competition of using cultural arts and performances to attract and get their messages out to the people. Political parades and motorcades circulated through city streets and held rallies usually featuring some forms of popular cultural arts. The buzz of commentators was about whom Inul would come out to support and perform for, swinging the election on the power of her hips. Although Inul remained neutral in public, just making statements to the effect that she supported the people, most other artists, including *dangdut* stars, began to join forces with particular parties. The incumbent president, Megawati Sukarnoputri and her party, PDIP, led the way organizing prominent film and music stars into a support group. Most presidential tickets paired up a secular

9 The small but influential Liberal Islam Network (JIL) espouses ideas along the line of Abdurrahman Wahid, Nurcholish Madjid and other "liberal" Muslim reformers. Ulil Abshar-Abdalla (2003, 3), coordinator for this group, wrote: "Islam is a personal activity; while organizing public life is entirely the product of social agreement reached through procedures of democracy." [my translation]. M. B. Hooker (2003) discusses Wahid, Madjid, and two other "liberal" Muslim reformers, Hazairin and Harun Nasution.

nationalist candidate for president with a traditional religious figure, prominent NU personalities, as vice presidential candidate. These campaigns used *dangdut* widely, as these parties did in the earlier local and regional parliamentary elections, but the modernist and reformist-oriented Islamic parties were at a disadvantage in this regard because their use of the most popular form of "people's culture" would alienate their main base. Although many Islamic parties used popular cultural arts such as *campusari*, *angguk putri*, and even *jathilan*, they did not venture to present *dangdut*, especially in its most popular sensual form. This left them at a distinct disadvantage in appealing to the masses in the aftermath of a social drama in which this form of *dangdut* emerged triumphant.

Dramaturgy and Equalization

In addition to local views discussed above, many of my respondents have also mentioned the economic aspect of this social drama. Some male and female contacts have complained about the use of female bodies for advertising as exploitation of women. A young feminist activist who wears a headscarf (*jilbab*) told me that although she disagrees with the style of dress and dance of many *dangdut* performers, she supports their right as women workers and opposes any attempts to restrict them from earning a living. Some female students have expressed concerns about how the *dangdut* phenomenon is not all about *goyang* but it has to be looked at in relation to the broader Indonesian society in which women are "second class citizens." Again, we must address and take to heart these lay anthropological perspectives, which place this public cultural form within its macro context.

Taken together these local perspectives point out the paradox common to pop cultural phenomena in many countries, in which, on the one hand, there is exploitation of a social strata, while on the other hand, this same social strata is gaining access to economic resources or other benefits via the same cultural form. In this case, *dangdut* supports the continued structural and cultural subordination of women and the perpetuation of patriarchy as television stations, advertisers, and capitalist companies commercialize women's bodies and sexuality utilizing them to market products (see also Pioquinto 1995, 82-3). Women are turned into the objects of the male gaze, *goyang* fetishes, named and unnamed, which capitalist corporations, many of them multinational, scramble to use to fulfill their profit motives. Cafes and hotels also often use female bodies as *atraksi* catering to upper class customers. On the other hand, women gain access to economic benefits as a higher paid entertainment workforce and thereby improve the material conditions of their lives. *Dangdut* also supports the inclusion of some sexual minorities in this entertainment workforce, despite reinforcing constructions of them as mere objects of entertainment and pleasure. In addition, *dangdut* as a form of deviance, breaking the norms of the broader society that tend to emphasize a greater degree of *malu* (restraint and shyness) for women and control over their devalued persons, constitutes a form of resistance.

On a national and global level, the emergence of *dangdut* is also a mixed bag. Nationally, it represents the development of a popular cultural form, *budaya rakyat*, to a more universally distributed level reaching all social strata in ways it hadn't before, in its more raw forms, with female sexuality and flirting on display and hot, nasty, sexually-suggestive lyrics. The increased exposure of this cultural form opens new opportunities for *wong cilik*, women and sexual minorities, to speak and express their concerns to a broader audience. Their existential communitas has not become highly ideological or organized. Yet, its triumphant emergence on a national stage also creates opportunities for elite "*priyayi*" to use this cultural form, as they have used others in the past, to deliver their political messages and to further their interests. In addition, it provides another example of the cultural basis for continuing polarization between modernist, reformist-oriented and secular, "syncretistic"-oriented social segments, with their opposing interpretations and senses of communitas. On a global level, *dangdut* not only represents another vehicle of integration into the global marketplace, but it also entails the flow of many cultural models and values from the West which are being absorbed into this cultural form and local cultures. In contrast to the aristocratic "revival-of-tradition" sort of response to globalization, Inul's *dangdut* "revolution" localizes western and Asian cultural influences, combining them with local musical and dance styles and producing a new "modern" Indonesian identity. For many local youth who have grown bored with traditional cultural arts, contemporary *dangdut* packages an Indonesian creation incorporating many foreign ingredients into something they can enjoy.

Chapter 5
Muslim Puritans, Cultural *Dakwah* and Reformation

I arrived at Masjid Agung Kauman, the great mosque on the palace grounds, in time to make evening prayers with the congregation and to listen to the *pengajian*, the religious lecture, which took place afterwards. This was the second night of *Sekaten*, the local celebration of Prophet Muhammad's Birthday, and the *Alun-Alun Utara* (northern courtyard) was full of people again but not as much as on the two previous nights when the sacred gamelan instruments were brought out of the palace and set up in the two small pavilions in front of Masjid Agung Kauman.[1] The grounds around the mosque were filled with vendors, selling *sega gurih*, clothes, hats and other items. *Sega gurih*, rice made with coconut milk, laurel (*salam*) leaves and salt, is eagerly awaited and associated with *Sekaten*. It was served with peanuts, dry black beans, cucumber, cabbage, dried, shredded shrimp, and Indonesian curry chicken (*ayam opor*). An elder woman buying some *sega gurih* from one of the woman vendors told me that it symbolizes the heritage of palace traditions, the time when they ate lots of dried foods because they had no means to keep food fresh. It also symbolizes produce from the earth, agricultural produce. The delicious smells emanating from these tasty dishes filled the air.

I parked my motorcycle in the lot on the mosque grounds and went inside to pray. After the obligatory and optional prayers, a Muhammadiyah religious scholar stepped up to the microphone at the front of the prayer hall giving the first religious lecture for the night. These religious lectures are usually given every night during the final week of *Sekaten*—from the time the palace gamelan groups begin to play outside the mosque culminating with the climactic procession of *gunungan*—between early and late evening prayers and following late evening prayers while gamelan is played. The *pengajian* tonight mentioned the occasion and

1 According to Javanese legend, Raden Patah of the Kingdom of Demak established *Sekaten* celebrating the month of *Maulud*, the birth month of Prophet Muhammad. In order to overcome problems faced in introducing Islam to local people, his religious advisor, "Sunan Kalijaga suggested mounting a *gamelan* and leather shadow puppet performance, which was very popular among people. The performance was held in the yard of Demak's Great Mosque. The Javanese who loved *gamelan* and *wayang* performance came in multitude to the Mosque. After the performance was over Sunan Kalijaga gave a sermon and immediately most of the audience converted to Islam" (Darban et al. 2002, 193-4). Out of his appreciation for the people, Sultan Demak gave them food, vegetables, fruit and other market goods piled up in the form of small mountains (*gunungan*).

the importance of how the *Wali Songo*, the nine Javanese saints, used gamelan as a means to make *dakwah*, broadcasting Islam to the people. He noted that last night the gamelan groups arrived and tonight they will begin holding a second religious lecture. The scholar proceeded to speak about the characteristics of *Rasulullah*, the Messenger of Allah, and the kind of leader he was, starting out with a small group of followers in Mecca and winding up with thousands of people, not just followers but members of an *umat* where people are equal and on the same level. Later, he brought his point home to Indonesia, expressing hopes that Indonesians in the upcoming election choose a good Muslim leader who will have many of these same characteristics—truthfulness, trustworthiness, intelligence, and eloquence—to lead Indonesia. He used an example of a young man in Muhammadiyah who had many great characteristics as a young man, and was highly respected.

In fact, the theme of the characteristics of Prophet Muhammad was discussed several times during *Sekaten pengajian*, making analogical connections with present-day Indonesia. On the following night, another Muhammadiyah religious scholar, after reciting from the Holy Qur'an, discussed *ilham* (divine inspiration) and *nafs* (carnal desires) and how it is often hard for the *hati rohani* (spiritual heart) to act from "common sense" because of the effect and influence of *nafs*. He also made analogies to problems in Indonesia; for instance *korupsi* (corruption) and *suap-menyuap* (taking bribes) stem from *nafs*, while *ilham* can eradicate these practices through providing proper leadership. During one of the final nights of *Sekaten* a Muhammadiyah religious scholar directed the congregation's attention to the *pasar malam* (night market) across the road in the northern courtyard, the market and gamelan in front of the mosque, and the upcoming climactic events of *Sekaten*, commemorating Prophet Muhammad's Birthday. He went on to say that many religious scholars argue that this is *bid'ah*, a forbidden religious innovation, because the Messenger of Allah (*Rasulullah*) and his Companions (*Sahabat*) never celebrated his birthday and there is *hadith* stating that believers should leave those things that were not done by the Messenger of Allah and his Companions. Therefore, this commemoration is just "*tradisi*" (non-religious tradition) and it is important that we commemorate this tradition in a way which fits with Qur'an and *Sunnah* so that it has meaning, he cautioned.

After the religious lecture, on the second night of *Sekaten*, I went outside to sit on the outer landing of the great mosque beside other people waiting for late evening prayers and the gamelan performances which follow them. I initiated conversation with a young man, Mas Pramono, in his middle to late twenties. Mas Pramono told me that a special group of high-ranking civil servants from deep in the palace will perform gamelan for around two hours after late evening prayers. I asked him if he was from the Kauman community, a staunch Muhammadiyah neighborhood next to the mosque, and he informed me he was from Kota Gede, an area on the edge of town. He works in a silversmith shop making rings and other jewelry. Later, I asked him what people's feelings were in Kota Gede in relation to the Sri Sultan and his palace and he told me that they have a lot of respect for the Sultan as Governor of the Province of the Special Territory of Yogyakarta and

palace as a seat of administration, and their belief in his abilities and powers is strong. They have strong connections to the palace since the workers at the *Makam Senopati* (Panembahan Senopati Mausoleum) in Kota Gede are like palace civil servants, he added. Mas Pramono's views contrasted with those of Pak Dulah, a middle-aged man I had a conversation with the following day.

Pak Dulah is a local Muhammadiyah member from the nearby Kauman neighborhood. As we waited for late evening prayers, I asked him what people in his neighborhood thought about the palace. He told me that generally only people living out in the outlying villages believe strongly in the sultan and the palace, following practices such as *sesaji* and *ngalap berkah*. In Kauman they try to follow Islam more closely, making *dakwah* like tonight when Muhammadiyah speakers are giving religious instructions to people while *Sekaten* activities are going on. The *Wali Songo* applied a slow method of calling people to Islam, using the culture that was here and practices like gamelan and other things for broadcasting Islam, he told me. But this was hundreds of years ago, I said, why hasn't there been more progress toward Islamization. Pak Dulah complained that unlike in Malaysia, the government here in Indonesia perpetuates this sort of culture with *sesaji*, using it to attract tourists, while only organizations like Muhammadiyah and NU make *dakwah* teaching people Islam. When we heard the call to prayer, we entered the great mosque, like Mas Pramono and I the previous day, making our prayers in the congregation.

I prayed and walked to see the gamelan afterwards. Mas Pramono joined me at the pavilion on the right from the main mosque entrance. The gamelan groups were set up in the two small pavilions on each end of the courtyard with their instruments arranged around the floor dressed in official high-ranking palace civil servant uniforms. The musician at the large set of bronze drums wore a colorful sash over his shoulders. I stood chatting with Mas Pramono and other spectators, many from outlying neighborhoods and villages, in a crowd of a few hundred people surrounding the small pavilion. Most spectators were elderly or adult men and women, but there were some families with children and some youth. Two Taiwanese ethnomusicology students, assisted by a local Javanese teacher from a traditional Islamic school, and a few Europeans were setting up their equipment separately to record the gamelan performance. There were signs posted in the main entrance with the official names of both sets of titled gamelan instruments; the one on the right side, where we stood, was Kyai Nagawilaga and on the opposite side was Kyai Gunturmadu.[2] Like other sacred heirlooms, they possess the elevated title *kyai*. We walked to the back and asked one of the musicians which group would perform first tonight and found out the group on the opposite side would so

2 These two sets of gamelan comprise *Gamelan Sekati*, one of several categories of gamelan considered as *pusaka*. In 1757, Sultan Hamengku Buwono I added *Kyai Nagawilaga* to the more ancient set *Kyai Gunturmadu* as gamelan sets to be played for ritual ceremonies such as *Sekaten* and the circumcisions and weddings of the crown princes (Darban et al. 2002, 192-3).

we walked to that side finding a place to stand near the main entrance. When the red light over the entrance to this pavilion was turned on, the group playing Kyai Gunturmadu began to play its slow, rather pensive and meditative-sounding music. After one group finished, they turned on their green light, and then we walked to the opposite side to listen to the other group, playing in similar fashion.

The pungent odor of flowers and burning incense rose into the air, overpowering, for those nearby, the smells from the tasty food being sold at numerous booths erected between the two pavilions. Several elder women had tables on the sides of the two pavilions selling jasmine and magnolia flowers and *kemenyan* (gum benzoin incense) used for offerings before the sacred heirloom gamelan instruments, and betel nut leaves and tobacco for chewing. *Juru kunci* from the palace were stationed on the sides of each small pavilion with clay pots and baskets for offerings. A constant stream of people, mostly elder and middle-aged women, brought banana leaves with flowers, incense, and a little money as payment to the *juru kunci* for making their offerings, delivering their prayers for things they are asking for from the sacred palace instruments or from the palace via these *pusaka*. The *juru kunci* leaned forward asking the person what they wanted to ask for and then he put their incense into the pot and moved their bundle of offerings in the banana leaf over the incense burning in the pot, into the smoke, moving it around and then passing it back to the person with instructions for what to do with it to get their prayers answered. As the *juru kunci* moved people's offerings over the burning incense, they held their hands clasped in front of their bodies facing the gamelan instruments. I asked a middle-aged woman, there with her daughter and grandchild, what she made the offering for, and she told me that she was "just asking for something." She proceeded to say that she was asking for *keselamatan* for her family from the gamelan because it is *pusaka*. A thirty-five year old businesswoman from Surabaya, East Java, Tutik, told me her offering was to ask for her match or marriage partner. She went on to say that many people ask for blessings for many different things; some ask for financial productivity from their business or farm fields. The *juru kunci* tells them to do different things with the offerings he returns to them based upon what they ask for; some he tells to take a bath in water with the flowers in it and others he may tell to store them in their rice fields or businesses. The whole idea was to ask for *barokah* or blessings, she added. Tutik was wearing the white magnolia flowers in her hair, perhaps to make her self look more attractive to a possible suitor, a marriageable catch.

Tutik and several other women told me that people are here chewing betel nut leaves while the gamelan instruments are played in order to preserve their youth and to extend their lives. It is essential that you chew betel nut leaves, often with tobacco and lime, in the vicinity of the gamelan instruments or while they are playing for it to have this magical effect. These ladies stressed that the gamelan is *pusaka* and *keramat* possessing special and unique powers.

Many people would eat *sega gurih*, listen to gamelan music, perhaps make offerings, and continue across the road to the night market "fairgrounds" in the *Alun-Alun Utara*, socializing with their family and friends. After listening to both

gamelan groups, I walked over joining thousands of people who were enjoying carnival rides, an aquarium show, and musical performances on an open stage. Hundreds of people were sitting on the ground watching four female singers wearing head coverings and long dark green robes with sparkles. The music sounded like *dangdut*, with modern drums and electric guitars playing up-tempo beats, but the woman sang religious songs in Arabic in a style characteristic of acoustic *kasidah*. A small group of four or five males danced on the left side of the stage rather than scores of males in front like the usual routine at *dangdut* events. In the past, mostly *dangdut* and *ketoprak*, a form of traditional theater, were performed in the *Sekaten* night market, but this year a new management company brought in a broader range of artists, including many national stars.

When I returned to the small pavilions near the great mosque to observe activities and listen to more meditative gamelan music, I could still hear some of the religious lecture being broadcast around the grounds through loudspeakers. Around eighteen men and twenty women were sitting on opposite sides of the Muhammadiyah religious scholar on the outer landing of the mosque as he advised people to remember Allah and spoke about the first and last chapters of the Holy Qur'an sent to Prophet Muhammad, the last of the prophets of Allah. He called for Muslims to uphold and practice Islam as established in textual sources.

How are local Muslims to apply principles, rooted in textual sources, they believe to be eternal and universal to beliefs and practices in current times? Where and how do they draw the line between forbidden and allowable cultural elements in events such as *Sekaten* and *Gerebeg*? Muhammadiyah, a revivalist and reformist organization often characterized by members and non-members alike for its rationalist approach, has witnessed its rationalism being pushed to new heights in emerging debates about interpretations of local culture, about the interface between Islam and culture. How are Muhammadiyah leaders, scholars, and local members dealing with efforts to make their organization more relevant to changes occurring in Indonesian and global society? How are they attempting to remake Muhammadiyah in the era of Reformation? I will discuss these issues, after first providing some historical and contextual background for Muhammadiyah in parts of south-central and eastern Java.

Historical Overview and Local Dynamics

Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, born in Kauman, Yogyakarta, in 1868 had Islamic scholars on both sides of his family. His mother's father was the chief religious official of the Yogyakarta Sultanate. His father, Kyai Haji Abubakar, an imam and *khatib* (deliverer of Friday sermons) at Masjid Agung Kauman, taught him Islamic studies at home forgoing Dutch colonial education which local residents of Kauman considered to be tainted with anti-Islamic and Christian attributes (Pasha and Darban 2002, 103). Similar to many other Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca of his time, K.H.A. Dahlan remained in Mecca seeking greater Islamic knowledge, studying with Indonesian and Arab scholars. Upon his return from his first trip

to Mecca, he helped his father teach younger students and later became a *khatib* in Masjid Agung Kauman responsible for Friday sermons, weekly instruction on the mosque's outer landing, and serving on the Palace Islamic Law Council (ibid, 104). To the chagrin of higher ranking, traditional religious officials of the palace, K.H.A. Dahlan and associates, after studying and discussing the matter, corrected the *kiblat* (direction of daily prayers) in the palace mosque and nearby prayer halls. In retaliation, the officials had the prayer hall inherited from his father demolished. Distraught and frustrated, K.H.A. Dahlan departed Java on another pilgrimage in 1903 living in Mecca for two years where he studied *fiqh, hadīth,* Qur'anic recitation, astronomy, and the works of many Islamic reformers, including Muhammad 'Abduh, Ibn Taimiyyah and Rashid Rida. While in Mecca, he also engaged in many discussions with Indonesian scholars, long-resident in Mecca, about social and religious problems back in their colonized home (ibid: 106). Nevertheless, as Mitsuo Nakamura (1983) points out, while Muhammadiyah took great intellectual inspiration from Middle Eastern "modernists", it was very much a home-grown Islamic movement (cf. Vandenbosch 1941, 35).

Unlike many Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca during this period who sought and acquired Sufi mystical and ascetic knowledge returning to teach in traditional Islamic schools (see Zulkifli 2003), K.H.A. Dahlan developed more of a "modernist" *syari'ah* perspective returning to teach Islamic religious classes for one year in the Dutch-administered Kweekschool. With assistance from members of the modern nationalist organization, Budi Utomo, K.H.A. Dahlan organized Ibtidaiyah Diniyah Islamiyah, a school modeled on his experience in the Kweekschool with a curriculum of secular subjects mixed with Islamic religious instruction (Pasha and Darban 2002, 108). In the following year, 1912, he founded Muhammadiyah, a "modern" organization with statutes, established leaders, membership list, and fixed aims and goals. It was also self-consciously "modern" in its outlook of rejecting the traditional Javanese norm of *taklid*, unquestioning acceptance of religious interpretations and practices, and the blind submission to ancestors, elders, and religious authorities that accompanied it (cf. Azra 2000[1990]). K.H.A. Dahlan promoted the use of rational thought processes to assess the consistency or deviation of contemporary Muslim beliefs and behavior in relation to divine prescriptions. Similar to many other reformers of his day, he looked to a *purer Islam* in conjunction with modern secular knowledge as the precondition for Muslim progress in a world fraught with European colonial domination and Christian evangelization. Deviation from a truly Islamic path, based in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, and the concomitant stagnation of scientific development were viewed as the primary reasons for Muslim subordination and oppression. Like *salafi*, *wahabi* and other Islamic revivalist movements, Muhammadiyah sought to establish *Tauhid*, pure Islamic monotheism, shorn of all the *syirik*, *bid'ah*, *tahayul* and *khurafat* (polytheism, innovations, superstitions and non-Islamic beliefs). In addition, K.H.A. Dahlan agreed with Muhammad 'Abduh that Muslims could "tap Western science without having to become Westernized" (Hudijono 2000[1995]).

However, unlike many modernist Islamic thinkers and revivalist movements, K.H.A. Dahlan directed Muhammadiyah towards Islamic revival, renewal, and *dakwah* without resorting to political and military methods. Muhammadiyah was not to become a political party or militarized organization, although many of its members, including its founder, joined political parties or military units fighting Dutch colonial forces. Instead, Muhammadiyah was to be a "salvation army" of Islamic teachers, students, and institution-builders. K.H.A. Dahlan, not only taught his students to memorize and recite *Surah al-Ma'un* (Q. Chapter 107/Assistance), but also to understand and implement the message contained within it of giving food to the poor and helping orphans (ibid, 191; Mulkhan 2003, xxiii). He laid the foundation during his years of leading Muhammadiyah, from 1912-1923, for the organization's long history of developing educational institutions, from kindergarten to postgraduate levels, orphanages, hospitals, and boys' and girls' scouting groups.

From 1923 to the present, Muhammadiyah had twelve leaders including the head in 2004, Prof. Dr. H.A. Syafii Maarif, who continued the *general* direction and methodology of its founder. Over the course of these years, Muhammadiyah has not only expanded its network of institutions across the Indonesian archipelago, but also organized internal councils, committees and sections such as the Islamic law research council, social welfare, health, education, material resources, politics, and evangelism committees and women's and youth sections. However, some Muhammadiyah researchers posit that after K.H.A. Dahlan passed away, Muhammadiyah began to shift its style of *dakwah* emphasizing its opposition to elements of *syirik*, *bid'ah, tahayul,* and *khurafat* in local traditions so that it eventually began to appear to be anti-local culture (Chamim et al. 2002, 66, 2003:55). During the tumultuous years of WWII, K.H. Mas Mansur contested many colonial policies, and when the Dutch tried to return to colonize Indonesia following the war, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and other leaders and youth participated in the armed struggle for independence (Pasha and Darban 2002, 142-4). K.H. Ahmad Badawi galvanized Muhammadiyah into action in 1965, alongside New Order forces, to eradicate the Indonesian Communist Party (ibid, 146). In 1985, Muhammadiyah, then under the leadership of K.H. Abdur Razak Fakhruddin, was forced by New Order laws to change the basis of the organization from Islam to *Pancasila*; however, the Muhammadiyah National Convention in 2000 returned the organization to an official Islamic basis (ibid, 125-6). It is important to note in this brief overview that under the two recent leaders, Prof. Dr. Amien Rais and Prof. Dr. Syafii Maarif, Muhammadiyah began to take greater recognition of industrialization and globalization, striving to raise the level of *dakwah* through extending its targeted field and using new tools. In 1998, the central leadership also made a "political *ijtihad*" deciding to form an inclusive political party, *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), with membership open to people from all religious backgrounds, and with Dr. Amien Rais, stepping down from his Muhammadiyah post, as its first head (ibid, 151-2).

Muhammadiyah, soon after its initial formation, began to spread into different parts of Java and Indonesia, reaching East Java in the early 1920s and West Sumatra later in the same decade (Pasha and Durban 2002; Chamim et al. 2003; Pandoe 2000[1990]). Muhammadiyah, characterized by its commitment to the ideas of purification and progress, entered into dynamic processes of interaction with diverse local communities, and the course and outcome of these interactive processes were shaped in a variety of historical and social contexts (Chamim et al. 2002, 2003). In Yogyakarta, Muhammadiyah found a base in Kauman and other urban neighborhoods where the charismatic K.H.A. Dahlan, and family and friends possessed extensive social networks. Although the sultan's palace with its traditional religious officials, rituals and ceremonies, and the popularity of Javanese customs and beliefs in the surrounding area presented a continuing challenge for the Muhammadiyah movement, there was sufficient support for the founder's ideas of purification and progress to establish the organization in Yogyakarta. To the contrary, in Lamongan, East Java, an area on the northern coast of Java, with a long traditional *santri* history and presence, Muhammadiyah found it difficult to become established. For several decades, from the 1920s to the 1950s, Muhammadiyah *mubaligh* visited the area emphasizing the idea of purifying Islamic belief and practice and they were largely rejected as overly strict and rigid *wahabis* (Chamim et al. 2002, 71). Finally in the mid-1950s, when a small group of initiators, most with backgrounds in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), formed an institutional base and began to implement the idea of progress, starting with a scouts group soon followed by schools and social welfare institutions, Muhammadiyah became established and developed a local following (ibid). NU came to the area with a more accommodative style of making *dakwah* establishing several traditional religious schools in previous decades. They found many points of convergence between traditional *santri* culture and Javanese customs firmly rooted in this mostly agricultural region, and a range of mixtures arose as farmers and fishermen localized Islam. In addition, many traditional *santri* cultural arts, such as *selawatan*, *tahlilan, hadrah*, *terbangan* and *barzanjen* (or *berzanzi*), became interwoven with local life crisis rituals.

In Yogyakarta, the ideas of purification and progress were implemented together from the very beginning, with religious talks, classes and sermons, and the extensive development of social institutions aimed at eliminating Muslim poverty, ignorance, and backwardness. Muhammadiyah was able to spread its ideas and influence extensively throughout most Yogyakarta neighborhoods, without the strong mediating cultural and political presence of NU as in Lamongan. However, even in urban Yogyakarta, there was, and is, a range of reformist cultural orientations in terms of commitment to reformist theology, including the rejection of traditional ritual complexes and affirmation of a positive Islamic ethic (Peacock 1978, 49-51). Muhammadiyah was confronted with a similar situation in Lamongan as in the largely agricultural areas surrounding Yogyakarta where traditional *santri* have established an extensive network of *pesantren* and where their accommodative style of making *dakwah* has also led to similar cultural syncretism. Nevertheless,

Muhammadiyah developed its organization and network of institutions in both of these rural areas in east and south-central Java, but not without compromising its puritanical stances in relation to local culture on a grassroots level in these communities (see Chamim et al. 2003). In urban and rural areas of both regions, Muhammadiyah leadership's consistent position calling for purification of local culture from its *syari'ah* perspective, directly confronting public cultural forms deemed to be in contradiction to the Qur'an and *Sunnah*, *Tauhid* and *aqīdah*, has produced the perception of Muhammadiyah as a dry, simple, and cold movement (ibid, 74). Yet, some alternative perspectives have emerged on local and national levels that will potentially push the organization to new zones of rationality and beyond.

Towards Reformation: (Re)-Opening the Door of Ijtihad

Ijtihad—personal and group religious interpretation—has been a key concept and central theme for the Muhammadiyah movement which has declared that the "door of *ijtihad* is always open" (see Pasha and Darban 2002, 294-9). However, Azyumardi Azra (2000[1990], 24) charges that this is a mere slogan for Muhammadiyah and other "scripturalist" movements who close the door of *ijtihad* behind the *salaf* or early Islamic scholars. He argues that Muhammadiyah is "modernist" only in its practice but not in its ideology which clings rigidly to *salafi* interpretations eschewing in the name of *taklid* the interpretations of post-*salafi* Islamic scholars. In this regard, he claims NU, the "traditionalists," are actually more "modern." A team of Muhammadiyah social scientific researchers notes the doctrine of "returning to Qur'an and *Sunnah*," which has a purifying dimension, and the concept of *ijtihad*, which encourages renewing individual and group interpretations of prophetic messages, forms a circular theological methodology with integrated, though differentiated aspects (Chamim et al. 2003, 53-4). Their ethnographic data and analysis suggests that the door of *ijtihad* for Muhammadiyah is opening wider or, at least, being reopened. Indeed, the local discourses in east and south-central Java, the emergence of, and debate over, cultural *dakwah*, and the interpretation of Muhammadiyah researchers indicates that *ijtihad* is alive in Muhammadiyah circles as Muhammadiyah struggles to rethink its relationship to "tradition" and reframe its modernity (see al-Jabri 1999, 2).[3]

3 Piscatori (1986, 6-7) notes that the "door of *ijtihad*" was never completely shut in theory or practice, but by the end of the tenth century, under the influence of al-Shafi'i, it was generally considered a privilege to be undertaken only "by reference to the established orthodox opinions" of the four orthodox schools of law. Nevertheless, the eleventh-century jurist and Sufi philosopher, al-Ghazali, and the fourteenth-century scholar, Ibn Taimiyyah, argued that *ijtihad* was allowable when resting on sound scholarship and the "independently reasoned opinions of *'ulama*." Hanbali, Hanafi, and Maliki jurists were also less limited than Shafi'i jurists in making their interpretations. Although the door was not shut, the idea that the four legal masters and their immediate students exhausted the valid

Figure 5.1 Javanese ritual specialists making prayers at *sedekah laut* event

Before considering alternative discourses of local culture and cultural arts, let us first consider what the majority posture of Muhammadiyah leaders and members has been in east and south-central Java. Most of them interpret local culture, including cultural arts, from a purifying *syari'ah* perspective. They consider *wayang* to contain elements of *syirik*, due to the gods and goddesses in its stories, and *tahayul* in the way people consider the puppeteers as sacred and possessing special powers (see Chamim et al. 2002, 80). They also interpret traditional martial arts (*pencak silat*), popular in both regions, as exhibiting elements of *syirik* within its practices of *bertapa* and recitation of mantras asking for help from magical powers and spiritual beings. Traditional Javanese ceremonies in Lamongan, such as *tutup layang*, similar to *sedekah laut* and *labuhan* in south-central Java (see Figure 5.1), and *sedekah bumi* in both regions, are interpreted by these puritanical segments as entailing *syirik* because they involve processions of *sesaji* presented

possibilities of interpretation and analogical reasoning of the law led to the perspective that fewer people were qualified to perform *ijtihad*. After the sixteenth century, "limited *ijtihad* gave way to *taqlīd*, the idea that precedent must be faithfully followed or 'imitated' (ibid, 7)." Eighteenth and nineteenth-century reformers targeted *taqlīd* and limitations on *ijtihad* as a major weakness of Muslims; eighteenth-century reformers called for *ijtihad* to restore the early legal sources, while nineteenth-century reformers aimed it at reinterpreting these sources in line with modern circumstances (ibid, 8).

Figure 5.2 *Santri* performing *selawatan* at traditional festival

to the powerful being of the sea and gods/spirits of the land, called *Mbok Sri* in Lamongan (ibid, 81). They view these ceremonies as ruining *aqidah* in having participants ask for peace, happiness, and prosperity with offerings to the sea and *tumpengan* rather than praying directly to Almighty God. Most Muhammadiyah members consider cultural arts in Lamongan, such as *gambyong* and *tandhakan*, similar to *dangdut* on the national stage, that involve female dancers performing sensual dances with their *aurat* partially uncovered, as violating Islamic principles and ruining community morals. From the same perspective, the voices of traditional female singers, *sinden*, who perform in *wayang* and *karawitan* are also interpreted as *aurat*, potentially raising the carnal desires and passions of men. Furthermore, they consider traditional *santri* cultural arts, including *selawatan, hadrah, dibaan, berzanzi, samrah,* and *pujian*, and *tahlilan* funerary ceremonies and palace *Sekaten* and *Gerebeg* ceremonies as *bid'ah* since they are innovations that do not fit with the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (see Figure 5.2). Traditional *santri* arts are widespread in Lamongan and the surrounding areas of Yogyakarta, and traditional Javanese funerary ceremonies on the third, seventh, fortieth, one hundredth and one thousandth day after someone dies occur in these areas as well as in many urban neighborhoods of Yogyakarta, especially where there are *pesantren*. They consider traditional *santri* verbal arts, mostly singing prayers to Allah and praises to Prophet Muhammad and his relatives and companions, as *bid'ah* due to the manner in which they are performed with loud voices and

even screaming. According to their interpretations of divine textual sources such prayers and praises are supposed to be done in a low and humble-sounding voice. Moreover, using these cultural arts as media for *dakwah* or social solidarity is also unacceptable for these segments as they argue that the *niat* or intention/aim of these practices are contrary to Islamic principles which makes their deployment for other purposes contrary as well. It would be forbidden from this perspective to use palace gamelan sessions, as in the ethnographic scene at the beginning of this chapter, to disseminate Islamic teachings. Besides arts and entertainment tend to make people forget about religious worship and they often miss the substance of Islamic messages amidst the excitement of artistic performances. These views project little space for cultural arts and creativity.

On the other hand, some Muhammadiyah scholars and other members take the position that cultural arts are permitted forms of human creativity and expression. In Lamongan, they have categorized arts into three categories: sacred, soiled, and dirty arts (Chamim et al. 2003, 85-6). Sacred arts are those without any forbidden elements which contradict Islamic teachings, including Islamic literary arts and poetry, martial arts without *syirik*, and other arts used as media for entertainment, social solidarity and *dakwah*. "Soiled arts" are those that do not inherently possess forbidden elements, but they are mixed with them, such as martial arts exuding magic and mysticism which lead people to believe in powers other than God. The still popular traditional art of *wayang* also falls into this category "soiled" from the *tahayul* of sacred characters and stories, powerful gods, magical offerings, and special days and fasts. These arts can be purged of these negative aspects, which can lead to *syirik*, and used as media for *dakwah* and other purposes. *Seni najis* or "dirty arts," such as *tayub, gambyong* and *tandhakan*, are inherently dirty breeding grounds for poisoning social morality, associated with alcohol, gambling and prostitution.[4] These dirty arts can not be tolerated and must be purged from society (ibid, 86). These more "moderate" segments of Muhammadiyah also create more space for cultural creativity through their efforts of reproducing local culture without many harmful elements. For instance, in Lamongan, they have produced alternative *sesaji* in traditional ceremonies using fish products and not *tumpeng* as a symbol of thanks to Allah for granting *keselamatan*. They have also promoted martial arts emphasizing human strength and fitness without calling on spiritual entities for assistance, and funerary *tahlilan* and *slametan* giving *pengajian* with Islamic advice to the family and prayers for the deceased. In Lamongan, they perform the latter only on the seventh and fortieth days after passing, and in Yogyakarta, they are still in the "experimental stage," according to a scholar at the Muhammadiyah University. They strive to rationalize and de-sacralize traditional culture without resorting to earlier methods of puritanical "frontal attack" (ibid,

4 Barbara Martin-Schiller (1984, 52) states that an ethnomusicologist observing the village *tayub* (or *tayuban*) performance noted that this cultural form used to be used for elite entertainment, staged even in Ibu Kartini's younger sister's wedding, but over time it has come to be viewed as vulgar or immoral by the urban elite.

89). These efforts along with the art council's and youth and women's section's work to develop "modern" arts such as marching and pop music bands, theater, singing choirs, bridal decoration and martial arts, stem from implementing the idea of progress. They are self-consciously striving to make Muhammadiyah and Indonesia more rational and fit to meet the demands of the modern world. Some of these members point out the hypocrisy of puritanical segments that criticize negative elements in local cultural arts while neglecting to do the same for cultural arts on television, radio, and many of the cassettes on shelves in their own homes. The challenge posed by global flows of culture and mass communication is a major concern for many from puritanical and more "moderate" perspectives.

Still other members of Muhammadiyah argue that cultural arts are to be appreciated on their own terms and not as tools for teaching Islam. Some in this segment argue for the inherent beauty of art, even finding textual support for this interpretation. Similar to many people in Yogyakarta, some members in Lamongan argue that cultural arts are a "worldly matter" and not an area subject to religious dictates. They consider them to be simply cultural events outside the realm of puritanical or progressive motives. Some also go beyond the "moderate" *syari'ah* perspective, arguing for the expression of Islam intrinsically even though visibly there appear to be contradictions with Islamic principles. They interpret practices such as *sesaji* to be mere symbols devoid of religious meanings, so they do not need to be eliminated from artistic performances. Many Muhammadiyah members in Lamongan and Yogyakarta, even some in Kauman, watch cultural arts and attend traditional religious rituals, such as funerary *tahlilan*, to promote social harmony maintaining ties with their friends and neighbors. These diverse perspectives of public cultural forms and *dakwah* merged in the Lamongan Cultural Arts Leadership Committee's local *ijtihad* which resulted in the drafting of a fifteen point resolution promoting the conservation, adoption, innovation and modification of many cultural arts (ibid, 93-8).

These sorts of grumblings at the grassroots level and changes in national leadership, including some with western and traditional Islamic educational backgrounds, contributed to the emergence of the concept of cultural *dakwah* within Muhammadiyah circles. Discussions of cultural *dakwah* began in Muhammadiyah's congress in Aceh in 1995, but it was in meetings in Bali in 2002 and Makassar in 2003 that it was debated, clarified and shaped into a formal idea within the Muhammadiyah movement (Khaidir 2002, 54; Chamim et al. 2003). The social and cultural dynamism of this "era of reformation" has precipitated their processes of self-reflection—including an awareness of becoming increasingly isolated from the "*abangan*" masses—and "remaking" (Moeslim Abdurrahman cited in Baidhawy 2003, ix), altering their long-standing position of distance and purification of local cultural practices. A booklet on *dakwah kultural*, published by Muhammadiyah following the 2003 meetings, characterized the concept as:

> An approach and strategy of *dakwah* in the context of actualizing the teachings of Islam in the midst of cultural dynamics and social change within a society

> put forward in stages that fit the empirical condition directed towards making Islamic life grow according to the understandings of Muhammadiyah…The focus of cultural dakwah is placed in the awareness of faith to the point that the community is ready to receive and fulfill all Islamic teachings involving *aqidah, akhlak,* and *muamalah* with a focus on the phase of social change with a basis in social, economic, cultural and political plurality of the society. As a result, in the end, the phase of an ideal Islamic society will be achieved in the same manner as the main mission of the Islamic *risalah* (Muhammadiyah 2003, 1-2).
>
> [author translation]

This concept of cultural *dakwah* involves an important change in the approach of Muhammadiyah towards reaching "*abangan* and groups that experience marginalization within social life" (Nashir 2002, 6). In the past, they focused more upon developing "*santri*" and criticizing aspects of cultural practices deemed divergent from Islam. This new stance does not mean that they are going to accept traditions that contradict their understanding of Islam, but rather that they are going to increase their involvement in cultural activities in which the masses of tradition-oriented "*abangan*" participate. It means that they will "show their appreciation towards culture which is growing, along with accepting and creating new and better culture that fits with the message of Islam as *rahmatan li al'alamin*" (Muhammadiyah 2003, 9).[5] Jabrohim (2005), a Muhammadiyah scholar, argued that Muhammadiyah college campuses are important sites for developing and presenting cultural arts that will reach out to entire campus populations as participants or audience members. A national leader of Muhammadiyah stressed in my interview with him that they would enter into "dialogue" with people as part of the dynamic process of implementing this concept.

In regard to tourist events, *kejawen* practices and *dangdut*, this Muhammadiyah leader made some interesting comments which may give us some direction in analyzing the potential effects the implementation of this concept may have on social dynamics and structures of inequality. He argued that the government has lacked creativity in selecting cultural forms that emerge from society to stage in their events. Islamic music, song, and dance should be used more in their events, and they should avoid focusing too much upon exotic or "beautiful" cultural practices which reflect syncretism with other religions. In the long run, he declared that perpetuating events which reflect mysticism would ruin Indonesian society. He pointed out that there are two main positions in Muhammadiyah concerning cultural forms which depend upon the meanings participants give to these events. If they give a "budaya" or "social" meaning to the events, then Muhammadiyah looks at how it may contribute to advancement, harmony and development of

---

5 Muhammadiyah interprets *rahmatan lil'alamiin* (Q.S. al-Anbiyaa/The Prophets, 21:107)—"Mercy for all creatures"—as the main mission of Islam and various approaches and strategies of *dakwah* are part of this universal mission.

society because Muhammadiyah does not have a negative attitude towards *budaya*, he added. On the other hand, if these events are looked at as "agama," religious or Islamic rituals, then they would look at how they are "free from conceptions falling under *syirik*, *tahayul*, and *bid'ah*…because if they are religious rituals, they must be authentic." A dialogue can be entered into in the latter case of religious rituals to rationalize them, removing religious meanings from them or replacing them with beliefs and practices consistent with Islamic revelation. He was optimistic about the prospects of cultural *dakwah*, noting that progress has already been made in that many of the events performed by the palace are now looked at as "*budaya*" or traditional, although still as "Islamic culture and traditions." Also the sultan is not held to be as sacred as he used to be; these are examples of "progress" in the process of secularization, removing "religious" meaning from things "cultural."

He also looked at *dangdut* as problematic in its present form; it is in need of lots of changes. However, he considered it as a dynamic form, giving the example of *campursari* which used to be full of nasty dress and actions but then "Islamic *campursari*" emerged filling the form with Islamic messages and the artists became more polite in their dress and actions. He was confident that the same could occur with *dangdut* through persistent dialogue and advice, placing it in the Lamongan scholar's category of "soiled" rather than inherently "dirty."

Although this concept is still in the stage of debate and has not been formally implemented in all the local branches of Muhammadiyah, we can note from the ethnographic scene at the beginning of this chapter what seems to be an interesting expression of this transformed position during the recent *Sekaten Maulud*. While the two *keramat* gamelan groups from the Yogyakarta Palace were playing in the courtyard of Masjid Agung Kauman and thousands of people were making offerings to these symbols of the mystical power of the palace, religious scholars were broadcasting Islam much as locals have told me the *Wali Songo* did centuries ago. What was perhaps new this year was the content of some of the religious instructions. One of the religious scholars relegated the commemoration to the position of "tradisi" rather than "agama" stressing what is important is how locals perform this "traditional commemoration."

Moreover, Prof. Dr. Amien Rais and PAN, strongly supported by Muhammadiyah, used many cultural arts, such as *campursari*, *angguk putri*, and *pangkur jenggleng* during their campaign for the presidency and parliamentary seats (see Figure 5.3). They sponsored a television show featuring *pangkur jenggleng*, a traditional theatrical form with actors and actresses in traditional costume accompanied by a gamelan orchestra. Near the end of these weekly shows, filled with slap-stick humor shared with similar theatrical genre, female performers not wearing head scarves would sing normative Islamic messages, often written on the bottom of television screens, and/or points from their electoral campaign platform in high-pitched *sinden* style. Muhammadiyah, one of the two largest Indonesian Muslim organizations, has begun to change its orientation towards local cultural arts and ceremonies emphasizing greater participation and appreciation of these public cultural forms.

Figure 5.3 Amien Rais campaigning with *pangkur jenggleng* performer

In addition to the tenor of local discourses and the emergence of cultural *dakwah*, the interpretations of the Muhammadiyah research team in Lamongan spells a wider opening of the doors of *ijtihad*. These researchers used the Moroccan Arab philosopher, Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri's conceptualization of *bayani, burhani,* and '*irfani*—three modes of thought—to frame and analyze many local responses to cultural arts. They assert that this philosopher's logic presented in his work *Bun-yah al-'Aql al-'Arabi: Dirasah Tahliliyah Naqdiyyah li Nidham al-Ma'rifah fi al-Thaqafah al-Arabiyya* (1993) was modified by a Muhammadiyah council as a methodological basis for thought development within their organization (Chamim et al. 2003, 56). The Muhammadiyah Islamic Law Research Council introduced and discussed these ideas earlier in 2000 at meetings in Malang, East Java. *Bayani*, the mode of literal interpretation from divine textual sources, they argue still is dominant in Muhammadiyah circles and is used to produce exclusive truth-claims judging many practices to be *bid'ah*. They argue that the dominance of this kind of reasoning has had negative effects producing the image of Muhammadiyah as indolent and old-fashioned (ibid, 61). These researchers, and some other scholars in Muhammadiyah, hope that using the other two modes of reasoning in conjunction with *bayani* will make Muhammadiyah more open to diversity and more responsive to the development of civil society (ibid, 58).

Burhani, the rational and empirical mode of reasoning, will take into account perspectives and findings from a broad range of social sciences, including history,

sociology, anthropology, phenomenology, philosophy and many others. For instance, they frame local attempts to de-sacralize local traditions deeply-rooted in society as utilizing sociological analysis within the *burhani* perspective of making *dakwah* (ibid, 89). Moreover, they interpret more broadly that many local Muhammadiyah members use the *burhani* perspective to understand local arts (ibid, 102). *'Irfani*, the mode of reasoning using personal spiritual experience, brings in imagination and intuition directing people making interpretations to think more deeply about divine revelations and abstract Qur'anic concepts such as *fitrah*. The validity of truth claims from this perspective is inter-subjective (ibid, 64). They use this concept to frame and analyze a Muhammadiyah artist's interpretation of a form of *selawatan* he developed as an "expression of spiritual humanity that can spark the instinct in people to move closer to Almighty Allah" (ibid, 100). The artist also describes how he feels his insides vibrating as he listens to these religious songs. Muhammadiyah researchers interpret that this indicates an *'irfani* perspective in which cultural arts are a medium of connection to God. They go on to argue that from this perspective Muslim artistic creativity need not be limited in theme, form, or message to producing arts with Islamic messages or symbols. Islamic art can also be born from the "inner spirituality" of the artist and express social critiques of injustice, and therefore not be distorted by strict religious norms (ibid, 101). This recognition of the *'irfani* perspective builds upon the "spiritualization of *syari'ah*" growing in Muhammadiyah quarters since the mid-1990s when "modern" educated scholars arose in leadership positions coupling inclusive ethical concerns and Sufi spiritual ideas with the idea of purification (ibid, 55).

Interweaving *bayani*, *burhani*, and *'irfani* modes of reasoning, not only broadens the scope of *ijtihad* through incorporating social sciences and personal intuition and subjectivities, but it also holds the potential of reconfiguring Muhammadiyah's, and other "scripturalist" movement's, relationship to Islamic "traditions." Muhammadiyah, as indicated in the ethnographic scene above, and other Islamic movements (see al-Jabri 1999), tend to use analogical modes of thinking to connect textual sources to contemporary realities. *Burhani* perspectives open cognitive avenues for more fully taking account of *contextual* information about current and historical situations, which can propel Islamic movements far beyond the mode of attempting to recreate an idealized Islam or Golden Era which never really existed (see Varisco 2005, 122-31). Furthermore, *'irfani* perspectives open venues of human emotions, subjectivities and imagination, long restrained by overly rigid, literal, and narrow frameworks of interpretation, which can help Islamic movements mine figurative levels of understanding from textual sources. Taken together they can produce new Islamic "modernities," and some Muhammadiyah members seem to have this in mind.

Cultural Dakwah and Equalization

Finally, let us assess the possible effects of this conception of "cultural *dakwah*" as a "modernizing" and "rationalizing" force upon government/palace events, *dangdut*, and structures of inequality. Of course, we must note that this concept is still in formulation and there are many other social agents that will have an impact on these ceremonies, cultural arts, and social structure. Nonetheless, their intention of turning the "fetish of cultural difference" events into mere *adat*, *hiburan* or some other form of *budaya* devoid of "religious" meaning would definitely weaken the support and legitimacy of the sacerdotal local leadership of DIY. The political significance and authority of the Sri Sultan would gradually vanish and the palace would be turned into a mere symbol of *traditional* culture and not Islamic culture. This could serve to move in the direction of equalization eliminating some of the hierarchical feudal relations which still exist between ordinary people and royalty.

On the other hand, they would attempt to fill up the cultural form of *dangdut* with "religious" meanings, while removing the sensual *goyang* and fully clothing the female performers. This would make them more like Nasida Ria, Nida Ria and many other female bands from Central Java, especially Semarang, who sang songs full of religious meaning with a *dangdut* beat. However, the masses of "*abangan*," upper and lower classes have largely lost interest in these groups, and rarely listen to "religious" music except during the month of *Ramadan* and other special religious occasions. Muhammadiyah activists would try to enter into a dialogue to change the behavior of youth who dance, often in a drunken stupor, in front of the stages interacting with the female performers. This imposition of an educated elite conception of proper "religion" upon *budaya rakyat* would constitute a suppression of the deviant-filled resistance of the masses against normative Islamic rulings and organizations and their perceived accommodation with the long, hard years of Suharto's authoritarian regime. Furthermore, while the elimination of the *goyang* fetish could have the effect of raising esteem and respect for women curbing the exploitation of their bodies, it could also have a negative effect on economic benefits women receive as a central part of this entertainment labor force. Sexual minorities would also lose *dangdut* as a space of inclusion and acceptance. However, this depends, like other projections here, upon the form of cultural *dakwah* implemented, since some Muhammadiyah interpretations emphasize focusing on helping oppressed and marginalized groups in contemporary society just as K.H.A. Dahlan did during his times (see Mulkhan 2002, 41).

On a national level, cultural *dakwah* can serve to weaken the ideological basis for *Pancasila* and government-instituted Javanism as greater emphasis would be placed on *agama* over *adat* and *budaya*. This may serve to equalize the political playing field between Islamic and nationalist parties, reopening the debate over images and models of the nation. Similarly, Java as the center and Javanese as the preferred ethnic group would lose ideological supports as well with the

enhanced stress laid upon Islam and Muslim identity; however, the question of the position of other religious groups in the broader diverse society would have to be addressed. From my field experience listening to Muhammadiyah religious scholars speak, I have a strong impression of their promotion of religious tolerance and mutual respect. For instance, in one sermon given at Masjid Agung Kauman, the Muhammadiyah speaker interpreted the chapter *al-Kafirun* (Q. 109/The Non-Believers) as holding the meaning for Indonesian Muslims that they must respect the rights of members of minority religious and ethnic groups. Clearly, Indonesian Muslims, often dismissed as "salafi" or "scripturalist," make some interpretations of texts which project inclusive multicultural images of Indonesian society.[6]

On a global level, cultural *dakwah* would seek to enter the world market with different sorts of cultural forms as commodities. *Nasyid*, *kasidah*, and "religious" *dangdut* could be developed, perhaps, as tourist objects representing Yogya as a "cultural city" and as products to be exported into other markets, Muslim and non-Muslim societies. In any event, Muhammadiyah's conception of cultural *dakwah* could serve to use local cultures in such a way as to block some of the flows of Western cultural models and values, creating a kind of global "pluralism" in which local forms of culture would coexist with more dominant forms on a global level. Indonesian models of beauty, clothing, body style, and morals could be perpetuated alongside Western models, and instead of fetishizing difference as an exotic commodity, substantive differences in terms of economic and political models and values could be given greater opportunity to take root and grow.

6 Farid Esack (1997, 175) asserts that "the Qur'an does not regard all people and their ideas as equal, but proceeds from the premise that the idea of inclusiveness is superior to that of exclusiveness." He argues that such an inclusive discourse on religious pluralism requiring some textual reinterpretations was a key ingredient of Muslim willingness to collaborate with other religious communities in the struggle against oppression and injustice in South Africa. Pramono U. Tanthowi (2008, 23-5), a Muhammadiyah intellectual, also argues for textual reinterpretations and demonstrates strong theological roots for tolerance, equal rights and status in the presence of law, pluralism, and inclusivity through references to several verses of the Qur'an.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Chapter 6
Student Theatre, Social Critique and Equalization

This chapter, similar to chapter four on *dangdut*, is about a public cultural form that I did not initially expect to examine. Modern Indonesian theatre and contemporary pop music were not genre I imagined placing alongside the ever prominent "traditional" ceremonies and cultural arts. Actually many local contacts were surprised when I expressed an interest in including these forms in my study of local "culture." They assumed that I would focus upon *labuhan*, *gerebeg*, *wayang*, *jathilan* and similar ceremonies, rituals and performance arts, long emphasized in government discourse on "culture." As I noted earlier, these cultural forms are commonly construed as traits in the conventional manner of objectifying culture. However, I came to realize the local significance of these modern, theatrical forms through observing activities and asking local people which cultural arts forms they deemed most important to the future of Indonesia. Many people, especially students and young adult workers, told me that modern, Indonesian-language theatre was their favorite cultural art form and the one they thought most significant due to the way it expresses hopes about social justice, democracy, civil society and modernity in a language they understand. There is a growing lack of linguistic competence in some of the higher levels or formal styles of Javanese amongst the youth, and these levels are often used in traditional art forms. This contributes to their perception of traditional forms as old-fashioned and out-of-date. In addition, as I visited the *gelanggang mahasiswa*, the student union building, at Gadjah Mada University, I found Teater Gadjah Mada, the student theatre group, to be one of the most popular art groups on campus. After attending some of their performances and interviewing members of Teater Gadjah Mada, I began to do the same on other campuses around town.

I found student theatre groups on campuses across Yogyakarta, some more active than others, but all of them were engaged in some form of social and/or political critique. Most of the members of these groups were Muslims from a range of religious orientations. In contrast to public celebrations, religious rituals, healing practices, and popular entertainment forms considered earlier, these theatrical performances more openly expressed social and political themes. Many of the stylistic themes I infer as running through the works of these student groups are continuations of themes of professional groups in the preceding decades. These student theatre groups are still an integral part of social movements for change; however, unlike modern theatre prior to, and in the immediate aftermath of, the falling of the New Order regime, their plays and concepts suggest some

ideological formation and unveiling has taken place as different visions and hopes for Indonesia are more clearly articulated (cf. Hatley 1999; Halim HD 1999; Hellman 2003). Moreover, some converging themes across ideologically diverse perspectives indicate a basis for shared projections of desirable futures.

Modern Indonesian Theatre: Still in the Center of Critique and Activism

During the Old Order regime, under the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, traditional theatrical art forms were infused with political values and visions for the newly-emerged nation-state. Some local forms in Central and East Java, such as *ketoprak* and *ludruk*, became associated with "*abangan*" peasants and workers (Geertz 1960; Peacock 1968). The Indonesian Communist Party used these and other cultural forms to politicize segments of society, filling these forms up with proletarian terminology and values. With the crushing elimination of the Communist Party in 1965-66 and the rise of the New Order regime, the proletarian ethos embedded in these forms disappeared under state manipulation and supervision (Hatley 1971, 94). They were made to convey the dominant messages of New Order nationalism and *Pancasila* "democracy," a form of despotic democracy which provided for ceremonial reelections of Suharto and his ruling party, Golkar. Barbara Hatley (1971, 101) notes that both the older, court-centered *wayang* and the newer, urban working-class-based *ludruk* play the role of "communicating to the 'little people' the values and standards set by the elite." Under the auspices of the state, government-supported groups performed *wayang*, *ludruk*, and *ketoprak* expressing the superiority of the elite in hierarchical societies placed in mythological and historical times.

In the 1970s and 1980s, modern Indonesian-language theatre, termed *teater*, originally adopted from European dramatic models, became a site for socio-political critique and contestation of the dominant discourse of a "glorified" Javanese tradition (Hatley 1999, 268-9; Hatley 1993, 50). Bengkel Theatre and Dinasti, in Yogyakarta, and Teater Surakarta, in Solo, staged many plays that altered traditional mythological and historical tales so as to contest dominant depictions of glorious Javanese kingdoms and legendary figures. Both of these theatre groups tried to appeal to and incorporate the masses into the dramatic process, what I call a "people's theatre" theme. W.S. Rendra initially established Bengkel Theatre directly in a Yogyakarta neighborhood in 1969, and Dinasti, formed in 1977 by several former Bengkel members, held rehearsals in the open observed by ordinary people and critical discussions of performances and social issues following performances (Hatley 1993, 54-8). Gedag-Gedig, a theatre group founded in Solo in 1979, also encouraged spectators to comment and participate in performances as they took their plays to open public spaces performing free of charge (ibid, 63). Following the enforced de-politicization of university campuses in 1978-9, in the wake of student demonstrations, many activists, such as Emha Ainun Najib, joined Dinasti making it into an alternate site for social and political debate. "A key feature of the group is said to have been its open, democratic

structure, with no one figure of authority" (ibid, 58). Gandrik and Jeprik troupes, active in Yogyakarta in the 1980s, also extended this "people's theatre" theme, through developing a folk theatrical style which used colorful and "innovative adaptations of folk theatre forms spiced by light-hearted social criticism" (ibid, 59). These groups used familiar forms of entertainment such as *ketoprak*, with its spontaneity and improvisation, to poke fun at the elite and other social groups.

In addition to the "people's theater" theme, many plays during the 1980s involved a direct, materialist sort of critique of social and political inequalities or more indirect, subtle critiques, using Islamic symbolism rather than traditional Javanese symbols. For instance, Teater Jagat and Teater Gapit, both based in Solo, produced plays that graphically depicted the struggles of poor and working people in the throes of oppression at the hands of the government and wealthy capitalist developers (ibid, 63-5). In the late 80s and early 90s, a new theme of social critique emerged in Yogyakarta using Islamic symbols, concepts, and mythology to point out the failings of state and society. Teater Jiwa, Sanggar Shalahuddin, and Aisyah, the women's section of Muhammadiyah, staged plays criticizing the suppression of women wearing Muslim headdresses, the oppressive forces of development, and moral decline (ibid, 61-2). These three major themes: people's theatre, and "materialist" and symbolic (both traditional and Islamic) critique also run through current student productions.

In the 1980s and 1990s, university campuses became important bases for theatrical groups and integral parts of networks of artists, students, workers and NGOs (see Halim HD 1999). Nevertheless, government restrictions, televised cultural shows, and changing cultural tastes under the influence of global cultural flows kept modern theatre marginalized from the masses. Cultural artists had to go through many layers of bureaucracy before obtaining permits to perform in public. Many artists were censored, banned, and arrested. Shortly after President Suharto proclaimed a new "openness" for the expression of public opinions, Teater Koma's play *Suksesi*, a humorous allegorical criticism of crude government repression and the closure of open, democratic discourse, was shut down by police order (Bodden 1997). It was with the mass mobilization and expansion of the Reformation movement against *KKN* (corruption, collusion and nepotism) and rising prices for basic necessities that saw modern Indonesian theatre move from the margins to the center of public attention (Hatley 1999, 271). Graphic and subtle depictions of elite corruption, social inequality and injustice helped to fuel the movement to force Suharto from power and reform Indonesian society and the demands and hopes of protestors, in turn, helped to fuel artistic criticism. Performance arts appeared amidst increasingly large and intense demonstrations and rallies leading up to Suharto's resignation and the following day, Butet Kartarejasa, the head of Teater Gandrik, performed impersonations of Suharto before a million people who marched from all directions to the palace courtyard (ibid, 278).

In the aftermath of Suharto's fall from power, modern theatrical groups continue to criticize rampant political corruption, government repression, and the lack of respect for human rights. These and other broad issues around which

millions of Reformation activists were united in resistance (Halim HD 1999) are still evident in performance arts; however, the splintering of the movement along various lines of ideological difference has also taken its toll on modern theatre, both professional and student groups. Teater Gandrik, a professional group with significant commercial sponsorship, has continued with political critique along populist lines lambasting the ineffectiveness of efforts at social reform. They staged *Departemen Borok* (Department of Rot) near the end of September 2003 criticizing corruption and the culture and institutional practices which perpetuate it. This story was about a wealthy businessman and his employees who are investigated by an anti-corruption committee that collects all the evidence necessary to prove a case against them. The businessman accrues his wealth through cheating and false reports and tries to pay off the anti-corruption committee members to sweep his case under the rug. But in the end, the corrupt businessman and his employees are not brought to justice because the whole inquiry was just for show. The leader of the committee throws away the files of evidence and dismisses the investigators. This play indirectly references several well-known corruption cases in which nothing was done despite the existence of clear evidence. It likens corruption to an infection or festering sore (*borok*) eating away at society, even the institutions set up to treat the illness are infected with it.

In contrast, Emha Ainun Nadjib (Cak Nun)[1] with his musical group, Kiai Kanjeng, and Dipa, a former member of Dinasti, performed *Runtuh* (Collapse), several poems and a skit written by Cak Nun criticizing elitism, commercialization of education and pop culture, and global stratification, from a down-to-earth Islamic perspective. The program staged in mid-October 2003, sponsored by Insist (Institute for Social Transformation), a local NGO, took its title *Kesaksian Orang Biasa* (An Ordinary Person's Testimony) from a major theme running through Cak Nun's poems. The poems expressed an "ordinary person's" views about how the Bali nightclub bombing that took the lives of one hundred eighty of "our companions" destroys the "soul of the world's human *ummat*," and was perpetrated by "our own fate which is scrambling helter-skelter on the road of history." In Cak Nun's skit *Globalisasi Inrul* (Globalization of Inrul), he and another group member perform a short skit consisting of a dialogue between two ordinary people about contemporary Indonesian society. One of the men, after being challenged about his statement that there are more thieves than residents in Indonesia, apologizes and goes on to testify that "our country is encircled by thousands of groups of officials who each consider themselves as family and owners that also have rights to Indonesia!" These government officials are depicted as having their eyes bulging out of their heads and hands on their weapons as they scream out all sorts of words such as "democracy, reformation, autonomy, decentralization, precisely the same words spoken by non-governmental organizations." They also "scream out sacred verses (*ayat-ayat Suci*) for common people such as fabulous words

1 *Cak Nun* is pronounced "Chok Noon." *Cak* is an East Javanese title of respect and *Nun* comes from the last syllable of Ainun.

about Civil Society, problems of national philosophy, words that reverberate until I am lost." This man depicts himself as surrounded on all sides by Democracy, Reformation, Sacred Verses, and Human Rights. The other man tells him that he is overly dramatic and that his experience is different. He sees people enthralled with the fun of *Ngebor*. He describes the context of *Ngebor* with the audience sitting across the stage, musicians in the back, a group of background dancers consisting of female graduates from the Indonesian Arts Institute, and in the very front of the stage is a "creature called Inrul Darastrista. What is watched is not her face or her voice, but rather her buttocks." This man goes on to say that "Inrul's butt is the paradigm for the contemporary value of egalitarianism that is capable of actualizing the progressive spirit significant for the community of a nation state." The other man exclaims that he thinks that the "*Ngebor* buttocks is the highest achievement of the work of globalization," while the other testifies that all strata of society, including the civil and military elite and the president's husband revel in this "butt phenomenon" which will in the end spin their eyes right out of their heads.

This skit sharply criticizes the political and military elites and the pop cultural phenomenon, Inul Daratista, whose name is thinly disguised, and those who delight in her sensual style of performing. It presents an image of Indonesian society in which the state institutions such as the armed forces besiege society claiming rights over Indonesian resources, stealing from the people who they seem to outnumber. It also draws attention to the state of confusion many people are experiencing during this era in which popular concepts within the Reformation movement are being appropriated by elites. However, instead of focusing upon unraveling the multidimensional crisis lying beneath these concepts, all segments of Indonesian society have fallen under the spell of Inul's drilling buttocks, which has been defended as a matter of freedom and democracy. The "butt phenomenon" is not only a product of globalization which produces misplaced values but it also leads to spiritual blindness and emptiness. Cak Nun addresses social and political inequality, ideological subterfuge, and the exploitation of the female body from a critical Islamic perspective.

In contrast to the populist and religious orientations of Teater Gandrik and Cak Nun, a recently organized, semi-professional group, Akademi Kebudayaan Yogyakarta, express a "materialist" political-economic indictment of global capitalism and neo-liberalism. This group of mostly experienced professionals with a few students received sponsorship from Insist and other NGOs and businesses to perform *Orang-orang yang Bergegas* (People in a Rush) in six cities across Java during March/April 2004. This powerful critique of the social consequences of global capitalism focuses upon a family whose members are too busy struggling to survive, trying to get a promotion, attempting to develop a resistance movement, or scurrying about absorbed in frivolities to sit down and communicate with each other. With a large picture of Che Guevara, the Cuban revolutionary, in the background, the mother and maid spoke about how busy and in a rush people are these days. Her younger daughter was wrapped up in an artificial world of play

things, while her older daughter spoke of her ambition of attaining a promotion at her place of employment. The son and father engaged in a long discussion criticizing capitalism from their respective positions, after which the son steps to the front of the stage, kicking empty soda cans, products of global capitalism, as he gives a political sermon railing against the economic system.[2] When his father laments the predicament of workers today, blues play in the background, and at another point, images of poor people in Yogyakarta and workers on assembly lines roll on a screen. In the final act, after the mother fell ill, her husband, son and elder daughter finally spent some time talking to her, but the youngest daughter seemed totally oblivious to what her mother was going through. At the very end, following her mother's passing, she comes to a full stop declaring, to the delight of the audience, that she is tired.

Each of these three performances was staged on Gadjah Mada University campus at the Purna Budaya auditorium. Hundreds of mostly young students in small groups of friends and some families and middle-aged adults attended and enthusiastically received these performances. These theatre groups did not organize any discussions following their performances, but many small groups of people formed expressing and sharing their views on the plays, poetry and skit. Campuses are not only the center of such critical performances from professional theatre groups, but they have their theatrical forum creating productions that weave together the three major themes of people's or populist theatre and materialist and symbolic critique.

Student Theatre: Yearning for Social Transformation

I found student theatre groups on most campuses in the student unions or small buildings housing student organizations. Paintings, theatrical props and musical instruments are often strewn around student theatre groups' quarters and students are often sitting around socializing and holding discussion sessions. They grapple with the flux and instability of student membership through maintaining ties with graduates. Some graduates are still active members of the groups continuing to act, direct, and write plays. Nevertheless, these groups find it difficult to obtain commercial sponsors that prefer professional groups with more stable membership. Some student groups find occasional support from local government institutions, businesses, NGOs and professional theatre groups, but for the most part they rely upon insufficient funding from their university administrators. Different campuses over time have developed theatre groups with distinctive styles, as older members have stayed around to shape the group and socialize new members, many of whom may have been attracted to the general orientation of the group. Although particular campus groups have formed ideological foundations, themes are combined and traverse groups of different general orientations.

2 Eko Prasetyo, the publishing manager for Insist Press, argued that global capitalism is the main enemy of Muslim leftists struggling for a social revolution (2003, 105-169).

Teater Gadjah Mada routinely produces plays with a "people's theatre" theme and embraces a populist ideological orientation. After experimenting with performing several European plays, they have adapted the traditional form of *ketoprak lesung* to modern theatre. Some group members informed me that this shift was driven partially by a desire not to appear arrogant to local people, replacing foreign forms with those more familiar. Teater Gadjah Mada has adopted the use of *gejog lesung*—the traditional genre of music consisting of thumping out tunes with large wooden poles on a huge hollowed out piece of wood. These agricultural instruments used to pound rice were incorporated in traditional melodramatic theatre, especially in East Java. Their recent performances of *Modin Karok* and *Alang-Alang* utilized the genre of *ketoprak lesung* to tell folktales from Madura and Gua Langse Parangtritis, Yogyakarta. Performers played the *lesung* in the back of the stage as actors performed these stories in Indonesian. I had an opportunity to see their performance of *Modin Karok* in September 2003 when they were invited to perform at the palace on the occasion of the launching of Sultan HB X's book *Pisowanan Agung*, about the role of the Sultan in the Reformation Movement. Heri Sudarmanto, an UGM student, wrote the script and acted in the play. The story was about a *muadzin* (caller to prayer) from Madura who chose to defend the existence of *adzan* (call to prayer; Ar. Adhan) as a form of strengthening and upholding peace in the land. Modin Karok was disappointed with many religious matters, so he developed a unique method. He ordered his students to steal things from groups of religious teachers that he felt had not been doing the right thing. After returning things his students stole to the religious teachers, he became famous for this special ability. Adipati Sumenep, a royal ruler, met with Modin Karok and ordered him to look for the princess' ring that was lost, but none of his students stole it, so he was at a loss to find it. In reference to something else, Modin Karok uttered the words "*Ahad, Ahad, Ahad*" (The One, The One, The One—an attribute of Allah), and the ruler's guard's name just happened to be Ahad who thought he had been discovered by the Modin so he confessed to having stolen the princess' ring. Modin Karok's special powers were counterfeit or coincidental; however, in the end, he sets sail on a ship with his students more famous than ever. This play was a cynical critique of established religious figures that rely upon tricks and fraud, hoodwinking people into believing in their abilities. Moreover, they were depicted as hypocrites who point out the failings in others, while hiding their own corrupt deeds.

Alang-Alang (Tall Weeds), formulated by Gati Andoko, was performed at the UGM student union building in October 2003. Gati, the director for this troupe, is an UGM graduate who wrote an undergraduate thesis on *ketoprak lesung* and worked with several other theatre groups in the past. He was shot by government forces during one of the local Reformation demonstrations prior to Suharto's resignation. *Alang-Alang*, adapted from a local folktale, begins with a man facing lots of economic problems and pressure from his wife to do better. In search of a solution to his problems, Mr. Slamet meets with Syekh Bela Belu, a spiritual figure who advises Mr. Slamet to find a man called Sunan Geseng in the Langse

Figure 6.1 Teater Gadjah Mada performer in *Alang-Alang*

Cave. According to Syekh Bela Balu Sunan Geseng is the one who can help him solve his problem. After meeting with Sunan Geseng in Langse Cave, Mr. Slamet receives three rocks as symbols of his three wishes. Mrs. Slamet feels happy when her husband returns home with hope. The conflict between Mr. and Mrs. Slamet arises again when they have a difference of opinion about the three wishes that will be submitted. Pak Slamet wants to ask for wealth, power, and women and he runs around chanting "*kekayaan, kekuasaan dan perempuan*" (wealth, power and women), but his wife only wants wealth and power. Mr. Slamet asks for power and receives lots of penises of various sizes all over his body (see Figure 6.1). Later, he wished not to have all these penises and wound up with just one extra penis for a nose.

People were laughing and rolling around with the scenes from the play, but when it was over most of them left except for a small group of spectators who stayed and participated in the discussion session. The director and actors invited people to stay to take part in a dialogue about the play which they view as essential to the process of producing a real "people's theatre." During the discussion, a young man asked them about whether the actors were like "robots" following what the director had in mind and how they are responding to the capitalistic drive to commoditize cultural arts forms for the sake of tourist profits. Gati and some actors responded noting that he did not write a script that they followed; instead, he told the story to the troupe members and emphasized improvisation during open rehearsals. They also responded by asserting that capitalism is not always bad, and that if they make some money from productions it is fine but that is not their main goal. Along with this public mode of critical dialogue, Teater Gadjah Mada also expressed their populist orientation through the play itself. Similar to *Modin Karok*, *Alang-Alang* ridiculed religious authorities. In this case, the two sheiks, considered to be students of Sunan Kalijaga, one of the nine legendary *wali* of Java, were depicted as scandalous characters. In fact, the penises appear because one of the sheiks was a womanizer with strong sexual desires of his own. Both of these plays send the message for people to become more aware of their selves and to take more individual responsibility for their surroundings and lives. In addition, Gati informed me that while doing research for this play, he discovered that the central Javanese palaces have extensive artifacts symbolizing penises and vaginas (*lingga-yoni*) from the Hindu-Buddhist periods as well as numerous pictures of nude women taken during Dutch colonial times. These sexually explicit images are held "behind tall grass" out of public view. Teater Gadjah Mada's realistic and open representation of penises, seen not only on stage but also hanging around the group's office and rehearsal area, critiques and challenges elite control and censorship. These works exemplify Teater Gadjah Mada's populist, often anti-cultural, stance, entailing mental representations of ordinary people trying to realize their dreams and desires amidst domination by corrupt and phony elites. Moreover, these performances model desirable futures in which ordinary people participate more fully in society and have more room to grow and develop unhindered by religious and political authorities.

Some other student theatre groups express this people's theatre theme in their work without wholeheartedly embracing a populist ideological orientation. For instance, Teater Eska, the student group from the local IAIN (National Islamic Institute), in conjunction with the Women's Domestic Worker's Association (PRT), staged *Tanda Tanya* (Question Mark) at the French-Indonesian Institute during March 2004. Zuhdi Siswanto, a young student, directed and wrote a general script for the play leaving a great deal of room open for improvisation by actresses from the association to use their experiences expressing their feelings as workers. Moreover, Zuhdi developed the script from discussions with members of PRT about their lives and social problems. PRT association handouts and bulletins were distributed from tables outside the auditorium containing information about this NGO's concerns, activities and resistance. When the lights were turned off to begin the event, performers used kitchen utensils to produce some funky beats. A young woman came out on stage and gave an introductory speech setting the tone for this critical play about woman domestic workers making statements of protest against their treatment and the way they are not the focus of any of the current political campaigning. The play began with a heavyset woman and silent young lady standing near the door waiting for their friends to come back home from working as housemaids. She walked around the house doing choirs, while speaking to another woman criticizing the treatment of housemaids and the negligent actions of the elite in the electoral process. Later, several more young women returned home and spoke about their experiences and mistreatment. They spoke about being dehumanized, treated like slaves, sexual objects and robots. Eventually, the young silent woman had an emotional outburst which displayed her traumatic experience of being raped and "ridden like a horse" by the rich owner of the house. The women argued for human rights and laws protecting them as workers. As the program stated, "when justice will be found for this marginalized group is a question mark."

In addition to training members of the association to stage this joint "people's production," Teater Eska expressed the people's theatre theme in organizing an open discussion session following the play. The group members and some spectators stayed around to participate. Some senior members of Teater Eska, the young director/playwright, and some female actresses and association members made statements and entered into dialogue with spectators. This play and discussion not only indicated a "people's theatre" theme, but it also expressed a direct, materialist critique of the exploitation and marginalization of woman domestic workers in the prevailing economic and political system. Indeed, this event embodies mental representations of marginalized ordinary people and of class-based exploitation and abuse, although Teater Eska, as I will discuss below, has an encompassing Islamic ideological orientation. This performance directed by a young director from the National Islamic Institute demonstrates a strain of contemporary Muslim thought which emphasizes social justice and struggles against exploitation. M. Jadul Maula, a leader of a NU-affiliated NGO, and Moeslim Abdurrahman, an American-trained anthropologist affiliated with Muhammadiyah exemplify this increasingly influential stream of Muslim thought. Maula (2003) emphasizes

aspects of religious ethics motivating recognition of marginal groups and support for struggles against injustice and poverty. He cites a *hadīth* in which Prophet Muhammad advises farmers threatened with having their land taken from them to struggle for their rights (ibid: 12). Similarly, Abdurrahman (2003, 13) discussing the exploitation of women factory workers in Asia mentions a *hadīth* which states that a worker's salary should be paid before their sweat is dry as part of his assertion of "the need for politics of defending workers from exploitation." He continues, "This, I think, is the most basic religious message." In concert with these Muslim figures, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, chief coordinator of the Liberal Islam Network, states that "the value emphasized in Islam is justice. The mission of Islam I consider to be the most important now is how to uphold justice in the world, especially in the political and economic realms…" (2003, 5-6). While the elder Teater Eska directors and playwrights also embody these values in their plays they do so within a more symbolic and abstract Islamic framework.

In contrast, Teater Lobby Dua from the local STPMD-APMD campus consistently stages plays containing a direct critique of social conditions and embraces a materialist, Neo-Marxist perspective. One would expect no less from a theatre group on a campus with only one faculty, a socio-political faculty, dedicated to training rural leaders. They staged the play *Sketsa Rezim* (Regime Sketch), written by Menthol Hartoyo, a graduate and popular writer, in early 2003, which depicts the struggle between poor villagers and the rich and powerful over the planned destruction of a local ancestral mausoleum. When local villagers hear about plans to bring in bulldozers to level their sacred ancestral shrine, they arm themselves with weapons to stop it. An elder woman that often prays at the shrine, deriving status from her presumed ability to communicate with the deceased ancestor, sells out along with the local-level political leader to a wealthy Chinese businessman who bought the villagers land at low prices under false pretenses. The political leader, Mr. Lurah, lied to locals telling them to sell their land and the shrine would not be destroyed. Mr. Lurah receives more money from the businessman to distribute amongst locals in order to convince them not to demonstrate when the higher-level political leader comes to officially launch the factory-building project. The elder woman comes out of the shrine telling locals that the ancestor told them to let the businessman destroy the shrine and build the factory and not to demonstrate in opposition. However, a local man also enters the shrine and comes out telling them just the opposite and reveals to the community that the woman has sold them out for money. They went ahead and staged the demonstration in front of the political leaders, armed forces and the businessman. The local villagers were forced back, killed, and rolled over by the bulldozers.

Teater Lobby Dua staged another Menthol Hartoyo play, *Partai Coro* (Cockroach Party), in the STPMD auditorium during March 2004.[3] This scathing

3 The symbol of cockroach was also used in Cockroach Opera, a musical play *Teater Koma* staged in 1985 critiquing bureaucratic corruption and problems of urban poverty (Bodden 1997, 261).

critique of the electoral process was presented at the height of the 2004 general election campaign, with the parliamentary elections about to take place in early April. The story is about the formation and campaign of a new political party, *Partai Coro*, amidst the hustle and bustle of a general election in which flags, leaflets and other paraphernalia proliferates. Marginalized urban poor people declare that this party must be formed and supported to lift up the cause of those displaced and oppressed by development policies. They note that no other parties represent the interests of poor working class people, and that they have no other choice but to form the "Cockroach Party." Their hopes are dashed when this party, proclaiming to serve the common people, turns to the same corrupt, self-serving practices of all the other parties. This play portrays all parties, regardless of the ideologies they profess, as using poor people as a political football tempting them with false promises in order to win in the "democratic festival" called the general election. Both of these plays have a clear focus on the struggles of poor people, directly critiquing the political-economic system which pins them down. They clearly embody models of class stratification and conflict. Even religious sites, such as the sacred mausoleum in *Sketsa Rezim*, are symbolic realms of contention, as forces of the ruling class and poor peasants come out producing opposing interpretations. These performances model a desirable future in which unequal class relations are transformed and lower class people have a stronger social, economic and political voice.

Similarly, Unstradt, the literary and theatrical group at UNY (National University, Yogyakarta) staged a version of *Orang-orang Batu* (Rock People), a play presenting a direct socio-political critique. Hasta Indriyana, a young student, wrote this script and condensed it into a two-hour format for the regional theatrical competition in April 2004 at the Indonesian Arts Institute in Bantul, Special Province of Yogyakarta. *Orang-orang Batu*, like *Sketsa Rezim*, is a story about wealthy developers and their political stooges trampling on the rights and interests of poor villagers. In this case, a wealthy Javanese couple plans to build a golf course and luxurious housing complex in a village displacing the poor workers who live there. A young educated man who courts a girl from a poor family in this village hears that they are to be relocated as part of the rich people's plans. He told her parents he was opposed to the wealthy developer's scheme. The local-level political leader overheard him and came to convince the man of the correctness of the plan, arguing with the educated young man. Eventually the political official resorted to threatening the young man after being defeated in the argument. Later, the local political official, the wealthy developer and their thugs and bullies captured, tortured and killed the young man. The story ended with the poor family and the official coming to find his body; they cried and held him in their arms. This performance in the regional competition was rewarded with applause and the first place award fulfilling the panel of judge's criteria which emphasized social critique. The nature of this script may have been shaped somewhat by the demands of the competition, and not totally by the orientation of the group. In fact, it appears from my interview with Hasta that his influences and interests are

many, including "realism, surrealism, and romanticism." Hasta is also a student of Hamdy Salad, a prominent playwright and author from IAIN's Teater Eska, who teaches at UNY. The discourse of Hasta and other students in Ustradt indicated a plurality of models, mental representations of the ordinary village caught in the winds of change, of class-based political-economic conflict, and of struggles to strengthen Islamic values and practices. Although Unstradt deploys the direct, materialist critique in *Orang-orang Batu*, their orientation as a group seems to be rather eclectic and not indicative of a specific ideological orientation.

On the other hand, Teater Manggar-AMIKOM and Teater Eska are more firmly rooted in specific ideological orientations, using themes of traditional and religious symbolism within populist and Islamic perspectives. Teater Manggar uses elaborate traditional symbolism in *Wahyu Kusumaning Manggar* (Coconut Flower Revelation), a play written by Catur Nugroho, a student at AMIKOM campus. Catur wrote this play as a reflective commemoration of the group's founding a few years ago, but they also entered it into the regional competition. The story was about two brothers, Joko Wasis and Joko Bodho, from a rural background. The elder brother, Joko Wasis, has ambitions and big dreams and sets off to the city to realize them, leaving Joko Bodho, his younger brother who is physically and mentally disabled. Joko Wasis plays a trick on his brother and leaves him to cry. A group of gods empathize with Joko Bodho sending a messenger that grants him with a *pusaka*, a powerful coconut flower, which he can use as a weapon and instrument to realize his aspirations. Meanwhile, Joko Wasis has become a wealthy person in the city living a life of luxury with three wives. He has become so drunk with his success that he has forgotten his roots and background. When his younger brother comes to visit, he feels so embarrassed that he refuses to recognize him as his brother. Joko Bodho leaves broken hearted and a group of fairies come to console him. His brother falls sick from all of the stress of his lifestyle and no healers can restore his health. Finally, his brother returns and heals him with a touch of the magical coconut flower. The two brothers get back together in mutual happiness, the gods smile with delight, and the people celebrate their newfound happiness and perfection. This play draws upon the traditional personage of Joko Bodho, a common character in Javanese folktales, an unlikely hero who saves the day. Joko Bodho represents the members of Teater Mangga or the common people in Indonesia on their retrospective journeys and the group of gods and fairies represent a stimulus for them to look within themselves. The *pusaka* was just a symbol for the power and value within his self, the playwright informed me. It was not directing him to look for the power that lied outside but rather the power within him. Moreover, in contrast to the clown character in *ludruk* melodramas who expresses the superiority of urban elite culture over "backward" rural culture, Joko Bodho points out the unsuspected strength of rural culture and his brother the arrogant and selfish pitfalls of urban life. There is an indirect class critique and opposition to globalization which takes the form of hegemonic cultural influence uprooting local values and social ties. Yet, Teater Manggar's critique of urban-rural, class, and global hierarchies appear to be framed within more of a populist

than Neo-Marxist perspective. Similar to Teater Gadjah Mada, Teater Manggar's plays and discourse embody models of common people caught in the throes of dominant forces without laying stress on class-based hierarchy and conflict. Thus, their performances also project images of Indonesian society in which the potential of common people is given an opportunity to flower.

On the other hand, Teater Eska often uses indirect and symbolic themes within an Islamic ideological perspective. For instance, Hamdy Salad's play *Toghout* (Ar. Taghut; tyrant, transgressor) and Kaji Habeb's *Hingga Perbatasan Hari* (To the End of Days), staged in 2003 and 2002 respectively, use deep and elaborate symbolism, Islamic concepts, and references to chapters from the Holy Qur'an. *Toghout* is about a dying despotic king who comes back to life in a different form, more evil and cruel than ever. To realize his Evil, he orders a sorcerer/state advisor to prepare a new sacred book, a book of lies and state power in the form of a great market. This sorcerer passes the responsibility and his *ilmu* or scientific and magical knowledge to a younger man. However, this young man also studies *ilmu* from many religious scholars unbeknownst to the evil ruler and his advisor. After learning all this religious knowledge, he opposes and fights against the king. He is eventually arrested, imprisoned and tortured. Despite being subjected to numerous forms of torture, he held firmly to his *iman* (religious faith and conviction) and commitment to truth. Continuing their efforts to break the young man and his followers, the evil ruler and his assistants have trenches built and place these believers within them and set the trenches on fire filling them with raging flames. The trenches extend very far through space and time, as long as a century, forming the most savage and uncouth prison in human history. *Toghout* is a subtle criticism of global capitalism, a dying system, finding new life in the form of more extensive world markets. In fact, *Toghout* (pronounced *To-hut*) is a polysemous symbol representing the cruel trench diggers and the *Oneness* of globalization on the one hand, and *Tauhid* (pronounced *Tow-hid*), the Oneness of God, which the young man and his followers were committed to, on the other. *Toghout* evokes *Tauhid* not only as similar sounding terms with similar conceptual elements such as *oneness* but also as dialectical opposites and historical opponents. This story implies the heroic existence of "secret" and hidden rejection of dominant ideas flowing in from more powerful centers in the world. The people maintain a commitment to the Islamic "essence" rejecting the lies of the hegemonic oneness of global domination.

Likewise, Kaji Habeb's *Hingga Perbatasan Hari* entails socio-political critique set deeply within an Islamic milieu. Kaji Habeb, a graduate and accomplished painter, tells a story about the human spiritual journey in this world. The main characters in the play are Aku, which is the first-person pronoun in Indonesian, and Saat, which means Time. Aku (I) receives assistance from his servant, Saat (Time), in his search for the "Book of Death," which contains inner knowledge about the realities of existence and the ultimate meaning of life and death and our actions in this world. Saat informs Aku that this book cannot be found in any of the places one typically goes to look for books, even in the most out-

of-the-way places. He must take Aku to find a person who has the book. Some women enter the set bearing heavy burdens, and Saat has a discussion with one of them named Hawa (Eve) who complains of always being blamed for Adam's mistakes and their subsequent expulsion from Paradise. As Aku and Saat proceed on their journey, Kaji Habeb's inspiration from Chapter 18 of the Holy Qur'an, *Surah al-Kahf* (The Cave) becomes apparent. Similar to this Qur'anic chapter, they remain in a cave falling asleep for an undetermined period of time, while evil kings persecuting believers and worshippers continue to rule the world. The evil king at the beginning of the story orders the massacre of believers dancing gracefully like "Rumi's dance" and singing praises to God, and the evil king at the end directs *Ya'juj* and *Ma'juj* (Gog and Magog), ravaging beasts of the final days in Islamic prophecy, to strangle and slaughter everyone. Aku hears many other people looking for "hidden treasure" in the cave, but he does not find the book before he dies. Saat informs him that what he was looking for passed him by but he did not realize it. This Qur'anic-inspired story criticizes the ideological props of gender and class inequality, through the characters of Eve and Saat. Eve argues that she was not to blame for Adam choosing to eat the apple. Saat, a mere servant, is relied upon as a guide on his boss' ultimate journey in search of invaluable information. Of course, there is also a clear allusion to cruel leaders in Indonesia and elsewhere in the world which persecute Muslims and attempt to halt the flow of new or different ideas and interpretations that challenge their hegemony.

These plays exemplify Teater Eska's trajectory of work which self-consciously strives to utilize the treasure of Islamic concepts and knowledge—*khazanah Islam*—within its artistic creations. They have been trying to produce "prophetic theatre," integrating Islamic revelation into the context of literature. This allows them to produce plays with several levels of meaning and universal messages, not only for Indonesia but for societies all over the world. Moreover, they try to not use actors and actresses as mere tools to deliver messages, but the performers themselves are part of the process and have messages of their own. This "transcendence" Hamdy Salad envisions can also occur when the spectators watching their plays open their minds with the abstract ideas and messages performers and writers convey to them. Similar to the Teater Eska and PRT collaborative play discussed earlier, Kaji Habeb's and Hamdy Salad's plays and discourse embody populist and political-economic models; however, they incorporate them within overarching religious models. In addition, Hamdy Salad told me that Teater Eska has been discussing and implementing cultural *dakwah* since the mid-1980s focusing upon how Islam could be made to accommodate local and foreign cultural art forms, including rock and roll, rituals, and customs making them into tools for *dakwah* the way the *Wali Songo* did it. He considers Muhammadiyah's recent moves toward cultural *dakwah* to be more limited and rigid than what Teater Eska or NU has been doing for many years. However Teater Eska has fit into Indonesia's diverse Islamic spectrum over time, it is clear that their group, with "prophetic theatre," concepts of transcendence, and cultural *dakwah* is wedded to an Islamic ideological framework. Their performances model a desirable future in which

Indonesian society is an Islamic polity consistent with the prophetic tradition and exhibiting characteristics of radical democracy.

Modern Theatre and Equalization

Modern professional, semi-professional and student theatre has emerged as another public form/forum, inside and outside of political demonstrations and NGO activism, to express criticism of various aspects of a multidimensional crisis and a longing for change. Student theatre, despite the obvious problems of maintaining continuity in the troupe, with students coming and going, has become a highly active venue for the expression of social and political critique, both in direct and more sublime forms. As we have seen, theatrical groups of various ideological orientations make critiques of the prevailing socio-political order through multiple themes, often in combination. Although these themes were present in earlier periods, they did not appear to be clearly embedded within distinct ideological frameworks until the post-Suharto era. No doubt populist, materialist, and Islamic ideologies are not new in Indonesian society. In fact, these ideologies and the models they entail were embodied in public cultural forms long before the emergence of the New Order regime. Yet, through government repression and the drive to form a broad, united opposition movement, modern theatre, in particular, downplayed ideological differences and deployed common themes to produce indirect critiques that could sidestep state censorship. Moreover, concerted New Order efforts to "de-ideologize" Indonesian society, promoting *Pancasila* as the sole ideology, had taken its toll (see Ramage 1995, 186; Hellman 2003, 19). Thus, the more apparent ideological formation suggested in the works above is not just a function of the post-Suharto splintering of the Reformation Movement along various lines but is also a function of a more open expression of perspectives long present. Perspectives, previously held behind a shield of common defense and resistance, have become more evident and explicit (cf. Bain 2000).

Nevertheless, some recent developments have occurred within these ideological perspectives which are significant for processes of equalization. First, there is greater focus on the individual across all of these ideological positions. Teater Gadjah Mada and Teater Manggar, along the populist lines, clearly emphasize individual responsibility, involvement and introspection. Teater Eska shares this turn towards the individual with concerns about individual transcendence, rising above social and cultural limitations and gaining new insights, including the performers as well as the spectators. Even Neo-Marxist materialist-oriented groups such as Akademi Kebudayaan Yogyakarta and Lobby Dua highlight individual dyadic and family relationships under the influence of global capitalism and individual efforts to make change given fraudulent political parties and an electoral process bent on serving the interests of the rich. This concern with the individual, ranging from psychological, experiential, behavioral, spiritual and material, bode well for processes of equalization, moving in the direction of greater individual empowerment and access to resources. Modern theatre is propelling Indonesian

society to be more concerned about the well-being of individuals, especially those that have been marginalized and oppressed, and their responsibility to participate in processes of change. On the other hand, this concern with the individual also points out the limitations of power through directing attention to self-reflection, introspection, transcendence and spiritual journeys. These are realms within which, even with more equitable distributions of power and resources, people are left to their own devices and imaginations. However, under conditions of stark social and economic inequalities and elite political hegemony disguised as serving the poor or the nation, which are typical of despotic democracy (see West 2004), people often seek refuge and escape in these realms. Most significantly, the convergence of these ideological orientations at the point of the individual indicates a shared vision of a desirable future, whether secular or religious, in which empowered individuals participate in governance (cf. Holland et al. 2007, 195).

Secondly, from the late 1960s to the late 1990s, cultural arts instilled with direct political-economic critique and a working class or "small person" ethos were marked and stigmatized as communist. Nowadays, works of this sort not only occur in the open but they are promoted and awarded as we have seen in the regional theatrical competition. This emphasis and popularity extends the influence of this perspective across ideologies. Populist and Islamic-oriented groups also exhibit great concern for the material realities of people's lives and overbearing political-economic structures. Moreover, Neo-Marxist oriented theatrical groups have also ventured into the zone of cultural symbols demonstrating the class struggles implicated in their contestation (see also Arbuckle 2000). Perhaps, more than anything else, this shared concern with class inequality indicates the growing influence of liberation theology amongst Javanese Muslims as religious values motivate them towards social transformation.

Thirdly, the emergence of "prophetic theatre" expresses a broad Islamic framework for understanding Indonesia's multidimensional crisis. Islamic-oriented theatre in the late 1980s and 1990s focused upon particular issues such as restrictions on headscarves and family values or produced veiled criticisms of the New Order regime much as other groups did. However, "prophetic theatre" developing in Teater Eska in the early 2000s casts an overarching ideological explanation for social and political problems, placing them in broad historical, civilization-wise and Qur'anic contexts. This new theme of prophecy within literary and dramatic settings indicates models and deep-seated concerns for justice, equality, and freedom from oppression and tyranny framed within an "other-worldly" perspective which implies an Islamic "theocracy" resounding with elements of radical democracy rather than secular, liberal democracy. To what extent the values and philosophies from these political models will be combined and convergences found within "prophetic theatre" are unclear at this point.

Finally, globalization has clearly arisen as a major focus of concern and critique by theatre groups across the ideological spectrum. These groups are all addressing issues of local cultural change in the face of global cultural flows and influence. Populist groups tend to look more extensively at the fate of local traditions,

symbols, and values, while materialist groups explore the capitalist and corporate aspects and Islamic groups delve into the moral and spiritual dimensions. These anti-globalization sentiments should not be interpreted as expressions of anti-Americanism or anti-Western feelings; that is, as opposition to an entire way of life, but more precisely as indicating aversion to American and Western *hegemony*. They express opposition to cultural and economic imperialism and pride in, and commitment to, local and Islamic cultures. Javanese of these diverse ideological perspectives agree on the desirable prospect of Indonesia as a distinct and less adversely affected partner on the global stage.

Chapter 7
Maiyah, Communitas and Common People

Most enduring anthropological and sociological models of religious movements project cycles of change resulting in "routinization" and a return to a "steady state" or "structure." Weber pointed out in his classic analysis of the processes of change in religious movements that the initial spontaneity of these movements and the charisma of their leaders eventually become formally institutionalized and part of the normative social structure. Anthony Wallace and Victor Turner contributed significantly to Weber's insights through expanding on the phases of these movements and exploring their cognitive or symbolic and ideological dimensions. For Wallace (1956, 1970[1961]), the phases of "revitalization" movements are steady state/period of increased individual stress/period of cultural distortion, period of revitalization, and new steady state; while for Turner (1974, 286, 293) religious protest movements pass through phases of structure/anti-structure/counter-structure/restructuring. They both presume routinization of mental and behavioral aspects as religious movements return to a "steady state" or relatively stable structures. "Cults" and "sects" become "churches," formally established religious institutions, and later "sects" or "cults" split off again in opposition to aspects of the establishment perpetuating the cycle.

Wallace explicates the cognitive dimension with the concept of "mazeway reformulation" (formulation of a code) which he places as the first stage of the period of revitalization that occurs under conditions of stress and cultural distortion. Revitalization movements are defined as "deliberate, organized attempts by some members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture by rapid acceptance of a pattern of multiple innovations" (Wallace 1970[1961], 188). Reformulating or reconfiguring "mazeways," mental images of the body, society and its culture, and world, is central to the process of revitalization. Likewise, Turner explores this dimension of cultural change through examining the metaphors of anti-structure, a liminal phase of these movements entailing a diffuse sense of humanness, oneness and egalitarianism, Turner calls communitas. Turner described the analogy and metonymy in terms of pairings and oppositions of symbolic elements without inferring any more inclusive cognitive structures such as "mazeways." In contemporary cognitive anthropological terms, the larger mediating bundles of knowledge are considered models or schemata.

I argue in this chapter that during processes of change, people in the *Maiyah* religious movement are reformulating and reconfiguring both schemata and models, involving analogies, metaphors and other symbolic elements. They

accomplish this within flexible ideological and organizational frameworks, while keeping the fires of communitas alive. Moreover, I recommend changes to these models in the direction of accommodating and considering a greater degree of dynamism in the interrelations between new religious movements, society, and existing sociopolitical structures.

After providing some ethnographic and historical background for the *Maiyah* movement bringing its charismatic founder and followers into clearer focus, I proceed to explore its ideas and meanings to participants and society-at-large. This movement's creative combination of mysticism, fundamentalism, and politics has taken it from its humble roots in monthly religious lectures in East Java to becoming a magnet with quickly expanding appeal to masses throughout Indonesia and Southeast Asia. In the final section, I will discuss the relevance of this movement to rethinking the dynamics of routinization and communitas and to processes of equalization in which this movement is deeply entrenched.

The Maiyah and its Genesis and Ethnographic Context

Emha Ainun Nadjib, the founder of the *Maiyah* movement, was born in Menturo, a village in Jombang, East Java, on 27 May 1953. After finishing elementary school, he attended Pondok Pesantren Gontor, a "progressive" traditional Islamic school, for two and a half years. During his youth in East Java, Emha became acquainted with several traditional Islamic cultural forms. In 1968, he moved to Yogyakarta graduating from a Muhammadiyah high school and studying in the Economics Faculty of UGM for only four months before focusing his attention on honing his literary talents through joining a study club, Persada Studi Klub. There he interacted with young writers and cultural artists performing on Malioboro Street, a lively venue of public cultural activities. In his literature, he expressed his concerns for the social, cultural and spiritual health of members of society through a spirit of protest. Emha Ainun Nadjib joined the famous theatrical group Dinasti in the late 1970s setting his poetry to music and helping to stage many plays. His poetry reflected the problems of poor people touching on the conditions of their daily lives. In the 1980s he wrote several plays and collections of poems and remained an activist seeking broad changes in Indonesian society. His works aimed at social problems and criticizing injustice, adopting a socio-religious approach and entailing existentialist themes rather than New Order pragmatism (Jabrohim 2003, 32-51, 2005, 44). Through this work he became nationally recognized as a prominent figure in cultural arts, a *budayawan*. When ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association) was formed in 1990 Emha joined it hoping that it would be a vehicle for social critique and multidimensional change in cultural arts, society, politics, and economics. He aimed to politicize all of these domains through this largely modernist intellectual organization; however, after the local government of Central Java restricted his speaking activities, he grew disenchanted with ICMI and withdrew from it (Jabrohim 2003, 32). On 17 August 1991, the anniversary of the Proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia, Emha Ainun Nadjib sent a twelve

page letter to ICMI officials stating his decision to remove himself from any connections to the organization (ibid). He returned to the forum amongst common people with renewed vigor.

Emha Ainun Nadjib, often called Cak Nun, initially came back to the grassroots through the medium of theatrical productions. He and a group of cohorts and colleagues staged *Pak Kanjeng*, a play that critiqued a development plan that dislocated poor, local residents in order to build a dam. It played in Yogyakarta, Solo, Surabaya and several other locales before being banned by the New Order regime. Nevertheless, Cak Nun's cohorts involved with this play and critical dialogues and reflections on poverty and social problems, stuck together and became known as the *Pak Kanjeng* community and their *gamelan* was called *gamelan Pak Kanjeng*. In 1992, Cak Nun began giving lots of *pengajian* combining religious instructions, including Islamic mysticism and asceticism (*taṣawwuf*), with a forum for dialogue about all dimensions of the experiences of common people. His regular visits to his community of birth, Jombang, East Java, to give *pengajian* sessions amongst the local people became the immediate root for the *Maiyah* movement. These *pengajian* in East Java, taking place on the new moon (*Padhang Bulan*) of each month, took on that name and became popular amongst grassroots people, both urban and rural. People came from all over Java, even West Java, to attend and participate in these gatherings. Eventually, the community of *Pak Kanjeng*, Cak Nun's close cohorts, began to participate more fully in these monthly *pengajian* sessions performing music and song, and sometimes poetry and theatre. They became known as *Kiai Kanjeng*.

According to *Potret Perjalan Emha Ainun Nadjib* (Portrait of Emha Ainun Nadjib's Journey), a video compact disc about the life of Cak Nun, between 1998 and 2003 Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng visited twenty-one provinces and over eight hundred local regencies. In the midst of this intense period of stress, cultural distortion, and yearning for change called the Reformation Era, the *Maiyah* movement spread and grew in many areas, especially in Java and parts of Sulawesi. After Jombang, Yogyakarta was the next location to have a monthly *pengajian* session, scheduled on the 17th of each month, beginning in 1999. In Yogyakarta, these monthly sessions are called *Macapat Syafaat*, evoking a popular traditional Javanese poetic form, *macapat*, and the Islamic notion of religious intercession, *syafaat*. The *Maiyah* movement took root in the national capital, Jakarta, in 2001 under the name of *Kenduri Cinta* (Love Feast) evoking their aim of bringing love to the national stage, forging close, peaceful ties between Indonesia's diverse ethnic and religious groups. *Gambang Syafaat*, in Semarang (north-central Java), and *Izroil Wonosobo*, in Wonosobo, Central Java, were soon to follow as regularly scheduled *Maiyah* events.[1] Here again, Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng took local culture into account in this expansion of the movement. The *gambang* is a popular local Javanese instrument made totally from wood, a symbol of local society. In Jakarta and Semarang, the *Maiyah* convenes on a monthly basis, early and late

1 *Izroil* is taught locally to be the angel guarding Hell.

in the month respectively, but in Wonosobo, where traditional Javanese beliefs are still strong, they occur every thirty-five days, according to the local custom of scheduling social activities every thirty-five days. *Akikah* (Ar. *'Aqiqa*, new-born baby hair-clipping rites) are also performed in this region thirty-five days after the child is born. Caknun makes a visit and holds a *pengajian* roughly every three months in Sulawesi where he is considered a local ethnic leader who has returned from Java as foretold in local mythology. Although he is generally perceived as charismatic, Cak Nun appears to be considered as more charismatic, even magical, in Sulawesi where local people form a line before him to receive supernatural healing. Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng have also performed in Australia, England, Egypt, and Malaysia, where some local youth are requesting that they establish a regular *pengajian* session.

With this recent expansion of the *Maiyah* movement, some degree of organization has taken place. Cak Nun's brothers have long been assistants in the *pengajian* activities. His younger brother is still a personal assistant and his elder brother is a local coordinator in Jombang. In other cities long-time disciples, often called *Maiyah* "graduates" or religious leaders (*kyai* or *Gus*) have become local coordinators facilitating regularly scheduled events and occasional meetings of local followers. Some more recent followers have also coordinated *Maiyah pengajian* in their home villages and towns and some "graduates" have taken the ideas of the movement and planted them in their local communities, as the movement continues to spontaneously spread. In 2004 on a national level, Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng selected some "directors" of political and economic affairs in the *Maiyah* movement and local committees formed to publish movement bulletins and coordinate local discussion groups. The position of these "directors" was contested from the initial announcement to the *Maiyah* gathering in Yogyakarta, and it was clarified that they should be conceived of as role players facilitating movement activities and not as authoritative heads or "bosses."

The semantics and underlying cognition of the concept *Maiyah* evokes a powerful sense of communion and togetherness. *Maiyah* or *Maiyahan*, derived from *Ma'iyah* and *Ma'a* in Arabic, means to be with you, connected, and along with you. In a small pamphlet, titled *Salam Maiyah*, distributed to *Maiyah* participants on 16 June 2002, which includes the nine movement principles and poetry and prose explaining the meaning of *Maiyah*, Cak Nun and movement elders further explained this term as meaning "being part of my heart. You are one of the fibers from the structure of my feelings." It also stated that this term is based in the sayings of Prophet Musa (Moses) and Prophet Muhammad as they shored up the faith of their respective followers telling them that Allah is with them. In poetic passages this pamphlet describes *Maiyah* as "being together with Allah and the Messenger of Allah" and struggling, patiently and with "mature knowledge," to bring the world in harmony with this sense of togetherness. Thus, part of the underlying cognition is the notion of connectedness that believers have to each other and to Allah and His Messenger.

Maiyah pengajian events generally take place in open fields or courtyards beside buildings such as schools, mosques, and cultural arts centers, in cities and villages, in the late evening after all of the day's obligatory prayers have been performed. During the rainy season, they are often moved inside these nearby buildings. Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng, with their *gamelan saron* (a metallophone instrument), hand drums, flute, violin, and electric keyboards, guitar, bass and microphones, take center "stage" under the lights dressed in white clothing, men in white pants, shirts and fezzes and women in white pants, tunics, and scarves. Participants generally dressed in Islamic style clothing, scarves and caps, and loose-fitting tunics and shirts of various colors sit on mats in the front and sides of Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng but some participants and spectators sit in the rear as well after the venue fills up. Men and women remove their footwear before stepping on the mats, as when entering mosques, prayer halls and homes, and sit in separate sections without any formal, physical divides. However, women singing or playing musical instruments on the stage or in the front of the *Maiyah* circle are interspersed with the male performers, sharing the same space. Novia Kolopaking, Cak Nun's wife, who is a famous singer and actress, appears occasionally in the center of the mats singing with Kiai Kanjeng. Movement disciples, long-term "graduates" and newcomers sit around the mats mixed with other followers and visitors.

The composition of the gathering varies from location to location reflecting the general social makeup of these locales. For instance, in Jombang and Yogyakarta mostly *"santri"* (pious Muslims) attend, though with slightly different cultural backgrounds, whereas in Semarang and Jakarta there is a much more diverse gathering, often including Chinese Catholics and Buddhists and members of other ethnic and religious groups. Nevertheless, those inclined to be more attendant to normative Islamic practices form the very backbone of this movement, though these *"santri"* are quite variable ranging from student activists and members of Islamic study groups to former *preman*—thugs, bullies and gangsters—and other men and women with a plethora of social and moral problems. *Maiyah* guests, some invited, and others who requested attendance, are often directed to sit at the front or center with Cak Nun and give speeches and participate in dialogue. At the first *Maiyah* (*Macapat Syafaat*) I attended on 17 September 2003 in Kasihan, Bantul, in a village just outside of Yogyakarta, a television crew from SCTV was present recording part of the event to air on national television as part of their Ramadan programming. I was invited to sit at the front and engage in dialogue along with an Islamic teacher and activist from Solo, Central Java. On other occasions I participated in *Macapat Syafaat* a group of women from Central Java and several legislative candidates appeared as guests participating in discussions. In Semarang and Jakarta, Chinese Catholic seminarians and representatives of other religious groups are often invited to share the central stage and participate in sharing their views and perspectives. In Jakarta, non-Muslim Batak leaders and many national political and cultural figures, famous poets, and NGO activists appear as guests joining discussions with common

people about national issues. In addition, many Islamic cultural artists of various genres such as *hadrah*, *kasidah*, *samrah* and pop music are invited to perform alone or with Kiai Kanjeng.

In fact, some sort of musical and singing performances often open *Maiyah* events as followers, guests and visitors arrive and find their seats on the mats, floors or ground surrounding the venue. At the outset of the first *Maiyah* I attended, a group of elder women, sitting on the side, sang traditional Javanese Islamic songs, and on other occasions, a *hadrah* group or Kiai Kanjeng performed. Cak Nun generally serves as the master of ceremonies making announcements, setting the agenda for the night, and introducing guests. He opens the events with prayer, Qur'anic recitation, and short talks on a variety of religious topics, delivered with a great amount of wit and humor which often has those present bursting into laughter. Sometimes a visiting religious teacher may give a talk as well. Early in the gatherings Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng lead participants in *selawat* and *zikir*, singing and chanting expressions of love, remembrance and praise for Allah and His Messenger, often accompanied with music moving disciples and followers into ecstatic states of love and togetherness. Interspersed throughout the practically all-night gathering, in Yogyakarta and other places prepared for such a revival, Kiai Kanjeng performs several songs utilizing a variety of musical genre, from *campursari* to blues, expressing Islamic values and messages. To welcome Chinese participants and visitors in Semarang and Jakarta, Kiai Kanjeng used the melody from a popular Chinese theme song of the television series *Kung Fu* to perform *selawat*. Likewise, to welcome Christians they used the melody from the well-known Christmas song "Silent Night" turning it into *selawat* as well. Melodies from pop songs and the blues and jazz styles of Louis Armstrong and Al Jarreau were also utilized. Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng have selected and popularized some traditional Javanese songs, some several hundreds of years old, which convey Islamic values and messages. Cak Nun has informed me that they do not try to pick just any traditional song, as a symbol of tradition, but only good ones that represent the marrow of Islam long present in local culture. Despite the obvious attraction of such amazing musical performances, for many, the core of these monthly events is the open dialogues, facilitated and moderated by Cak Nun, involving participants from various layers of society. These dialogues cover a variety of topics and issues including electoral politics, Indonesian media, "war on terrorism," worker's legal problems, sex workers, low morality and so forth. Often well-known speakers and guests from other religions and parts of Indonesia are invited to participate in the dialogue on the same level "as equals" with the rest of the congregation. Everyone is encouraged to participate in these dialogues and many men and women from the floor take the microphones making statements and asking questions. Throughout the night, the *Maiyah* moves back and forth between artistic performances, sacred spiritual expressions, and pragmatic meditations and discussions about worldly affairs.

The *wirid* (Qur'anic recitation)*, zikir* and *selawat* and Cak Nun's inspirational talks create a powerful, encompassing ecstatic mood and feeling of communion

with other participants and as a community of equal believers connected with Allah and Prophet Muhammad. This existential communitas is at risk of being lost during open dialogues and political discussions in which "classifications" and the divergent positions and perspectives held on these topics come to the fore. However, Cak Nun's and "graduate" disciple's insistent reminding and pushing of participants to transcend petty differences and divisions to find mutual love and togetherness help to maintain a sense of communitas in these gatherings. Cak Nun also skillfully uses a number of Islamic concepts to break down the divisions and to propel participants further along the spiritual path, while also directing this spirit of communitas into the realm of social relations and politics. Kiai Kanjeng and Cak Nun close these events, around 2AM for *Macapat Syafaat*, with *selawat* and prayers and young male followers come up to shake Cak Nun's hand giving him *salaams* (peaceful greetings) before heading off on their often long treks home. Cak Nun, Kiai Kanjeng, and some invited guests enter the house beside the school taking refreshments and continuing discussions.

Ideas and Principles of Maiyah

During the final period of the New Order regime, in the 1990s, Indonesian society began to experience a multidimensional crisis, with continued political repression despite promises of openness, ethnic and religious conflicts, proliferation of thugs and bullies, violent crimes, poverty and drugs, and finally the sudden economic downturn and mass rebellion demanding Reformation. Cak Nun also experienced personal tension and frustration as a Muslim intellectual and nationally-recognized cultural figure trying to realize his ideals of changing Indonesian society and culture. After becoming submerged on the grassroots level, Cak Nun continued to develop several of his transformative ideas expressing them in numerous *pengajian* events. At a social gathering celebrating his birthday in 2002, *Salam Maiyah*, written by Cak Nun and several movement elders in Indonesian, was distributed containing many of the ideas and principles that have become regularly expressed and embedded in *Maiyah* activities. This document and the regularity of certain ideas indicate that the more spontaneous happenings and utopian feelings and images that colored the genesis of this movement have become structured to some extent; incipient ideological and normative communitas was underway. According to *Salam Maiyah*, the nine basic principles of *Maiyah* are:

1. Triangle of Love: Allah-Muhammad-Humanity
2. This-worldly and Other-worldly Commerce
3. Don't be erroneous in determining your aim
4. The Civilizational Cycle
5. Truth-Goodness-Beauty
6. Heaven and Earth/Vertical and Horizontal
7. Identifying Benefit/Disadvantage
8. Differentiating between kinds of religious obligations
9. Making the *Muhajirin* and *Anshor* our brothers and sisters (monotheizing culture).

Not only the nine basic movement principles, but the notion of the *Maiyah* itself entails metaphors of anti-structure and transformation and re-synthesis of models and schemata. Through successive poetic stanzas of *Salam Maiyah*, the *Maiyah* is referred to as being "wherever we are…with whomever we are with… whatever we experience…whatever effects of life fall upon us…whatever we meet or meets us…whatever surrounds and assaults us" and we are "always with Allah and *Rasulullah*." *Maiyah* encompasses the social relationships, contexts, experiences, conditions and forces, both seen and unseen, of believers' daily lives. This perception of a sense of communitas outside of confined ritual contexts can be compared across religions and religious movements. For instance, members of El Shaddai, a charismatic Catholic movement in the Philippines, "say the feeling of God's presence follows them into their everyday lives (Wiegele 2005, 55)." Indonesians, the same as people in all societies, acquire various social and cultural categories, schemes of classification of people, objects and forces, comprising schemata of the social, natural, and spiritual realms, during the socialization process. The concept of the *Maiyah* brings all of these areas of life together within an overarching spiritual state, space or condition that should inhere throughout their lives, always being with God and His Messenger. Indeed, the first basic principle of *Maiyah*, listed at the top of a circular diagram of the nine principles in *Salam Maiyah*, is the "dialectic of the triangle of love" between Allah, Muhammad, and the believers.

Moreover, *Maiyah* breaks down the distinctions between secular and religious domains, characteristic of the Indonesian government's dominant interpretation of *Pancasila* in which religion is to have no formal relationship to the state and is encapsulated within the "civil religious" principle of *Ketuhanan* (Belief in God). According to this ideology and its implementation in law, every Indonesian citizen is supposed to have an officially-recognized religion; however, religion is not supposed to influence the form of government or economy and to what extent it should shape a variety of cultural forms is an ongoing controversy. This all-encompassing concept of *Maiyah* extending into all areas of life, subverts this secular and "civil religious" format, making Islam immediately relevant to everything.

Although *Maiyah* encircles everything in the believer's life, the movement's leaders' image of it makes a distinction between the good and bad elements, pitting the spirit of togetherness with Allah and *Rasulullah* against the forces of evil. The "root paradigm" of the Battle of Badr is a highly evocative constituent of the mental representation or schema of *Maiyah* as a revolutionary religious force in the world (cf. Turner 1974, 64). In the Battle of Badr, Prophet Muhammad and his vastly outnumbered contingent of followers achieved a resounding victory over the forces of Arab non-believers who were repressing and trying to destroy the new religious movement. Before the battle, Prophet Muhammad prayed and reported his vision of God's victory to his holy warriors who subsequently stood steadfast in battle despite their numerical and material disadvantages and who tried to spare the just amongst the enemy at the Prophet's command (Haykal 1976, 226-31; Lings 1983, 148-9). At the bottom of each of the poetic passages of *Salam Maiyah*, the Battle of Badr is evoked explaining that the *Maiyah* is a "Badr resistance that is patient and has mature knowledge." The strong faith, patience, steadfastness, and knowledge of the closeness of Allah and His Angels are clearly meaningful facets of this battle for *Maiyah* leaders. The negative forces of opposition against which *Maiyah* struggles are depicted in successive stanzas as:

> all actions building structures that distance humans from Allah and *Rasullulah*… the concept of the world market that trivializes Allah, the management shaping life which commits cruel acts against Allah and *Rasulullah*…all powers which exclude Allah and *Rasulullah* in the structure of human families, in the map of social intercourse…all kinds of systems and ideologies of life which develop human sadness, which impoverishes humanity in the midst of the spreading out of Allah's blessings and resources, which expels humanity, which sickens and makes humanity sick, which enjoys the energy of Satan and represses The Beneficent The Merciful Allah in the country's and humanity's development… all types of culture, technology, literature and songs, arts and crafts, news and entertainment which convey ignorance and verbally abuse knowledge, which worship foolishness, which insults human degrees, which supports enlarging the low, humiliating values which destroy respect for Allah's creatures, which steals the blessings of Allah for selfish interests…all forms of power and government which uses the natural environment and human life for attacking the sacred wishes of Allah which were revealed to *Rasulullah*.

All oppressive political, economic, social, ideological and cultural systems of today are like the wicked *Quraysh* of the first century *Hijrah* (Emigration to Medina) and their way of life that served to distance people from the monotheistic message the prophet delivered. The *Maiyah* schema clearly entails motives for fighting the impurities in the world, but what does this mental representation affirm and motivate followers to build in their place? In the final stanza, instead of stating what *Maiyah* is against, it states in the positive that it is "for building the *Daulah Maiyatullah* (Power/Sovereignty of Togetherness with Allah), togetherness with

Allah and *Rasulullah*, a kingdom of gratitude to Allah and a government of thanks to *Rasulullah*, in accord with the permission and will of Allah bringing the entire universe and human life together with *Rasulullah* to glorify and prostrate before Allah." Rather than aiming to replace the impurities of the world with a focus on *syari'ah* laws and jurisprudence or any other system of established, normative structures, the *Maiyah* movement strives to extend the spirit of communitas, perpetuating the anti-structural impulse, in the ecstatic feelings of thankfulness, gratitude and worshipping together with *Rasulullah* and all of existence the One God, Allah.

In a later prose section of *Salam Maiyah*, it explains deeper meanings of many aspects of *Maiyah pengajian* events such as the white clothing, singing, and musical performances of Kiai Kanjeng, the discursive style, sociality, and the circle of *Maiyah* gatherings. It states that the white clothing of elder members of Kiai Kanjeng does not symbolize that they are Islamic scholars or more pious in their prayers or recitation of Qur'an. Their white clothing is not a stage costume or for anyone to see; they are instead, an expression for themselves that they are still dirty and sinful and as motivation to continue in the process of purifying themselves. Thus, the white clothing points to the conditions of their hearts and minds, such that, even if they present them to Allah, they are acknowledging their impurity and not their holiness. Similarly, the music and singing, at times mumbling or screaming in high pitched voices, are not considered to be *for* Almighty Allah. They are also expressions of the mystical and spiritual path (*rohaniah*) in the direction of Almighty Allah, so that as Kiai Kanjeng singers scream "truly their hearts run as fast as possible to the lap of the Most High, Allah, definitely with a feeling of shame for all their sins." They perform *selawat*, *wiridan*, and *zikr*, because humans are the *khalifah*, Allah's vice-regents in the world who are responsible for following Allah's directions in managing themselves and the natural environment. They have to be the ones to make the decisions on whether the instruments, songs, and dancing bodies will be used for promoting low values or "making beautiful statements of love to Allah, The Glorified and Most High."[2] Cak Nun evoked the first basic principle, the "triangle of love," explaining to a *Macapat Syafaat* gathering that their *selawat* has the significance of thanking *Rasulullah*, the beloved of Allah, and who can intercede on our behalf before Allah. Nevertheless, Kiai Kanjeng elders do not use the music and song directly for performing obligatory acts of worship such as the call to prayer, punctuating the five daily prayers or the rituals

2 Shehadi (1995) reviews a range of Islamic philosophic views on music during medieval times. Whereas Ibn Taimiyyah (d. 1328) held the view that most forms of music and singing were prohibited, al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the famous Sufi, held a more moderate view which permitted most forms of music and singing which were not associated with or considered to precipitate sinful activities. In his Ihya Ulum-Id-Din, al-Ghazali espouses his views on the stages of the mystical path in relation to music, singing and poetry and concludes that "it is not illegal for those who enjoy good moral songs and it is commendable for those religious persons who are engrossed in divine love" (1991, 2: 202).

of Hajj, because, and they make it clear, *Maiyah* events are not *ibadah mahdloh* (Ar. *Mahadah*) or forms of worship that must be kept pure and genuine in terms of following the practices of *Rasulullah* without any *bid'ah* (innovations). *Maiyah* events are "just cultural events which pull their inspiration from *Agama*. It makes cultural behavior religious." This acknowledgement instantiates the eighth basic principle of *Maiyah*—"Differentiating between Kinds of Religious Obligations (Personal and Communal Obligations)"—which directs followers to know what is more or less important. They direct people away from doing things not for Allah, and toward joining all of existence, including their instruments, in glorifying the God of the heavens and earth. This is what Cak Nun, speaking at *Macapat Syafaat*, called "spiritualizing material things" and "verticalizing" or directing them to Allah, which is an instantiation of the ninth basic principle of Maiyah—"Making the *Muhajirin* and *Anshor* our brothers and sisters"—through turning our culture into an embodiment of Islamic monotheism, *Tauhid*.[3] In addition, the underlying meaning of white clothing, music, and song reveals the Sufi character of this movement, a form of Sufi mysticism that strives to pursue the path of purification and moving close to Allah within the bounds of "fundamentalist" orthodoxy, avoiding the excesses of the so-called "drunken Sufis."[4]

The movement leaders go on to state that they try to extend the *Maiyah* socially to all segments, layers, groups, and areas of various sociological characteristics. They want to bring people together on various levels, as friends, neighbors, local communities, citizens, organizations, ethnic groups, and as people with various beliefs, opinions, and perspectives. Moreover, the movement promotes good relations amongst members of society, neighbors and fellow countrymen and women, helpful, loyal, supportive and peaceful ties of mutual respect and togetherness. This value for constructing good social relations with our fellow members of human society together with focusing on improving our relationship to Allah is an instantiation of the sixth basic principle of *Maiyah*—"Heaven and Earth" or "Vertical and Horizontal." Cak Nun explained at a *Macapat Syafaat* gathering that the Muslim saying *Assalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh*

3 *Muhajirin* are the companions of Prophet Muhammad who migrated to Medina during the lifetime of the prophet before the conquest of Mecca, and the *Ansar* (*Anshor*) are his companions from the inhabitants of Medina who embraced and supported Islam.

4 *Muslim Saints and Mystics* (2000), a translation of Episodes from Farid al-Din Attar's *Tadhkirat al-Auliya' (Memorial of the Saints)* by A. J. Arberry, is a collection of stories and sayings of several early "ecstatic" or "drunken" Sufis. This collection includes some pronouncements and anecdotes about the life of Abu Yazid al-Bestami who is considered the founder of the "drunken" school of Sufis (ibid, 119). He was executed late in the ninth century, around 875, after expressing his supreme mystical experience of "the merging of his human individuality with the Individuality of God" (ibid, xiii) in terms those in power considered to be blasphemous. Over the course of the subsequent centuries Sufism and orthodoxy began to reconcile, a process many consider to be completed with the works of al-Ghazali. The *Maiyah* movement strives to experience ecstatic togetherness with God and His Messenger within the limits of orthodox theology.

embodies this principle promoting peace amongst humans on a horizontal plane and wishing that Allah send *barakah* (gifts and rewards) down on them from the vertical plane.

A section on the "language of the *Maiyah*," its discursive and ideological style further elaborates on the broad framework in which these ideals of social togetherness are embedded. Focusing on the language of politics, it states:

> The country-wise language of the *Maiyah* is nationalism. The international language of *Maiyah* is universalism. The civil language of *Maiyah* is pluralism. The cultural language of *Maiyah* is heterogeneity, or diversity which is allowed, understood, and managed. The method or administrative management is called democracy.

The *Maiyah* movement is not a nationalist movement but it uses the language of nationalism, or of the nation-state, to deal with issues and problems within the country, whereas it uses universalism when it extends its purview beyond Indonesia or places Indonesia within the broader global context.[5] In *Maiyah* discussions, Indonesia is often considered within the international context, especially within the world of Islam, global capitalism, and the "war on terror." This critical, universal discursive style transforms the dominant narrow, secular nationalist world view in which Indonesia typically performs its role as an accommodating, dependent developing country. Furthermore, the movement approaches Indonesian pluralism and diversity in a fashion which re-synthesizes and reconfigures the New Order model of "Unity in Diversity." *Salam Maiyah* points out that the New Order "political policy and cultural strategy" on diversity was to restrict the presentation of each group's differences, making sure their own distinct "colors" and inclinations did not stand out. "All were made into one, made to be uniform; each and every identity was hidden as much as possible. The principle of the New Order was *Tunggal Ika*." That is to say, New Order rhetoric spoke of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Many in One Form), but the thrust of their political practice was *Tunggal Ika* (One Form).[6]

---

5 Piscatori (1986, 146-7) points out that the "aspiration for broader unity does not automatically entail rejection of identification with, and loyalty to, one's particular nation-state" and "many Muslims dream of something greater while at the same time identifying with their particular homeland out of habit, pragmatism, or desire, or a mixture of all three." This definitely appears to be the case with the *Maiyah* movement as exemplified by its recognition of discourse on the level of the nation-state and beyond. From my discussion with movement elders and disciples, their identification with their Indonesian homeland seems to be mostly out of pragmatic concerns over the distinctive conditions that confront them and shape their responses in contrast to the particular conditions Muslims face in other societies.

6 Bertrand (2004, 216) argues that "the institutional legacy of the New Order regime intensified tensions between certain ethnic groups. Because Suharto interpreted Indonesia's national model and gave it an institutional expression that excluded certain groups, threatened

On the other hand, *Maiyah* movement's model is to allow each group to present its own character, exhibiting diversity or *bhinneka*. They do not fight or engage in conflict with each other because they are tied together with the principle of "*ke-ika-an*" which implies a "collective commitment for keeping each other safe and prosperous" and "contributing to the goodness and benefits for all." This was the "good news" of the emerging Republic of Indonesia that turned into the sour news of uniformity. *Maiyah* leaders go on to assert that the *Maiyah* is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* promoting the understanding that various ethnic groups have their own dialects and religious groups wear different style clothing and worship in their own ways, and none of this diversity should be closed down or shut off "as long as there is the agreement to defend and love each other and make the goal of mutual happiness together into a process…Heterogeneity is a enough to be defended by one principle: each and every one present themselves for togetherness. That is *Maiyah*." This transformed model of diversity is often embodied in the *Maiyah* events, such as the *Gambang Syafaat* gathering, during June 2004, in which Chinese Catholics performed "Silent Night" in Christian fashion followed by Kiai Kanjeng's Islamic version. This transformed model is also an application of the fifth and seventh basic principles of *Maiyah*—Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Benefit/Disadvantage—remaining true to Islamic practices while upholding good ties in a beautiful way and promoting benefits for all rather than the disadvantages of repressing cultural differences, denying group's rights, and causing enmity amongst members of society.

Not only is the model of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* transformed, but the dominant national and international model of "democracy" which focuses on elections and other liberal democratic institutional procedures is reconfigured. In the *Maiyah* movement's administrative method or management style, "democracy" involves open discussions with a voicing of divergent perspectives, empowering common people, and encouraging the initiative of followers to spontaneously spread the movement. As noted earlier, at times, tensions between divergent perspectives have to be managed during open discussions of *Maiyah pengajian* events. Often people from other religions are present as guests and the movement leaders and disciples encourage them to share their views and beliefs with everyone present. When some participants or visitors express intolerance, *Maiyah* members remind them of the spirit of love and understanding of diversity discussed above.

---

others' identities, or repressed ethnic demands, some groups felt increasingly insecure." In his analysis, fears and tensions over the prospect of renegotiating the national model and actual institutional changes stimulated the violent conflicts which occurred during the end of the Suharto regime. The *Maiyah* movement's alternative model is similar to the one Bertrand presents: "A more diluted conception of the nation could allow the reconciling of a common identity, while permitting a fuller expression of cultural diversity, a flourishing of local languages, and even institutions and symbols representing local distinctiveness…The national model might be maintained at its core while moving toward a more multiculturalist model" (ibid, 221).

Divergence of perspectives also occurs between fellow Muslims in *Maiyah* events. At the *Macapat Syafaat*, during June 2004, there was disagreement in the open discussion about how people should deal with the upcoming presidential election. The newly selected "director" of *Maiyah* political affairs was going down the list of candidates deliberating on the qualities of each in order to determine which would do the least harm. Some of the student activists responding in the open forum expressed their position that people should boycott the election because the process is unfair and the outcome will be more of the same for common people. Cak Nun entered the dialogue stating that the *Maiyah* will not take one set position and people are free to follow the sort of method the director described for selecting a candidate or not to vote at all. Likewise, during *Macapat Syafaat* in March 2004, prior to the parliamentary elections, several members of Islamic political parties visited and participated, and opposing views were expressed on some issues. Cak Nun pointed out that people in society, even in families, often disagree on things, but we must follow what Allah, The Glorified and Most High told us in the Qur'an, to come together and "*bermusyawarah*," consult with each other, and thereby, maintain our unity. He extended on this perspective stating that we must distinguish between *farqun* and *firoh* (Ar. roots, *faraqa* and *fara*), that is, between those we can unite with and those we must separate from, our friends and foes. Even though, we don't agree with everything from an organization or political party, the things we do agree on are often important enough for us to band together with them applying the concept of *farqun*. On the other hand, he explained, there are other organizations and parties that have some positions that are so much in contradiction to the goodness we embrace that we must separate (*firoh*) from them and not give them support. However, even members of these groups are welcome in *Maiyah* out of the hope that the spirit of love in the *Maiyah* will change their hearts and minds. This inclination for flexible, open positions and the avoidance of set, authoritative political lines, indicates the incipient ideological communitas, "betwixt and between" structure and anti-structure.

In addition, empowerment and initiative of common people are central to the *Maiyah* notion of democracy. Cak Nun told me that his single most important message is that *rakyat kecil* or lower class people have to be in the center of any process of democratic change in Indonesian society. In comparison to the staid, conservative political circles of the United States and Europe, this appears to be a form of "ultra-democracy," or at least, radical democracy. This democratic method is embodied in the open dialogues in which national figures and political leaders such as Pak Wiranto—a former army general and leader of the New Order ruling party, Golkar—and even Cak Nun himself, are challenged by ordinary people, farmers and workers, and where ordinary people themselves are "keynote" speakers sharing their everyday experiences with the *Maiyah*. For instance, an elder villager spoke at *Macapat Syafaat* about local irrigation problems, and sex workers, female domestic workers, and Papuan activists spoke at *Kenduri Cinta* sharing their lives and perspectives. Furthermore, the initiative of common people is not held tightly within any hierarchical structures, as local people form committees and

followers take the ideas and principles of the movement back into their villages and neighborhoods. The *Maiyah* movement and groups of youth within it have conceived and organized scores of *Maiyah*, expressing their spontaneous cultural creativity, without the involvement of Kiai Kanjeng or Cak Nun.

Similar to the political discourse of the *Maiyah* movement, their "economic language" is also transformational. *Salam Maiyah* speaks emphatically against class polarization and economic inequalities:

> The economic language of *Maiyah* is not to have asymmetry in life between one person or group and others. But this is too idealistic and utopian; it is probably more realistic for us to state that the *Maiyah* is a dynamic process narrowing or lessening the gap or asymmetry in the lives of people. It is a systematic and collective process which does not arrive at having the very rich while others are very poor. The *Maiyah* standard is as high and qualitative as possible as compared to the straight with as much lessening of the imbalance.

This style of economic discourse is often used in *Maiyah* open dialogues when local, national and global economic issues are raised. It directly critiques the economic imbalances and class stratification with a materialist sort of focus on the distribution of wealth and resources. I have participated in discussions following *Macapat Syafaat* with Cak Nun, Kiai Kanjeng, and guests in which *Maiyah* leaders also critique the follies of the post-colonial Indonesian economy in which Indonesian-grown resources are sold to Thailand where they are used to produce finished products which are sold back to Indonesians. They also point out the long-standing economic inequality of the sultan owning large tracts of land around the city, while none of the palace servants even owned their own homes until just recently. This critical perspective on economic inequalities is an application of the second basic principle of *Maiyah*—"This-worldly and Other-worldly Commerce"—attempting to look at worldly matters from the perspective of principles determined by Allah in the Qur'an, transcending various human perspectives determined by worldly factors. In this case, Allah directs humanity in the Qur'an to deal justly with the poor distributing wealth and resources to them instead of taking the biased human perspective that the wealthy deserve to hoard and concentrate resources because they are royalty or of some other high status.

The *Maiyah* movement is more akin to liberation theology movements in the Philippines and in Latin America than to the prosperity theology movements in the Philippines and US. El Shaddai like the US-based Protestant organizations upon which it was based emphasized personal transformation rather than social and structural transformation; moreover, its leader aligned himself and his group with the state and interpreted people's protests leading to the toppling of President Ferdinand Marcos as a "miracle" and the result of "God's Power" (Wiegele 2005, 89-90). In contrast, similar to liberation theology movements in the Philippines (ibid) and Latin America (Lancaster 1988), the *Maiyah* movement strives for personal, social and structural transformation. Leaders and members of this

movement interpreted the mass protests and confrontations with armed forces of the state, which led to Suharto's resignation, as people's power although their ideal for manifestations of people's power is that it is achieved in a state of personal and collective spiritual togetherness.

These models of political, economic, and social transformation are given ultimate meaning in the overarching *Maiyah* schema and its mystical and spiritual dimensions. As the fourth basic principle of *Maiyah*—"The Civilizational Cycle"—informs followers, there is no ultimate meaning to be found in civilizations which continuously rise and fall; all along the revolving wheel of time, people must orient themselves towards returning to their Lord, Almighty God. *Salam Maiyah* highlights the open, democratic character of the *Maiyah* in its pursuit of purification, closeness to Allah, and success in the afterlife in a section titled the "*Maiyah* Circle." It reiterates the key idea that Kiai Kanjeng are not on a stage performing for spectators, adding that they form a circle which is open for people to join with them and to form concentric circles in which everyone can participate in collective communion in pursuit of the ultimate lasting values in life. The *Maiyah* leaders, who often close their eyes, are focusing their awareness on Allah, The Most High, and not on the temporary, fleeting things of the world. It states that they sing, play musical notes, and recite Qur'an for loving and guarding their relationship with Allah, The Guardian, The Benevolent, not to be compared to state officials, financial capital, or anything else many people make into their gods. The third basic principle of *Maiyah*—"Don't Be Erroneous in Determining Your Manner and Aim"—cautions believers against the pitfall of making anything in the world into a god or object of worship. In fact, *Maiyah* leaders conclude this document with this focus on *Tauhid* and the relationship of believers with the One, Universal God. It states that Allah, The Glorified and Most High has made a commitment to fulfill four functions—as Provider of a way out of life's problems, Spreader of resources, Manager/Accountant, and Public Relations—for those who love God and "deposit" their *taqwā* (piety) and *tawakkal* (trust in God).

Clearly, the nine basic principles of *Maiyah*, what Cak Nun and elder Kiai Kanjeng described as the "door of *ijtihad*" for the *Maiyah* movement, are embodied, expressed, and enunciated in their activities. These principles are important constituents in the transformative schema of *Maiyah* and alternative models of Indonesian society, politics, and economy which entail powerful motives for revitalizing Indonesian society, especially through de-secularizing it and empowering common people in a spirit of loving togetherness.

Participant, Public Responses and Maiyah Adaptation

In order to highlight the dynamic interface between the *Maiyah* movement, society, and opposing forces, I will discuss the responses of some participants, supporters, detractors, media, and political officials. As this movement continues to grow expanding into more regions and local areas, I think that several participant responses, based on my discussions and interviews, are crucial to consider in regard

to the interface between the movement and society. First, *Maiyah* participants interpret the sense of equality, concern for common people, and lack of rigid hierarchies in the movement to be highly significant. Some have pointed to the equality exhibited in the open dialogues in which people from all layers of society, from the "descendants" of *Rasulullah*, Indonesian political officials, royal family members to farmers and sex workers, come together on the same level and in the spirit of mutual love. Some participants see this sense of equality as being rooted in the early Islamic community of *Rasulullah* and his companions. However, others have expressed concern for guarding against the erection of social hierarchies in the movement. As I mentioned earlier, some *Maiyah* members sought clarification that the new "directors" were not being considered as "bosses" while other members were lower-class "laborers." In addition, a participant told me that he thought one weakness in the movement is that it is too "Cak Nun-centric" in the sense that they would be at a loss without him. He felt the movement needs other members with the ability to play the central role Cak Nun plays. Secondly, participants emphasize that this movement is a force to bring the Muslim community together, removing feelings of ethnic and religious differences. The *Maiyah* can eliminate the significance of ethnic divisions the way *Rasulullah* did as he formed the early Muslim community. They assert that Indonesian Muslims from the broad spectrum of diversity can transcend these differences in *Maiyah*. Whereas they see opposition between NU and Muhammadiyah in terms of their respective emphases on religious rituals/spirituality or social institutions, the *Maiyah* integrates both areas of concern, using both as tools for reconstructing society. Furthermore, organizations from the full spectrum of Islamic ideologies, including those who aim to purify Muslim practices while avoiding politics and those that strive to build an Islamic state, are welcome to participate. Thirdly, many participants respond favorably to the movement's use of local culture to contest the forces of globalization. One student activist told me that they "use localization to fight globalization." While he conceded that they are not defeating the forces of globalization, they are producing alternative culture which raises people's awareness that there is something wrong with globalization.

Fourthly, many participants are attracted to the *tasawwuf* or Islamic mysticism stressed in the movement. For those highly involved in secular thinking or deeply concentrated on worldly problems, this movement provides them with a broader perspective on life incorporating *akal* or the use of reason/conscience together with seeking *syafaat Rasul* (intercession of the Prophet) and *kodrat Allah* (Will of God). Its mystical teachings place greater emphasis upon the heart and purifying one's inner self through expressions of love and gratitude.[7] A recent college

7 Jackson (2002, 60-1) notes that al-Ghazali, the renown Islamic scholar and Sufi, emphasized the heart (*qalb*) or self (*nafs*) as the way to apprehending the truth and acquiring true religious convictions. He still saw value in rational speculation as a public enterprise, especially for defending the faith against attacks, but for engendering a "God-pleasing state of being and acting" on a personal level it was not of much use.

graduate told me that this aspect of *Maiyah* helps him to go beyond looking at Indonesians as the victims of secularization, seeing them in terms of what they are made to think, in order to see them in terms of the things they are not able to think. This broader perspective of life can help Indonesia, he added. Fifthly, this mystical element, especially the ecstatic pursuit of *syafaat Rasul* and *kodrat Allah* gives new meaning to *Maiyah* for many participants. In the deep, heart-felt *selawat* and *zikr* segments of *Maiyah pengajian* events, prior to the open dialogues which draw on *akal*, participants find a space in which they can feel free or released from their many worldly problems, a joyous space of communitas. As mentioned earlier, many participants have rough backgrounds involving problems with drugs, stealing, and other forms of crime and immorality. They feel welcome in the "*Maiyah* circle" in which people do not exude the self-righteous attitude that they are "already good." The dominant attitude at the *Maiyah* is one of striving to be good or at least better. Many of these *Maiyah* participants would not feel at home in "puritanical," modernist or neo-modernist organizations where members give the impression that they are "already good." Moreover, many *Maiyah* participants, like most Indonesians, are afraid of what these groups would do if they had an Islamic state under their control given their self-righteous, "already pure, already good" attitude.

In the broader Indonesian society, I find mixed feelings about the *Maiyah* movement. Many non-participants assess the religious character of *Maiyah* events favorably, underscoring Qur'anic recitation, *selawat*, *hadrah* and other religious cultural forms. For many people I interviewed these sorts of public cultural forms were their favorites and the ones they felt most important for the future of Indonesian society. Some of these non-participants also valued the religious instructions that take place in the *Maiyah*. On the other hand, many detractors pointed to the music as a weakness of *Maiyah* events, and of those modeled after it, which attempt attracting people to come to listen to religious talks by offering artistic performances. They argued people wind up being more interested in, or at least distracted by, the entertainment. Many modernists and even some traditionalists take this posture, although most traditionalists use similar cultural forms. Others pointed to the "vulgarity" of the open dialogues where discussions may take place about prostitution or other topics they deem inappropriate for religious events. Many of these individuals and organizations are also critical of the lack of a definite political objective in the *Maiyah* movement. They look for Islamic movements that have as a goal the formation of a particular kind of system, but in the *Maiyah* they find only a focus on peace and love and forming kinds of values that respect humanity *irregardless* of the system. Some other people, inside and outside of government, are critical of the movement because they feel that Cak Nun has produced this movement for his own political aims.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of some opposing views, no overall or established opposition to the *Maiyah* movement has taken place inside or outside of the Indonesian government. Although some in the media hold negative ideas about Cak Nun, they often ask Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng to appear on television

performing and discussing religious matters. In addition, Cak Nun, still widely perceived and labeled as a *budayawan* or cultural figure, is often asked to sit on panels engaging in dialogues about customs and cultural issues. Political and government figures and committees also request the involvement of Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng in a number of events and dialogues. For instance, the mayor of Yogyakarta, asked Cak Nun to be the host of a political dialogue about Yogyakarta taking place on a stage in the field of the municipal headquarters on an occasion celebrating the anniversary of an Indonesian milk company. Kiai Kanjeng performed on stage and some movement youth set up tables selling some of the group's compact discs and other items. This event like many others was later televised. Cak Nun was also asked to be a moderator at a presidential debate which took place at the Yogya Expo Center, and he and Kiai Kanjeng were asked to close a local event of the Committee for Regional Autonomy with songs and prayers. This indicates that many government figures and media outlets perceive Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng in a positive light as cultural figures and intellectuals, but we should not assume that it reflects any definite understanding or approval of the *Maiyah* movement.

Although there appears to be no established policy to repress or suppress this movement, some people have the impression that the government is keeping an eye on the movement and may have intelligence agents attending *Maiyah* events. The movement itself promotes change through peace and love and enlightened thinking, but some groups that attend and speak at *Maiyah* events do have definite political objectives and may promote more aggressive tactics. Moreover, many political figures and government officials are no doubt concerned about the relentless critique and roasting they receive in *Maiyah* forums and Cak Nun's public statements. Some politicians and segments of the media have become lukewarm towards Cak Nun and his national popularity has been on the decline. Cak Nun stated that he feels more welcome nowadays in Malaysia, Australia, and Egypt than in his own country. Some officials in local areas where *Maiyah* events were scheduled to take place, reportedly attempted to schedule *dangdut* performances at the same time so as to compete with, and subtly suppress, the movement. However, this tactic has reportedly been ineffective, since the masses still flocked to the *Maiyah* events. Many *Maiyah* youth are planting the movement in their regions and neighborhoods, producing alternative public cultural forms and forums where only more conservative ones existed. In the current mood of openness, this movement has not been openly repressed and continues to expand without any direct confrontation with the armed forces or government officials.

Dynamic Interface, Communitas, and the Fires of Equalization

First, in terms of Wallace's model, the sub-phase of "adaptation," which involves the struggle and interface between the movement and powerful forces within or outside of the society under question, must be repositioned and reconceived from a stage prior to routinization to an ongoing process throughout the life of

the movement. Consistent with his "organismic analogy," Wallace implies that revitalization movements are like organisms adapting to natural environments in which a rapid succession of changes occur over a short period of time after which the organism-environment returns to a stage of equilibrium. To the contrary, these movements are not unified systems devoid of internal contradictions and conflicts of interest; they are instead, rather complex collectivities of leaders, disciples, and followers which are integral parts of social environments where stressors and responses take on and transmit cultural meanings. "Adaptation" can be reconceived as an ongoing process occurring even after the movement becomes ideologically and organizationally routinized turning into a "counter-structure" in Turner's terms. Some movements move in the direction of integrating into the dominant system, while others strive to maintain a counter-cultural, transformational track or adopt violent tactics to realize their goals. There is a broad range of hard-to-predict possibilities arising from the *dynamic interface* of movements and opposing forces, both in terms of mental and social structures.

In contrast to Mainstream Mormonism, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, in the US (Jankowiak and Allen 2005[2000]), the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity ("Moonies") and the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Korea (Barker 2002[1995]; Brouwer et al. 2005[1996]), the *Maiyah* movement has not integrated into the dominant groups in Indonesian society. Unlike these groups, *Maiyah* leaders and followers have not embraced the hegemonic political, economic, and cultural policies of the state and global capitalism. Therefore, they continue to grow on the margins of mainstream society amongst the masses of disaffected youth, workers, activists and intellectuals propagating their counter-cultural ideas and practices.

On the other hand, their dynamic interface with society does not appear to be leading towards violence; neither suicidal nor homicidal tendencies are evident. Unlike Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese new religion, and the Order of the Solar Temple, a European Knights Templar-inspired new religion (Bowen 2008, 211-16), and Reverend Jim Jones' Peoples Temple (Hall 2002[1979]), the *Maiyah* movement does not perceive itself as being persecuted by the government or other dominant sectors of society. In the case of these other movements, perceptions of repressively unfair treatment from outside social forces contributed to an intensification of their apocalyptic notions and eventually wound up in violence. Although, as I have noted, Cak Nun and movement disciples perceive a decline in their popularity in Indonesia and attempts by outside forces to draw people away from the movement, there does not appear to be any perception within the movement that they are being persecuted or that their goals are being unfairly frustrated. Moreover, the *Maiyah* movement has not tried to disseminate and instill a highly codified schema, apocalyptic or otherwise, amongst its disciples and followers.

In addition, *Maiyah* interpretations of *jihad* contrast with those made by many contemporary Muslim movements which stress violent tactics. As I noted above, the Battle of Badr of the early Muslim community is a very meaningful

element in the *Maiyah* schema. However, the *Maiyah* movement has emphasized the significance of struggling against a variety of evil forces with patience and enlightened thinking rather than underscoring violent tactics. Indeed, the meanings gleaned from this paradigmatic war project the evil forces of today to be like the anti-Muslim *Quraysh*. They stress figurative meanings of opposing forces rather than literal meanings of military tactics. Yet they have not faced the intense state repression of many Islamic movements in the Middle East and South Asia, pressures they will most likely face if they pose a threat to the power of state forces. The *Maiyah* movement has not presented such a threat through either electoral methods or mass demonstrations. They have continued to focus on Islamizing Indonesian society through the peaceful means of spreading love and togetherness in public discussion forums, religious speeches, music and song, and *selawat* and *zikir*. How this dynamic interface would change if they develop into a political party or cadre-based mass organization with a distinct political platform and codified ideology is hard to predict.

Secondly, Turner's assertion that religious protest movements that develop an ideological and organizational format have already moved from being anti-structural to counter-structural, losing the fertile spirit of communitas, requires a second look. These movements, he posits, may maintain a sense of ideological and normative communitas but these particular forms of communitas, in contrast to existential communitas, are "already within the domain of structure" as the movement has made the inevitable fall into structure which is the fate of all such movements (Turner 1969:132-3). Turner's later works exhibit a less linear perspective and more concern for ambiguous, playful, and inventive spaces in cultural performances and celebrations, even in imposed religious and civic festivals (1982, 1983, and 1987). The verbal and non-verbal language expressed in such spaces is "always charged with *communitas*, the lively possibility of immediate human communion" (Turner 1983, 190). Nevertheless, he maintained the view that this spirit of communitas is destroyed as it is politicized and channeled "toward goals approved of by power hierarchies, secular or sacred" (ibid, 188). To the contrary, I demonstrate in this chapter that the *Maiyah* movement keeps a fertile spirit of communitas alive despite several years of politicization and its deliberate submission to, and focus upon, divinely sanctioned goals. Moreover, the *Maiyah* movement represents a religious protest movement caught somewhere between "anti-structure" and "counter-structure" as it adopts and disseminates nine basic principles and establishes national directors and local leaders and committees, while also resisting ideological and organizational routinization. Some degree of organizational and ideological structure is being formed to facilitate the rapid growth and expansion of this movement and to reach its goal of de-secularizing culture and society. However, in the *Maiyah pengajian*, "the joyous shared flow or solemn communion" of communitas extends into the classified, routinized, factual, commonsense, and hierarchically-organized domains of life (cf. Turner 1982, 29 and 1987, 25). The *Maiyah* movement has sought to "adapt" to the cities and regions in which it has expanded through conscious sensitivity to local cultural

and social characteristics and to the national government and globalization through political education, critical dialogues and Islamizing local culture.

The *Maiyah* movement has been able to develop and expand for over ten years without showing any signs of routinization, reaching a steady state, or becoming a formalized structure. It has been able to stave off these typical "ending points" for new religious movements through formulating a code and forming organizational structures instilled and permeated with a softening flow of ecstatic communion, mysticism, and spontaneity. The movement code disseminated in the *Salam Maiyah* pamphlet and embodied in *pengajian* events is a flexible, transformative code devoid of any rigid ideological objectives. Indeed, the *Maiyah* schema, a core mental representation for the movement, incorporates evocative anti-structural metaphors of the early Muslim community wrapping them in a mystical state of togetherness with God and His Messenger. This schema is all-encompassing traversing every aspect of the believer's life. Several transformative models of political, economic, social and cultural life contest and re-synthesize pre-existing models in these domains bringing the lively and inventive spirit of communitas into areas usually reserved for hierarchical social relations. Political and economic structures of inequality are lessened in radical democratic visions of empowering common people and redistributing wealth to the poor. Mutual social support and accommodation of cultural diversity are projected in a reconfigured image of "Unity in Diversity." The nine basic principles, instantiated and applied in this schema and models, also steer and motivate followers to infuse religious inspiration into every domain of Indonesian society, de-secularizing it through bringing the joyous flow of love, peace, mutual respect, and thankfulness to God and His Messenger.

Similar to incipient ideological communitas, the beginnings of normative communitas has been sustained without forming rigid, hierarchical structures. In keeping with their radical democratic perspective, the *Maiyah* movement has sought to form organizational structures without erecting social hierarchy characteristic of the society and world they are striving to change. The charismatic, multi-talented founder and leader, Cak Nun, Kiai Kanjeng, national "directors," local leaders and committees are viewed as functional units or role players facilitating the goals and activities of the *Maiyah* community. Moreover, each *Maiyah* venue, whether in the national capital or small villages, is considered to be equal and on the same level just like the participants and visitors that attend them. Although there is a great deal of respect in the movement for Cak Nun and Kiai Kanjeng, followers are encouraged to plant the movement in new localities on their own initiative and using their own creativity without the involvement of the movement elders. Scores of new *Maiyah* venues with their own names have been formed through the spontaneous creativity of movement youth.

Whether this incipient ideological and normative communitas, caught "betwixt and between" anti-structure and counter-structure, can be sustained through continued politicization and adaptation to changing political forces is yet to be seen. However, it is clear at this juncture that this movement has been politicized from the very start and this has not dampened the fires of communitas

due primarily to the fact that many of the metaphors of anti-structure, such as the Battle of Badr, *Muhajirin* and *Anshor*, constitutive of the *Maiyah* schema and basic principles are themselves political in nature. The powerful emotions and notions they evoke are projected into politicized contemporary conditions in Indonesia and around the world. Similarly, this movement has sought to achieve goals approved of by sacred power hierarchies, especially God and His Messenger. Rather than destroying the spirit of communitas, it has given birth to it and kept it alive. Perhaps in several South Asian cases of religious protest movements in which anti-structural communitas entails a mystical experience that eliminates all distinctions and discriminations, this presumption applies (see Turner 1974, 286-9). Some Indonesian Muslim movements, such as the "*abangan*" movement inspired by Syekh Siti Jenar, involving mystical union to the point of identification with God may entail similar dynamics (see Kartodirdjo 1973; Gatra 2003, 10-15). However, in an Islamic context such as this where the protest movement tries to stay within the bounds of Islamic monotheism, mystical experiences of togetherness while maintaining orthodox distinctions and discriminations between the believer and God and His Messenger are a source of ecstasy and not a signal of its demise.

In fact, these sources of ecstasy produced through *Maiyah selawat* and *zikr* in pursuit of *syafaat Rasul* and *kodrat Allah* are highly significant for participants and processes of equalization. A growing number of Indonesians are attracted to this movement not just because of its critical analysis of social problems, but because of the powerful feelings of peace and psychological catharsis they experience singing thanks and praises to Allah and His Messenger. Many Indonesians that have grown weary of all the political posturing and rhetoric during the Reformation Era find a welcome reprieve from this seemingly endless bantering in the *Maiyah*. It seems that the *Maiyah* movement has already created a microcosmic space, where communitas has resisted routinization, not becoming part of the social structure like many other movements that have emerged or developed during this Reformation Era. While many spontaneous forms of protest that emerged in this period may be on the decline as organizations splinter into smaller routinized groups performing regular public demonstrations and other activities or develop into political parties or NGOs, the *Maiyah* may very well keep the fires of equalization burning most brightly outside of the hierarchical structures of bureaucratic institutions.

This page has been left blank intentionally

Conclusion

DEMOKRASI
Demokrasi-Demokrasi
Demokrasi-Demokrasi (2 times)
Demokrasi
Segalanya dari Rakyat
Demokrasi
Segalanya oleh Rakyat
Demokrasi
Segalanya untuk Rakyat
Demokrasi
Kedaulatan Rakyat…
Gagasan, Pendapat, Pikiran
Boleh saja tidak sama
Jangan karena kedudukan
Kita saling berhanteman
Walau berbeda-beda
Kita tetap bersatu
Allah Yang Maha Kuasa
Memberkahi selalu…
--Masbul BA, Nasida Ria, Vol. 31, *Satu Juta Satu* (2002)[1]
[Democracy-Democracy
Democracy-Democracy (2 times)
Democracy
All from the people
Democracy
All by the people
Democracy
All for the people
Democracy
People's Sovereignty
Concept, Opinion, Thought
Just allow them to not be the same
Don't let it be because of our position

1 This song, *Demokrasi*, written by Masbul BA, appeared on Nasida Ria's tape cassette, Volume 31, which was first circulated in September, 2002. Nasida Ria is a modern *kasidah* group from Semarang, Central Java which is composed of women. They appear to be most popular with Muslims from rural, traditional Islamic backgrounds.

We fight each other
Although we have differences
We remain one
Allah The Almighty
Always blesses…]

During this period of *Reformasi*, Indonesians have produced and expressed diverse ideas about desirable futures for their society and country, and many of these have been embodied in their performances and interpretations of public cultural forms. In this book, I have considered government and palace-organized ceremonies, celebrations and rituals, cultural and/or religious associations', small groups', healer's and individual's rituals, popular cultural arts, and a new religious movement's artistic *pengajian* sessions based upon my ethnographic research. In addition to my observations of these events, hundreds of interviews and discussions I conducted with people from various walks of life, including palace officials, government civil servants, students, workers, vendors, teachers, cultural artists, religious scholars, neighborhood residents, villagers and religious movement followers and elders, provide a broad view of various, interconnected sectors of local society, and perspectives on public cultural forms and what they mean for the direction of change.

Indonesians, wherever they are socially situated, have been challenged in various ways by the multidimensional crisis which characterizes this era, and these challenges must be part of any examination of the religious and ideological resources they garner to meet them. Political and traditional leaders have been challenged to demonstrate their continued relevance to the yearnings of the masses and the winds of change. Religious organizations have been rethinking their methods of reaching out and developing contact and support from local people. Student theatre groups have been trying to figure out what to critique and how to frame their socio-political criticism in the post-New Order context. Members of new religious movements have been trying to maintain the driving, unsullied spirit for change without becoming part of a corrupt hierarchical social system. Javanese Muslims from the broad spectrum of Islam in Java have been challenged to pursue their religious goals, spin their webs of meaning, and stake out their identities while trying to overcome these differences in order to build new alliances. These and many other challenges, I have tried to take into account as I considered the context of these events and their interpretations.

Dominant meanings of the city of Yogyakarta and of government and palace-organized events center around the local palaces and their embattled sacerdotal leaders, living representatives of the glorious Javanese past and symbols of hope in an uncertain future. Educational, commercial, nationalist, and protest meanings of the city, embedded in the built environment, social institutions and processes, are overshadowed by ceremonial centrality of the palace and its Islamized Hindu-Buddhist culture. Complex combinations of elements from multiple cultural streams—animist, Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic mysticism—are blended in elaborate

festivities marketed to tourists while socializing locals with representations of the magical powers of mediating figures, entities and substances. A sense of Javaneseness, in its most exotic "*kejawen*" or Javanist form, is commoditized preserving signs of cultural distinctiveness in the global marketplace. In fact, these events and their organizers express a conception of a desirable future which involves integrating, more fully, a modernizing and developing Indonesia, with some local trappings, into the global capitalist system. Similarly, they promote maintaining Islamic ideas and Javanese philosophy, as *agama* and *adat*, with greater emphasis on the latter, as long as they don't hinder the implementation of their version of liberal democracy and the accommodation of essential cultural flows from the developed world.

Nevertheless, the complex combination of cultural elements embedded in government and palace-organized events only represent a portion of the broad spectrum of Islam in Java. Examining a set of local practices—*ziarah, slametan*, and trance states—and local interpretations of them, I demonstrated the wide array of Islamic variants in Java which has posed such a problem for insiders and outsiders to delineate. Most outsiders, including Western anthropologists and scholar-administrators, have tended to locate Islam in a small segment of this continuum, only amidst the "pious" Muslims. Woodward, while correcting this error, clearly erred in the direction of locating Sufi Islam throughout the range of "*abangan*" variants. While for some locals this is accurate, for others it distorts their own interpretations of these practices and perhaps assumes that the Islamized interpretations of the palace hold across local society. Insiders have also disputed where and how much Islam to locate across this diverse array, using contested categories to this end. American scholar-administrators, much like their Dutch predecessors, tend to single out "political Islam," especially in its "modernist" and reformist variants, as a threat to "democracy" and "law and order." As long as the "pious" Muslims keep their religion on a personal level, outside of the public square and the realm of politics they are acceptable or at least tolerable (see also Ramage 1995, 191-2). To the contrary, my research with diverse Muslims, as indicated in the range of interpretations of local practices and popular culture, suggests that Muslims from almost across the board use Islamic concepts and principles to criticize Indonesian society in support of *Reformasi* and multidimensional change. Of course, there is a range of ideological positions on desirable futures and modes of interacting with globalization which we will consider briefly below.

Some of those espousing divergent ideological positions came into conflict in healer's performances and in the *dangdut* social drama. Muslim revivalists—Sufi and *salafi*—have ridiculed the beliefs and practices of traditional Javanese shaman, *dukun*, as un-Islamic for several decades. However, in the Reformation context, their criticism has been amplified and taken on more extensive dimensions as these sectors of the Muslim community strive to lay claim to the public sphere. *Kejawen* beliefs and practices, exemplified by the *dukun*, are discursively construed as fomenting and precipitating spiritual, social, and political disorder. Sufi and *salafi*-oriented discourses attempt to rein in this cosmological disorder in different ways.

Sufi revivalists try to delineate proper Islamic mystical and ascetic pursuits from improper ones, while *salafi* revivalists try to exorcize all forms of heterodox pursuits, including many of those performed by traditionalist Sufi brotherhoods. Sufi revivalists project an image of an orderly Indonesia under the leadership of supernaturally potent *wali*-like figures, while *salafi* revivalists project an image ordered by the power of Qur'an and *Sunnah* and leaders obedient to their rules and principles.

Similarly, diverse positions were evident in the social drama surrounding Inul's "drilling" hips and a new style of highly visual and sensual *dangdut* that followed in their wake. *Dangdut*, long popular in localities across Indonesia, often incorporated sensuality and flirtation between female performers and male audience members as part of attractions it offered to spectators. Its feminine aura has made it into a genre dominated by female and male transgender performers, and this aura has recently facilitated raising the bar on more explicit displays of sexuality with an appearance of a variety of new styles of *goyang* or rhythmic body movements. Led by Inul's controversial emergence on the national stage, *dangdut* has risen in its popularity, including upper classes amongst its fans, and has become a hot item for television stations and entertainment producers. But this did not occur without a fight. Many "modernist," reform-oriented Muslims, tainted as New Order supporters during the end of Suharto's reign, were opposed to Inul's clothing and performance styles and tried to stop or limit her performances, while many secular, "syncretistic"-oriented Muslims came to her defense. Different forms of *communitas*—spontaneous, existential happenings of the masses and routinized, formally structured campaigns of the reformist institutions—and different kinds of encyclopedic knowledge were entailed and evoked during this social drama. KH Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), a former Indonesian president, framed many supportive sentiments in terms of "human rights" and "freedom of expression," making it an issue of "democratization" versus Islamic censorship. Liberal democratic ideals, anti-cultural populism, and Islamic reformist ideologies and their desirable futures were evident in this conflict. *Dangdut* presented a new exciting form of accommodating global flows and integrating into global capitalism through making something more "modern" to the youth than traditional cultural arts and more "Indonesian" than rock n' roll, reggae or hip-hop.

Muhammadiyah, the largest "modernist" and reformist-oriented organization, has recently debated repositioning itself vis-à-vis local cultural ceremonies, rituals, and arts in an effort to bridge the gap between their educated elite and the masses of lower class Indonesians. Even prior to national-level debates over the concept of cultural *dakwah*, on a grassroots level in south-central and east Java, local members had been voicing alternative discourses to the dominant, *syari'ah*-oriented position of Muhammadiyah officials. These discourses had already been creating new ways of approaching local culture moving beyond the cold and distant stance of purification with which they had become associated. These alternative discourses, the emergence and debates over the concept of cultural *dakwah*, and the interpretation of Muhammadiyah researchers utilizing additional

modes of reasoning, including social science and phenomenology, to assess local culture and stances toward its expressive forms indicate that the "door of *ijtihad*" is open in Muhammadiyah quarters. Muhammadiyah remains committed to making Indonesian society more Islamic, developed and prosperous, and to creating a form of global "pluralism" in which local Islamized forms could coexist with more dominant forms from wealthier, developed countries.

Modern, Indonesian-language, professional and student theatre took center stage as the masses mobilized to unseat the long-time New Order dictator. Activists and creative artists had been using this genre for nearly three decades to criticize the government and society, during which time they developed several sublime and direct methods of critique, often placing more emphasis on resistance than on clearly defining ideological positions. Moreover, the ever-present threat of censorship and repression led many groups to express their discontent through symbolic themes. With the greater openness of the Reformation era, theatrical groups have begun to more openly exhibit their lines of ideological difference, along with their inclination towards particular sorts of themes; nevertheless, several concerns and topics are still broadly shared across groups of differing orientations. They have a common focus on the individual, political-economic conditions, and the effects of globalization, and Teater Eska, a group at the local national Islamic university, has framed these concerns within revealed knowledge, producing what they call "prophetic theatre." These theatre groups envision a range of populist, socialist democratic, and transformative Islamic futures for Indonesia, and all of these camps strive to resist global domination.

Similar to Teater Eska, the *Maiyah* movement, with its artistic and ecstatic *pengajian* sessions planted across Java and many other regions of Indonesia, strives to realize transformative Islamic futures. This new religious movement, initially founded in the early 1990s through Cak Nun's spontaneous efforts to reach out directly to the masses overcoming his frustrations with what he perceived as Muslim intellectual ineffectiveness, really took off during the Reformation era expanding in scope and breadth. During this period of rapid growth, it began to become ideologically and organizationally structured, but its transformative ideas and renewing spirit of joyful communion kept it from becoming rigid and routinized. Whereas many "traditionalists" strive for "secularization" through mixtures of "culture" and "religion" without emphasizing "religion" and "modernists" aim for "secularization" through rationally separating "culture" and "religion," the *Maiyah* movement seeks to de-secularize society and culture through saturating them with "religion." It answers the traditionalists' fears that an emphasis on "religion" would eventually eradicate "culture," with a creative preservation of traditional religious forms and an Islamic infusion of various borrowed forms, including Christian, Chinese, and blues melodies. It also answers the modernists' concerns about inappropriate mixtures of "culture" and "religion," with clear acknowledgement that their events are religiously-inspired culture and not to be confused with the pure forms of worship established by Prophet Muhammad. In addition to de-secularization, the *Maiyah* movement promotes a

radical form of democracy and, in the words of Cak Nun, a "post-globalization," rather than anti-globalization, posture in which they resist being the "slaves of corporate stakeholders and global processes of homogenizing the world's diverse peoples," while also accepting globalization as long as it meets their needs and respects humanity.

In my assessments, this range of public cultural forms has many positive and negative effects on processes of equalization. On a local level, government and palace-organized events reinforces the exalted position of the wealthy, land and business-owning, royalty, and serves to reproduce the status quo in which local workers receive the lowest wages in all of Indonesia. *Dangdut*, on the other hand, provides an opportunity to improve the material conditions of women and sexual minorities that become part of its entertainment labor force, while also reproducing negative ideas about these subordinate groups and exploiting their bodies. Muhammadiyah, equipped with a new dynamic conception of cultural *dakwah*, is poised to further challenge the ideological props of the aristocratic elites through dialogue and de-sacralized ways of performing local ceremonies, rituals, and arts. On the other hand, their approach to *dangdut* and similar arts, may serve to lessen both the exploitation of the female and male transgender performers and the opportunity these genres offer for improving their economic conditions. On regional and national levels, while government and palace-organized events include more diversity than in the past, especially of the Chinese minority, they still emphasize Javanese traditional culture and identity buttressing the domination of the secular-nationalist Javanese aristocrats. *Dangdut* represents the rise in prominence of common people's culture, but its deviant-filled, anti-structural, character has not yet reflected the development of an articulate ideological framework to voice the concerns of the masses of everyday, poor people. It has remained wide open to elite appropriation and use for voicing liberal democratic ideals, secular nationalism, and political campaigning. Sufi and *salafi*-oriented healers' performances and Muhammadiyah's cultural arts, through continuing to emphasize Muslim identity and Islamic reformist ideology, would serve to weaken the supports for Javanese ethnic and regional hegemony and the long-time dominant, national ideology, *Pancasila*. Traditionalist Sufi, modernist and neo-modernist critiques of Javanist cosmology and sources of supernatural charisma and authority potentially undermines the props that supported Suharto, and other would-be dictators, and the widespread system of corruption he championed. On a global level, government and palace-organized events and *dangdut* shows facilitates the continued dominance of global capitalist elites offering "exotic" ceremonies and female bodies as commodities in the world market. They both involve the accommodation and acculturation of flows of ideas and practices from more powerful and wealthier nations in the global hierarchy, wrapping them up in traditional or modern packages. Muhammadiyah and other Muslim revivalists strive to contest the control of global capitalist elites through producing and televising cultural events that embody Islamic ideas, values, and practices. While they continue to promote the absorption of Western science and technology, much

like the aristocratic elite, Muhammadiyah aims to limit and resist the absorption and assimilation of dominant cultural flows pertaining to other domains of life which contrast with Islamic teachings. Modern theatre and *Maiyah pengajian* events, with their persistent critique of political and economic overseers and structures of inequality, have a positive effect on processes of equalization on all levels.

In addition to evaluating the effects of these public cultural forms, there are some factors—such as transformative/conservative ideas, implementation of progressive concepts, the building of new alliances/polarization, synergy of state and society, and the impact of powerful international forces—on a broader level of analysis, which strongly influence the direction of equalization, that we must assess. Moreover, in regard to these factors, we must broaden the scope of cultural relativism to consider local ideas and activities we may initially feel an impulse to rule out as having any positive effect on issuing in a greater degree of socio-political equality and justice. In fact, there is a broad range of transformative ideas traversing all of the Indonesian social segments we have discussed in this book. There are prominent traditionalist leaders, and others, such as Gus Dur that imagine a desirable future for Indonesia in terms of "liberal" democracy emphasizing the rule of law, equal treatment before the law, freedom of speech and thought, respect for plurality of views, and protection of minority rights in society (Wahid 2003). According to the view of many "liberal" democrats, realizing this sort of socio-political system requires no *direct* contribution from religion, which should be kept separate from the state and government (see also Esposito 2004, 99). Some may conceive of some degree of religious inspiration for the moral foundation of this system, but they rule out any formal institutionalization of Islamic law. For instance, Sri Sultan HB X (2003, 3-6) asserts that Indonesia can turn to Medina during the time of *Rasulullah* for an ideal model of *masyarakat madani*, which he describes as a plural, democratic, and peaceful society where there is respect for its legal foundation and people's rights and responsibilities together. He states that Medina was the first society with a constitution calling for religious freedom, inter-religious brotherhood, peace, security and unity, political principles and ethics, legal rights and responsibilities for each citizen, and consistent upholding of laws based on truth and justice. Indonesia, with its weak sense of tolerance, weak respect for individual rights, insufficient level of law, emphasis on the harsh approach, disrespect for individual rights, and weakness of society vis-à-vis its leaders, falls far short of the characteristics of a *masyarakat madani*, he concludes. In fact, *masyarakat madani* is a transformative concept which became popular during the Reformation era and for which there are many definitions. Many people treat it as synonymous with "civil society," taking the characteristics above without giving much consideration to the Islamic context and ideas that produced these characteristics. Others place greater emphasis on the Islamic context and ideas of the *masyarakat madani* of Medina, while acknowledging that they support the same general characteristics of "civil society" with Western historical roots. They recognize a convergence of Islamic and western values in producing a humane,

"civilized" society. Still others reject placing any western gloss or frame on early Muslim societies and their characteristics, because they consider them to be radically different due to the underlying religious ideas and faith.

There is a similar range of positions on the concepts of *mufakat, musyawarah, gotong-royong* (mutual help), and *kedaulatan rakyat*, which appears in the Nasida Rida song above. These concepts, formerly used by the secular nationalists of the Old and New Order regimes, became more openly contested during the Reformation period. Ramage (1995, 109) observes that some Muslim intellectuals in ICMI criticized New Order interpretations of *mufakat* and *musyawarah* as contrary to the Constitution and the fourth principle of *Pancasila*, which called for "Indonesian-style" democracy, arguing the regime was misusing these local concepts to argue against parliamentary voting and representative governance. In addition, Eldridge (1997) noted, many NGOs used these popular understandings of "democracy" to gingerly strive for reforms and improved conditions during the time of the repressive Suharto-led state. Nowadays, many students activists and Muslim revivalists are openly critical of the way the political elite use these ideas to manipulate and mislead the people into thinking that their calling upon and implementation of these concepts are part of a "democratic" process. They call for greater and genuine participation of common people in political deliberation and consensus formulation and bringing people together for mutual help projects that benefit common people rather than serving elite interests. Moreover, many grassroots Indonesian Muslims place these ideas within an Islamic framework, as was evoked in the song cited at the beginning of this chapter, in which they reflect good relationships between people working for the public interest or *maslahah*, while Allah, The Almighty, from the vertical plane, showers blessings down upon his creation. "*Demokrasi*," from, by and for *the people*, is clearly a borrowed conception adapted to local social conditions and fit into an Islamic worldview and/or interpreted to converge with Islamic ideas and values. Nevertheless, as was the case with responses to "liberal" interpretations of *masyarakat madani*, some Indonesian Muslims reject these concepts as foreign to Islam and indicative of defunct secular nationalists and their accommodation of a western way of life only thinly veiled with local or Islamic terms.

On the other hand, some activists and intellectuals embrace the concept of trying to establish an Islamic state modeled on literal, *syari'ah*-oriented interpretations of how early Muslim society was developed and organized without referring to the ideas of *masyarakat madani*, *kedaulatan rakyat* or *demokrasi*. The operative concept for these activists is *Khalifah al-Rashidun* which finds its inspiration in the example of *Rasulullah* and the "Rightfully-Guided" caliphs that led the Islamic state after his passing. Some of these activist organizations and parties are rather "nativist" in terms of their wholesale rejection of cultural ideas and models from the non-Muslim West, including "democracy" and "civil society." Others half-heartedly embrace these non-Muslim, western concepts only as a temporary phase on the path of establishing an Islamic state. There are also some student activists who conceive their transformative ideas in terms of an Iranian-style "Islamic

democratic" system allowing for many democratic procedures and institutions, while giving "veto" power to Islamic scholars that oversee the system and keep it from moving outside the bounds of their authoritative interpretations of Islamic principles.

In between the "liberal" democrats and the "legalistic"-oriented Islamic state builders, there is a broad range of traditional Islamic students and graduates, non-governmental organization activists, and modernists that use Islamic concepts to frame the transformation of Indonesian society. For instance, Najib Kailani, a former *santri* at a traditional Islamic school, wrote that the concept of *bai'at* or a political contract between a leader and the people, rooted in early Muslim societies (*khulafurrasyidin*) needs to be applied in Indonesia so that politicians that make promises and commitments during the general election can be held responsible after they take office (Bulletin Al-Ikhtilaf 16 April 2004). This concept reflects the authority of the people over their leaders, because they have more control over leaders when they have the power to change leaders that violate their political contract. Similarly, many local Muslims derive transformative ideas from the example of *Rasulullah*, focusing on his leadership characteristics, his loving character, or his revolutionary qualities. In addition, many modernist and traditionalist NGO members and critical artists, such as the playwrights of "prophetic theatre" are critical of overly other-worldly preachers that do not express the relevance of Islam to struggles for social justice and freedom. Many of these groups adopt a "gender" perspective that calls and strives for eliminating gender discrimination and inequality throughout society, in homes, schools, businesses, and political institutions. Muhammadiyah has consistently striven in this regard to implement its "concept of progress" building institutions to help the poor and disadvantaged. Moeslim Abdurrahman (2005, 180-1), a Muhammadiyah-affiliated scholar, argues young Muslim intellectuals concerned with "returning to the Qur'an" should be more focused upon viewing "the poor" as "a social category born from national and global capitalist structural oppression which is unjust." Likewise, many former traditional Islamic school students, NGO members, are trying to utilize aspects of Islamic ethics to fight social injustice, processes of impoverishment, and to explore marginal themes such as problems of land reform and local culture (Maula 2003). Many Muslims of diverse backgrounds also draw inspiration for change and creating a more "civil society" from discourse about the legendary examples of Muslim saints who found tolerant ways of promoting Islamic ideals while preserving local culture. The *Maiyah* movement also draws upon numerous Islamic concepts, including *Tauhid*, *muhajirin* and *anshor*, *taṣawwuf* and their core concept of *mai'yah* itself, to galvanize the grassroots towards changing their society and culture.[2] Furthermore, this movement grasps upon principles and

2 Fatima Mernissi (1992, 42-59) laments what she views as the lack of access of Arabs to principles and practices of tolerance and respect for individual rights and freedoms, cornerstones of secular humanism and democracy rejected in the Middle East and North Africa in the name of nationalism and anti-Western struggles. Varisco (2005, 96) criticizes

practices of *religious* humanism which they interpret as being rooted in Qur'anic teachings about the value of good, loving and respectful, "horizontal" ties between fellow human beings, in Prophet Muhammad's generosity, patience, and mature knowledge, and in the way the *anshor* provided sincere help and material support for visitors to their city that they had not even known.

Secondly, the implementation of many of these transformative ideas is important for processes of equalization, moving these ideas out of the abstract realm and into people's practice and experience. This can serve as an important learning experience which can deepen the commitment and motivation of people to furthering transformative processes. It has occurred with many of these transformative ideas. For instance, Sri Sultan HB X and government civil servants have begun to implement their concept of pluralism and mutual respect through including a Chinese festival, *Peh Cun*, on their tourist schedule and making supportive speeches and appearances. This event and experience gives spectators, participants, and Javanese, who were well-represented amongst the lion and dragon dance performers, a new sense of inclusion and a concrete example of tolerance and respect of diversity. Similarly, student theatre groups from all ideological persuasions have implemented their transformative ideas of changing the "undemocratic" format that has characterized their art, as well as society more broadly, through incorporating performers and the audience more, and in new ways, in the creative and dialogic processes. Some theatre groups, such as Teater Eska, have also implemented the idea of empowering women through joint projects with women's organizations and incorporating them as active participants and leaders within theatrical production and dialogical processes. The *Maiyah* movement has also implemented its ideas in the way they stage events, the setting, format, inclusion of people in the circle and open participation in the political forums, and the manner in which they organize the movement without rigid hierarchies.

Thirdly, building progressive new alliances for change can propel forward the equalizing process, whereas the polarization of grassroots forces can hinder them. Many issues have been pulling different Indonesian Muslims from different orientations apart and others have been pushing them together; the strength of the divisions has significantly weakened the Reformation drive for structural changes. Divisions over local and popular culture have continued and escalated in some ways during this period, and to these divisions add different political visions and opponents and Indonesia is looking at another potentially explosive and violent period. The broad unity of the early Reformation movement has degenerated to a great extent with its splintering into numerous small organizations and

---

Mernissi's tack of inscribing over generalized images of "Muslim society" and even "Islam" based on some local Muslim perspectives. In contrast to what Mernissi depicts for Arab societies, these tolerant, respectful and civil principles and practices are in abundance in Indonesian society and moreover, Indonesian Muslims frequently draw upon Islamic concepts and models to frame their struggles for a society with unions, worker's rights, greater tolerance and inclusion of marginalized groups, and participatory democracy.

parties. Some extremely polarizing groups, so-called "radical *abangan*" and intolerant "puritanical" revivalists, have made their public presence felt as forces opposed to building progressive alliances. However, most Islamic variants are more compromising and inclined towards unifying with Muslims of different orientations. This can be witnessed in the shift in some Muhammadiyah member's positions on local culture, moving closer to NU-style positions. In addition, these Muslim organizations, the two largest in Indonesia, have begun to bridge some differences and non-governmental organizations formed by followers of both groups work together on many issues confronting local people. The broad unity of shared concerns and key issues we have witnessed in modern Indonesian theatrical groups also bodes well for the growth of new alliances for change as does the fact that many groups from various backgrounds participate in dialogues with each other and people of other religious backgrounds in *Maiyah* events.

Fourthly, the presence or absence of synergy between the state and society to further equalizing processes. Only at a few points since the falling of Suharto has there been any significant resonance of the government with major issues of progressive social movements and demands from the grassroots. These have occurred during the Gus Dur and Megawati presidencies when they made moves to change the position of Chinese in society, striving to make the national motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* more inclusive and less homogenizing.[3] The other significant moments came with state support of new regional autonomy laws which have not been fully implemented yet and what they mean on local levels is yet to be fully determined. Local autonomy, long repressed under the authoritarian rule of the Old and New Order regimes, has been given greater space to grow by the passage of two laws by President Habibie's government which gave local governments authority over eleven areas while five remained with the central government (Tanthowi 2008, 9). KH Abdurrahman Wahid (2003) himself has criticized these efforts charging that it has only made "little kings" in local areas who lord over people perpetuating corruption and lack of respect for the law. Tanthowi (2008) also problematizes local autonomy policies arguing that they have allowed local elites to exceed the limits of their authority by implementing *syari'ah*-inspired regulations in an intolerant and exclusive fashion which marginalizes non-Muslim minorities. Perhaps his case study in Cianjur, West Java suggests that there needs to be more empowered participatory involvement of Muslims and non-Muslims and more synergy between the central and local governments to assure more tolerant, inclusive, and multicultural implementations of *syari'ah*-inspired

3 Chang-Yau Hoon (2008, 51-74) demonstrates how President Abdurrahman Wahid's 2001 lifting of the 1978 ban on displaying Chinese characters and importation of Chinese publications and annulling discriminatory regulations restricting manifestations of Chinese beliefs, customs and traditions and President Megawati's 2002 declaration of support for Chinese education and Chinese Studies departments and of *Imlek* (Chinese New Year) as a national holiday helped restore ethnic Chinese cultural rights and contributed to a flowering of Chinese language and culture.

regulations. Likewise, lawmaker's attempts at raising the inclusion of women in the legislature while resonating with the efforts of many social organizations did not go far enough towards making structural changes. In 2003, laws were passed setting targets of a 30% quota for women in the legislature and political parties were prompted to make women at least 30% of their candidates. Although almost no parties reached this goal, local women's organizations were able to use this opening to push political parties to address gender issues and the interests of women. Some other moments in which some legal reforms have been made may be cited as points of synergy, but other than these limited occasions, the dynamic drive for Reformation, which even included some prominent national figures, has stalled. For the processes of equalization to take off in any significant fashion there needs to be a major about face by the state in the direction of joining the efforts of many social groups we have seen aimed towards major political, economic, and social changes.

Finally, the influence of powerful, wealthy nations can tip the scales in favor of processes of equalization or despotic exploitation depending upon its articulation with local dynamics. Pressure from more powerful countries for Indonesia to get on board the "war on terror" through increasing its repression and surveillance of Islamic organizations, cracking down on "radical Islamists" and "*jihadists*" and other segments of "political Muslims," tends to support the re-establishment of an authoritarian state along the lines of the New Order regime. In this regard, Kahin and Kahin (1995) have argued that the Eisenhower administration's subversive interventions in Indonesian politics led to the strengthening of authoritarian power. Moreover, some Indonesians have expressed nostalgia for the good economic times under the strict political rule of the New Order era, calling for a return to this sort of state. These calls have not gone unopposed. In addition to the "war on terror," global capitalist institutions, multinational corporations, and Western governments offering deals to the Indonesian government, such as free trade packages from Japan and U.S. commitments to renew military ties, can serve to reinforce structures of inequality in Indonesia where the military still holds on to its privileged position in the economy and society and where workers are already overexploited by multinational corporations. On the other hand, if these powerful international forces were to support Indonesian workers' demands for higher salaries and better working conditions and for the relinquishing of military-controlled assets to civilian representatives of the Indonesian people, things could turn in the direction of equalizing changes, and not just "democracy" as a campaign slogan or empty ideological rhetoric, but as real alteration of common people's life chances and access to resources.

Glossary

Abangan	lower class; non-observant Muslim; syncretistic Muslim
adat (Ar. ‘adat)	local cultural ideas and practices
akal (Ar. ‘aql)	human intelligence; conscience
angguk putri	female dance performance with hand drumming and religious songs or Javanese metal drum music
badui	male dance performance to religious chants
berkah (Ar. Barakah)	blessings
bertapa	performing ascetic acts
bid’ah	religious innovation
campursari	contemporary music genre fusing traditional and modern forms
dakwah (Ar. Da’wa)	calling people to Islam
dangdut	contemporary music genre formed from Malay, Indian, and Arab music
dukun	traditional shaman
fatwa	religious legal decision
ghaib	invisible realm
goyang	rhythmic dance movements
gunungan	giant ceremonial mounds of food
hadith	recorded sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad
ijtihad	interpretation from religious sources
ilham	inspiration
ilmu	spiritual knowledge; science
jampi	traditional remedy; magically activated substances
jathilan	traditional Central Javanese group dance performance often involving trance
juru kunci	caretaker of sacred place; ritual specialists at cemeteries or other places
kakak	elder sister or brother
kampung	compact cluster of homes in urban neighborhood
karawitan	gamelan performances with traditional singers
kasidah(an)	religious singing
kebatinan	innerness; spirituality
kedaulatan rakyat	people’s sovereignty
kejawen	Javanism; syncretistic system of Javanese beliefs and practices
keprihatinan	apprehension

keramat (Ar. Karāmat)	sacred graves, places, objects, animals, and people possessing supernatural powers
kesurupan	spirit possession
ketoprak	traditional Javanese theatrical form
khazanah	treasure
khurafat	non-Islamic beliefs
klenik	religious charlatanism
kodrat	God's unlimited power
kuntulan	martial arts-like dance performance often accompanied with drumming
kyai	elevated title for people, objects, plants, and animals with special powers and abilities
mufakat	consensus
musyawarah	consultation
nafs(u)	human desires; soul
ngalap berkah	obtaining blessings
ngebor	drilling movement
pengajian	religious instruction/speeches
priyayi	aristocrats; high-level bureaucrats
puasa	fasting
pusaka	heirloom
Reformasi	Reformation
reog	traditional East Javanese dance form often involving trance
rukun	harmony; cosmic order
rupiah	Indonesian currency
ruqyah	magical formula
ruwatan	Javanist exorcism of bad fate
salafi	early Islamic scholars; Muslims that emphasize the authority of early Islamic scholars
santet	sorcery; black magic
santri	students in Islamic schools; pious Muslims
selawat(an) (Ar. Salawat)	chanting or singing praises of Prophet Muhammad
semedi	meditation
sesaji (Jv. Sesajen)	offerings
sinden	traditional Javanese singers
slametan	ritual communal meal
slamet	cosmic harmony and happiness
Sunnah	practices of Prophet Muhammad
Suro	first month of year on Javanese calendar
syari'ah (Ar. Shari'ah)	rules guiding life of Muslims
Syirik (Ar. Shirk)	polytheism; making partners with God
tahlilan	ritualized recitation of *zikir* and prayers
tahayul	superstitions

tarekat (Ar. *tarīqah*)	Sufi brotherhood
Tauhid	Islamic monotheism; Oneness of God
Tuhan	Lord; God
tumpeng	ritual mound of rice
ustadz (Ar. Ustadh)	Islamic teacher
wahyu	supernatural powers; revelation
Wali Songo	legendary Nine Saints of Java
wayang kulit	leather puppet theater
wibawa	Javanese conception of charismatic authority
ziarah (Ar. Zi'arah)	visiting sacred graves and other places
zikir (Ar. Dhikr)	reciting or chanting praises, glorifying and "remembering" God

This page has been left blank intentionally

Bibliography

Abdurrahman, Moeslim (2003), *Islam Sebagai Kritik Sosial*. (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga).

— (2005), *Islam yang Memihak*. (Yogyakarta: LKiS).

Abshar-Abdalla, Ulil (2003), *Islam Liberal & Fundamental: Sebuah Pertarungan Wacana*. (Yogyakarta: eLSAQ Press).

Adnan, Zifirdaus (1992), 'Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic Ideology: No! Islam and the State in Indonesia,' in Arief Budiman (ed.).

Agar, Michael and Hobbs, Jerry R. (1985), 'How to Grow Schemata out of Interviews,' in Janet W.D. Dougherty (Keller) (ed.).

Ahnaf, Moh. Iqbal (2004), *The Image of the Enemy: Fundamentalist Muslims' Perceptions of The Other*. (Master's Thesis, Graduate Program, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta).

Ali, M. (2005), 'The rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in contemporary Indonesia', *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 22:1, 1-26.

al-Jabri, Mohammed 'Abed (1999), *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique.* Aziz Abbasi (trans.). (Austin: University of Texas, The Center for Middle Eastern Studies).

Amin, Darori M. (2002), 'Sinkretisme dalam Masyarakat Jawa,' in Drs. H. M. Darori Amin (ed.).

Aragon, Lorraine V. (2000), *Fields of the Lord.* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'I Press).

Arberry, A. J. (2000), *Muslim Saints and Mystics*; Episodes from the *Tadhkirat al-Auliya' (Memorial of the Saints)*. (Ames, Iowa: Omphaloskepsis).

Arbuckle, Heidi (2000), 'Of Pigs, Puppets and Protest: Radical Yogyakarta Artists Get among the People,' *Inside Indonesia* 64 (October-December) <http://insideindonesia.org/edit64/heidi2.htm>.

Ardiana, Rohmah (2003), *Nilai-Nilai Ajaran Hindu dalam Ritual Labuhan Kraton Yogyakarta di Pantai Parangkusuma*. Skripsi, (Jurusan Perbandingan Agama, Fakultas Ushuluddin, Institut Agama Islam Negeri Sunan Kalijaga, Yoygakarta).

Azra, Azyumardi (2000[1990]), 'Mengkaji Ulang Modernisme Muhammadiyah,' in *Kompas* (ed.).

— (2005), 'Islamic Thought: Theory, Concepts, and Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam', in K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds).

Bachtiar, H. W. (1973), 'The Religion of Java: A Commentary', *Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia* 5:1, 85-118.

Baidhawy, Zakiyuddin (2003), 'Prakata,' in Zakiyuddin Baidhaway (ed.).
Bain, Laura (2000), 'Confused? Some directions in post-New Order theatre', *InsideIndonesia*64October-December<http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit64/bain4.htm>.
Barker, Eileen (2002[1995]), 'The Unification Church,' in David Hicks (ed.).
Barth, Fredrik (1993), *Balinese Worlds*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Beatty, Andrew (1999), *Varieties of Javanese Religion: An anthropological account*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Benda, Harry J. (1985), 'Christiaan Snouck-Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia,' in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Siddique, and Yasmin Hussain (eds).
Bertrand, Jacques (2004), *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Bodden, Michael H. (1997), 'Teater Koma's Suksesi and Indonesia's New Order,' *Asian Theatre Journal* 14:2, 259-280 (Autumn).
Bowen, John R. (1995), 'The Form Culture Takes: A State-of-the-Field Essay on the Anthropology of Southeast Asia,' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 54:4 (November), 1047-1078.
— (2008), *Religions in Practice: An Approach to the Anthropology of Religion*, 4th Edition. (Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.).
BPS Statistics Indonesia (2000), 'Indonesia's 2000 Population Census: A Recent National Statistics Activity.' Badan Pusat Statistik, Indonesia.
Brouwer, Steve et al. (2005[1996]), 'South Korea: Modernization with a Vengeance, Evangelization with the Modern Edge,' in Arthur C. Lehmann, James Myers and Pamela A. Moro (eds).
Brown, Michael Fobes (2005 [1989]), 'Dark Side of the Shaman,' in Arthur C. Lehmann, James Myers and Pamela A. Moro (eds).
Buwono X, Sri Sultan Hamengku (2003), *SABDA—Ungkapan Hati Seorang Raja*. Oka Kusumayudha and Ronny Sugiantoro (eds.). (Yogyakarta: PT BP Kedaulatan Rakyat).
Chambert-Loir, Henri (2002), 'Saints and ancestors: the cult of Muslim saints in Java,' in Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (eds).
Chambert-Loir, Henri and Reid, Anthony (2002), 'Introduction,' in Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (eds) (Honolulu: Asian Studies Association of Australia, Allen & Unwin and University of Hawaii Press).
Chamim, Asykuri Ibn et al. (2002), 'Muhammadiyah dan Kesenian Lokal di Lamongan: Apresiasi dan Interaksi di Tengah Purifikasi Agama,' *Innovasi* 12:1, 65-87.
— (2003), *Purifikasi & Reproduksi Budaya di Pantai Utara Jawa*. Zakiyuddin Baidhaway (ed.). (Surakarta: Pusat Studi Budaya dan Perubahan Sosial, Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta).
Colby, Fernandez and Fernandez, James and Kronenberg, David (1981), 'Toward a Convergence of Cognitive and Symbolic Anthropology,' *American Ethnologist* 8:3, 422-450. Special Issue: Symbolism and Cognition.

Conklin, Harold (1969), 'Lexicological Treatment of Folk Taxonomies,' in Stephen Tyler (ed.).

D'Andrade, Roy (1995), *The Development of Cognitive Anthropology*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

D'Andrade, Roy and Claudia Strauss (eds.) (1992), *Human Motives and Cultural Models*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Daniels, Timothy P. (2005), 'Javanism, Tourist Culture and Religious Rationalization: Caught between Commoditization and De-sacralization,' Unpublished paper.

— (2007), 'Liberals, moderates and jihadists: protesting Danish cartoons in Indonesia,' *Contemporary Islam* 1, 231-246.

Darban, Ahmad Adaby et al. (2002), *Kraton Jogja: The History and Cultural Heritage*. (Jakarta: Karaton Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat and Indonesia Marketing Association).

De Jonge, Huub (1993), 'Western and Indonesian Views on the Abangan-Santri Division in Javanese Society,' in Henk Driessen (ed.).

De Wit, Augusta (1906), *Java: Facts and Fancies*. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company).

Dougherty (Keller), Janet W.D. (ed.) (1985), 'Introduction,' in *Directions in Cognitive Anthropology*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press).

Eldridge, Philip (1997), 'Non-governmental Organizations, the State, and Democratization in Indonesia,' in Jim Schiller and Barbara Martin-Schiller (eds).

Elliston, Deborah A. (1999), 'Erotic Anthropology: "Ritualized Homosexuality" in Melanesia and Beyond,' in Morton Klass and Maxine K. Weisgrau (eds).

Emmerson, Donald K. (1981), 'Islam in Modern Indonesia: Political Impasse, Cultural Opportunity', in Philip H. Stoddard (ed.).

Esposito, John L. (2004), 'Practice and Theory,' in Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman (eds).

Esposito, John L. and Voll, John O. (1996), *Islam and Democracy*. (New York: Oxford University Press).

Evers, Hans-Dieter and Rudiger Korff (2000), *Southeast Asian Urbanism: The Meaning and Power of Social Space*. (New York: St. Martin's Press).

Fadl, Khaled Abou El (2004), *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Fadlan Abu Yasir (n.d.), *Terapi Gangguan Jin dengan Ruqyah & Doa*. (Yogyakarta: CV. AQSHA).

Farid, Esack (1997), *Qur'an, Liberation & Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression*. (Oxford: Oneworld Publications).

Faruk and Aprinus Salam (2003), *Hanya Inul*. (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa).

Ferzacca, Steve (2000), *Healing the Modern in a Central Javanese City*. (Durham: Carolina Academic Press).

Forum, (2003), 'Dia Lokomotif Inulisasi,' 11 May, pp. 22-26.

— (2003), 'Moral Bangsa di Bokong Inul,' 11 May, pp. 27-33.
— (2003), 'Selamat Datang di Negeri Dangdut,' 30 March, pp. 47-58.
Fox, James J. (2002), 'Interpreting the historical significance of tombs and chronicles in contemporary Java,' in Henri Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid (eds).
Fryer, Donald W. and Jackson, James C. (1977), *Indonesia*. (Boulder: Westview Press).
Gatra (2003), 'Syekh Siti Jenar: Jatuh-Bangun Islam Abangan,' 6 December 2003, 10:2-3, 10-15.
Geertz, Clifford (1960), *Religion of Java*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
— (1973), 'Ritual and Social Change: A Javanese Example, in *The Interpretation of Cultures*. (New York: Basic Books).
— (1995), *After the Fact*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
— (2001[1972]), 'Religion,' in Arthur C. Lehman and James E. Myers (eds).
al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid (1991), *Ihya Ulum-id-Din*, Vol. 2, al-Haj Maulana Fazlul Karim (trans.). (New Delhi: Islamic Book Services).
— (2002), *Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa*, Sherman A. Jackson (trans.). (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Ghoib (2004), 'Suro, antara Tradisi dan Kepercayaan,' 2:13, 21-23.
— (2004), 'Membongkar Mitos Bulan Suro,' 2:13, 24-27.
Giddens, Anthony (2000), *Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives*. (New York: Routledge).
Goodenough, Ward H. (1951), *Property, Kin and Community on Truk*. (New Haven: Yale University Publications in Anthropology No. 46).
Gunawan, Rudy FX (2003), *Mengebor Kemunafikan: Inul, Seks dan Kekuasaan*. (Yogyakarta: Kawan Pustaka and Galang Press).
Hall, John R. (2002[1979]), 'Apocalypse at Jonestown,' in David Hicks (ed.).
Harmi, Zulkifli Zul (2003), *Sufi Jawa. Relasi Tasawuf-Pesantren*. (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Pustaka Sufi).
Hatley, Barbara (1971), 'Wayang and Ludruk: Polarities in Java,' *The Drama Review* 15:2, Theatre in Asia (Spring), 88-101.
— (1993), 'Constructions of "Tradition" in New Order Indonesian Theatre,' in Virginia Matheson Hooker (ed.).
— (1999), 'Cultural Expression and Social Transformation in Indonesia,' in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds).
Hatley, Ron et al. (1984), *Other Javas Away from the Kraton.* (Monash University).
Haykal, Muhammad Husayn (1976), *The Life of Muhammad*. Isma'il Ragi A. al Faruqi (trans.). (North American Trust Publications).
HD, Halim (1999), 'Arts Networks and the Struggle for Democratisation,' in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley and Damien Kingsbury (eds).
Hefner, Robert W. (1987), 'Islamizing Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java', *The Journal of Asian Studies* 46:3, 533-554.

— (2000), *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
— (ed.) (2001), 'Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia,' in *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).
Hellman, Jorgen (2003), *Performing the Nation: Cultural Politics in New Order Indonesia*. (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Monograph series, no. 89).
— (1998), 'The Use of 'Cultures' in Official Representations of Indonesia: The Fifteenth Anniversary of Independence,' *Indonesia and the Malay World* 26:74, 1-12.
Holland, Dorothy et al. (2007), *Local Democracy under Siege: Activism, Public Interests, and Private Politics*. (New York: New York University Press).
Hooker, M. B. (2003), *Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatāwā*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).
Hoon, Chang-Yau (2008), *Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia; Culture, Politics and Media*. (Portland: Sussex Academic Press).
Hudijono, Anwar (2000[1995]), 'K. H. Ahmad Dahlan di antara Tokoh Muslim Pembaru,' *Kompas* (ed.).
Hutchins, Edwin (1980), *Culture and Inference*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
Jabromin (2005), *Membumikan Dakwah Kultural.* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah).
— (2003), *Tahajjud Cinta, Emha Ainun Nadjib*. (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar).
Jackson, Sherman A. (2002), *On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam. Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali's Faysal al-Tafriqa Bayna al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
— (2005), *Islam and the Blackamerican: Looking toward the Third Resurrection*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Jahroni, Jajang (2008), *Defending The Majesty of Islam; Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003*. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books).
Jandra, Mifedwil et al. (1990), *Perangkat Alat-Alat dan Pakaian serta Simbolis Upacara Keagamaan di Lingkungan Keraton Yogyakarta*. (Special Province of Yogyakarta: Department of Education and Culture).
Jankowiak, William and Allen, Emilie (2005[2000]), 'Adoring the Father: Religion and Charisma in an American Polygamous Community,' in Arthur C. Lehmann, James Myers and Pamela A. Moro (eds).
Jay, Robert R. (1963), *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*. (Cultural Report Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University).
Johansen, Julian (1996), *Sufi and Islamic Reform in Egypt; The Battle for Islamic Tradition*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Johnston, H.A.S. (1967), *The Fulani Empire of Sokoto*. (London: Oxford University Press).

Kahin, Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin (1995), *Subversion as Foreign Policy; The Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*. (New York: The New York Press).

Kailani, Najib (2004), 'Bai'at = Suara Rakyat,' *Bulletin Al-Ikhtilaf* 16 April.

Kartodirdjo, Sartono (1973), *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries*. (Singapore: Oxford University Press).

Kedaulatan Rakyat (2003), 'Dangdut Lebaran di Gembira Loka,' 14 November, p. 12.

— 'Kaliurang Sambut Lebaran,' 19 November, p. 4.

— 'Pentas Dangdut Lebaran Bakal Semarak,' 24 November, p. 12.

— 'Izin Dangdut di Objek Wisata Ditolak,' 24 November, p. 9.

— 'Goyang Dangdut di Rawa Jombor,' 24 November, p. 9.

— 'Puluhan Gunungan Bakal Dilarung,' 21 February, p. 6.

— 'Bupati Toyo Kungkum di Clereng,' 23 February, p. 1.

— 'Kotoran 7 Kerbau Bule Jadi Rebutan,' 23 February, p. 1.

— 'Kyai Manggolo Murti Dikirab,' 24 February, p. 5.

— 'Melepas Ayam dan Larung Kepala Kerbau,' 9 March, p. 3.

Kerr, Malcolm H. (1966), *Islamic Reform; The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abdul and Rashid Rida*. (Berkeley: University of California Press).

Khadduri, Majid (1961), *Islamic Jurisprudence; Shafi`i's Risala*. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press).

Khaidir, Piet H. (2002), 'Dakwah Kultural: Pergulatan Kreatif Islam dan Budaya,' *Innovasi* 12:1, 54-5.

Kipp, Rita Smith and Susan Rodgers (eds) (1987), *Indonesian Religions in Transition*. (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press).

Koentjaraningrat, R.M. (1975), Introduction to the Peoples and Cultures of Indonesia and Malaysia. (Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Company).

Kuntowijoyo, Naniek Kasniyah, and Humam Abubakar (1987), *Tema Islam Dalam Pertunjukan Rakyat Jawa: Kajian Aspek Social, Keagamaan Dan Kesenian.* (Departemen Pendidikan Dan Kebudayaan Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan Proyek Penelitian Dan Pengkajian Kebudayaan Nusantara (Javanologi)).

Lancaster, Roger (1988), *Thanks to God and the revolution: Popular religion and class consciousness in the new Nicaragua*. (New York: Columbia University Press).

Last, Murray (1967), *The Sokoto Caliphate*. (New York: Humanities Press).

Lee, Raymond L. M. (2001[1987]), 'Amulets and Anthropology: A Paranormal Encounter with Malay Magic,' in Arthur C. Lehmann and James E. Myers (eds).

Lehman, F. K. (1978), 'Symbols and the Computation of Meaning,' in D. B. Shimkin et al. (eds).

— (1994), 'A Cognitivist-Computational Definition of Religion: Knowledge, Symbolism and Ritual,' Cognitive Science Research Notes #27, unpublished paper.
— (1997), Cognitive Science Research Notes. (Unpublished papers).
— (2003), 'The Relevance of the Founder's Cult for Understanding the Political Systems of the Peoples of Northern South-East Asia and its Chinese Borderlands,' in Nicola Tannebaum and Cornelia Ann Kammerer (eds).
Lings, Martin (1983), *Muhammad—his life based on the earliest sources*. (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International, Ltd.).
Lohanda, Mona (1991), 'Dangdut: Sebuah Pencarian Identitas,' in Edi Sedyawati and Sapardi Djoko Damono (eds).
Lounsbury, Floyd (1964), 'A Formal Account of the Crow- and Omaha-Type Kinship Terminologies,' in W.H. Goodenough (ed.).
Martin-Schiller, Barbara (1984), 'Islam and the "Earth Tiger": Religion in a Pesisir Village in *Other Javas Away from the Kraton*. (Monash University).
Maula, M. Jadul (2003), 'Menanti Keterlibatan Penuh-Kreatif AGAMA,' in *Pasang To Rilino; Menanti Keterlibatan Penuh-Kreatif Agama.* (Makassar: LAPAR Makassar).
Mernissi, Fatima (1992), *Islam and Democracy*. Mary Jo Lakeland (trans.). (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company).
Moertjipto, Drs., et al. (1993), *Makanan: Wujud, Variasi dan Fungsinya serta cara Penyajiannya pada Orang Jawa Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*. (Yogyakarta: Departemen Pendidikan Dan Kebudayaan).
MSN News (2008), 'Indonesia passes far-reaching anti-porn law', *MSN Malaysia News, Regional*. http://news.my.msn.com/regional/article.aspx?cp-documentid=1757250, accessed 30 October 2008.
Muhaimin, A. G. (2006), *The Islamic traditions of Cirebon: ibadat and adat among Javanese Muslims*. (Canberra: ANU E Press).
Muhammadiyah (2003), *Dakwah Kultural Muhammadiyah*. (Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah).
Mulder, Niels (1998), *Mysticism in Java: Ideology in Indonesia*. (Amsterdam: The Pepin Press).
— (2000[1996]), *Inside Southeast Asia: Religion, Everyday Life, Cultural Change*. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Press).
Mulkhan, Abdul Manir (2002), 'Muhammadiyah Itu Terbuka Pada Tradisi,' *Innovasi* 12:1, 38-45.
— (2003), 'Kata Pengantar. Menengok Akar Sosial-Budaya Muhammadiyah,' in Zakiyuddin Baidhaway (ed.).
Nakamura, Mitsuo (1983), *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree*. (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press).
— (1984), 'The Cultural and Religious Identity of Javanese Muslims: Problems of Conceptualization and Approach,' *Prisma* 31.
Nashir, Haedar (2002), 'Perdebatan Dakwah Kultural dalam Muhammadiyah,' *Innovasi* 12:1, 6-11.

Neher, Clark (1994), 'Asian Style Democracy,' *Asian Survey* (November), pp. 949-61.
Omar, Abdul Mannan (2003), *Dictionary of the Holy Qur'an*. (Hockessin: NOOR Foundation-International Inc,).
Pandoe, Marthias D. (2000[1990]), 'Lahir di Yogyakarta, Minangkabau Membesarkannya,' in *Kompas* (ed.).
Pasha, H. Musthafa Kamal and Darban, H. Ahmad Adaby (2002), *Muhammadiyah sebagai Gerakan Islam*. (Yogyakarta: LPPI, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta).
Peacock, James L. (1968), *Rites of Modernization: Symbolic and Social Aspects of Indonesian Proletarian Drama*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Pemberton, John (1994), On The Subject of "Java". (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
Picard, Michel (1996), *Bali, Cultural Tourism and Touristic Culture*. (Singapore: Archipelago Press).
Pioquinto, Ceres (1995), 'Dangdut at Sekaten; Female Representations at Live Performance', in *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 29 (Winter-Summer), pp. 59-89.
Piscatori, James P. (1986), *Islam in a World of Nation-States*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Platzdasch, Bernard (2000), 'Islamic Reaction to a Female President,' in Chris Manning and Peter Van Dierman (eds).
Prasetyo, Eko (2003), *Islam Kiri: Jalan Menuju Revolusi Sosial*. (Yogyakarta: Insist Press).
Purwadi (2004), *Nyai Roro Kidul dan Legitimasi Politik Jawa*. (Yogyakarta: Media Abadi).
Raffles, Thomas Stamford (1817), *The History of Java*, Vol. II. (London: Black, Parburry, and Allen).
Ramage, Douglas E. (1995), *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance*. (London: Routledge).
— (2004), 'Statement to Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives,' < http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations>
Reid, Anthony (1993a), 'Kings, Kadis, and Charisma in the 17th-Century Archipelago,' in *Making of an Islamic Discourse in Southeast Asia*. A. Reid (ed.). (Monash Papers on Southeast Asia-No. 27).
— (1993b), *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce.* Vol. 2, Expansion and Crisis. (New Haven: Yale University Press).
— (2000), *Charting the Shape of Early Modern Southeast Asia*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
Riklefs, M.C. (1974), *Jogjakarta Under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792: A History of the Division of Java*. (London: Oxford University Press).
— (2002), *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

— (2006), *Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from the Fourteenth to the early Nineteenth Centuries.* (Norwalk: EastBridge).
Roff, William R. (1985), 'Islam Obscured? Some Reflections on Studies of Islam and Society in Southeast Asia,' *Archipel* 29, 7-34.
Saputra, Prayogi (2008), 'Soeharto: Kekuasaan dan Kejatuhannya.' Unpublished paper.
Schiller, Anne (1997), *Small Sacrifices: Religious Change and Cultural Identity among the Ngaju of Indonesia.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Scott, James (1990), 'Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,' in Manning and Philibert (eds).
Shamsul, A.B. (2005), 'Islam Embedded: 'Moderate' Political Islam and Governance in the Malay World', in K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds).
Shehadi, Fadlou (1995), *Philosophies of Music in Medieval Islam*. (Leiden: E.J. Brill).
Shore, Bradd (1996), *Culture in Mind: Cognition, Culture, and the Problem of Meaning*. (New York: Oxford University Press).
Soetrisno, Drs. et al. (2003), *Direktori Seni Tradisi Jawa Tengah*. (Semarang: Dewan Kesenian Jawa Tengah).
Sumbogo, Priyono B. (2003), 'Inul Titisan Ronggeng,' *Forum* No. 47 (30 March), 59.
Sunaryo, Edi (1997), Wujud dan Makna Perlambangan Gunungan Garebeg dalam Budaya Keraton Yogyakarta. (Thesis, Institut Teknologi Bandung).
Tanthowi, Pramono U. (2008), *Muslims and Tolerance; Non-Muslim Minorities under Shariah in Indonesia*. (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books).
Tempo (2002), 'Dangdut Generasi MTV,' 7 October, 128-9.
Turner, Victor, (1969), *The Ritual Process*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
— (1974), *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
— (1982), 'Introduction,' in *Celebration: Studies in Festivity and Ritual*. Victor Turner (ed.). (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press).
— (1983), 'The Spirit of Celebration,' in Frank E. Manning (ed.).
— (1987), *The Anthropology of Performance*. (New York: PAJ Publications).
Vandenbosch, Amry (1941), *The Dutch East Indies; Its Government, Problems, and Politics*, 3rd Edition. (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Varisco, Daniel Martin (2005), *Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
Wahid, K. H Abdurrahman (2003), 'Demokrasi dan Demokratisasi Indonesia,' *Kedaulatan Rakyat* 17 November.
Wallace, Anthony (1970[1961]), *Culture and Personality*. (New York: Random House, Inc.).
Wehr, Hans (1994), Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, 4th Edition. J. Milton Cowan (ed.). (Ithaca: Spoken Language Services, Inc.).
Weiss, Bernard (1990), *'Exotericism and Objectivity in Islamic Jurisprudence',* in Nicolas Heer (ed.).

Wiegele, Katherine L. (2005), *Investing in Miracles: El Shaddai and the Transformation of Popular Catholicism in the Philippines*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

Woodward, Mark R. (1989), *Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta*. (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press).

Zaehner, R.C. (1960), *Hindu and Muslim Mysticism*. (London: The Athlone Press).

Zulkifli, Zul Harmi (2003), *Sufi Jawa: Relasi Tasawuf-Pesantren*. (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Pustaka Sufi).

Index

abangan, 12, 38, 45, 48-51, 107, 112, 116, 155, 159
abdi dalem, 25n11, 96
'Abduh, Muhammad, 6n1, 100
Abdurrahman, Moeslim, 107, 124-125, 165
Abou El Fadl, Khaled, 8
Abshar-Abdalla, Ulil, 66n3, 92n9, 125
abuse of female domestic workers, 124
adat, 15, 16, 33, 112, 159
agama, 29, 33, 71, 143, 159
Ahmadiyah, 38
air doa, 61, 64, 76, 79
Akademi Kebudayaan Yogyakarta, 119, 130
Akikah, 136
Alang-Alang, 121-123
Al-Asma' al-Husna, 28, 43, 72
Al Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad, 54, 103n3, 142-143, 143n4
Al Jabiri, Muhammad Abid, 13, 110
amalan, 47, 68
AMIKOM (Akademi Manajemen Informatika dan Komputer), 127
Andoko, Gati, 121
angguk putri, 42, 82-83, 93, 109
Anshor (Ar. *Anṣār*), *see Sahabat*
apem, 40, 40n1
'aqīdah, 75, 103, 105
Arab music influence, 83
Asdie, Doctor, 43-44, 71-75
Asnuri, Kyai Haji, 67-71
Asy'ari, Hasyim, 6n1
atraksi, 82-83

badui, 42, 83
Bahar, Anissa, 85
bahasa Melayu, 83
bai'at, 165
bakam method, 78
Bantul, 23
Battle of Badr paradigm, 141
becak, 25, 25n11
Bekakak, 25, 25n12
Bengkel Theatre, 116
berkah (*barakah*), 22, 25n11, 31, 47, 98, 144
Bersih Desa ceremonies, 25, 25n12
bid'ah and founding of Muhammadiyah, 100;
and shift in Muhammadiyah position, 101; and dominant Muhammadiyah interpretation of local arts and culture, 104-106; and alternative interpretations, 106-107; and a Muhammadiyah leader on cultural *dakwah*, 108-109; and Maiyah cultural arts
Boyolali, 74
buang sial, 23, 27, 57
budaya, 29-30, 33, 108-109, 112, 161
budaya rakyat (common people's culture), 83
budayawan, 134, 151
bupati, 23
Beringharjo, 18

Cak Nun, *see* Nadjib, Emha Ainun
campursari, 20, 20n3, 84, 93, 109, 138
carbon-based pills, 63
Catholic, 22, 39
Cepuri, 24
chakra, 44, 44n4
Che Guevara, 119
Chinese Indonesians, 16, 32, 62-63, 166-167, 167n3
Cianjur, West Java, 167-168
cikal bakal (founding ancestors), 24n10
City Monument (*Tugu*), 19

Class divisions, 1, 31, 38, 48, 50-51, 86, 90-92, 94, 107, 112, 116-119, 124-127, 137-138, 146, 158-159, 165
communitas, 91, 134, 139-140, 153-155, 160
corruption, 11, 45, 87, 117-118, 26

Dahlan, Ahmad, 6n1, 99
dakwah (Ar. *da'wa*),
cultural, 13, 106-107; and *wali songo*, 95-97; and Muhammadiyah, 97, 101, 107, 129; and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 97, 129; and Teater Eska, 129
dangdut, 12, 20, 81, 93, 99, 108, 112, 115, 159
Daratista, Inul, 50, 81, 84, 88, 119
Demak, 36, 95
Demang, 61
democracy,
culturally relative approach, 5; variety of conceptions of, 5; dominant discourse of liberal form, 5-7, 51-52, 159; and populist views, 92; and prophetic theatre, 129-131; modern *kasidah* song about, 157-158; and local concepts, 164-166; New Order *Pancasila* form of, 116
demonstrations, 18, 87, 117, 121, 155
Departemen Borok, 118
Department of Culture and Tourism, 20-23, 82
Department of Religion (*Agama*), 32n18
Dewa Dewi, 27
De Wit, Augusta, 36
dibaan, 105
diisi, 77, 79
Dinasti, 116-117, 134
DIY (*Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta*, Special Territory of Yogyakarta), 1, 28-30
dombret, 84
Dorce, 85
dukun, 12, 40, 55, 58, 60, 75, 77
dynamic interface, 148-153

elections, 52-53, 92
encyclopedic knowledge, 90, 160
equalization, 8
and traditional ceremonies, 30-31; and alliance of Muslim variants, 53-54; and *dangdut*, 93; and cultural *dakwah*, 112; and modern theatre, 130; and Maiyah, 155; and public cultural forms, 162-163; and evaluation of macro-level factors, 163-168

Fadlan, Ustadz, 71, 74
fatwa,
Nahdlatul Ulama affiliated group's ruling forbidding selection of woman for president, 52; role of MUI (*Majelis Ulama Indonesia*) rulings under New Order regime, 87; MUI post-Suharto rulings on pornography, imported products with pork fat, and bank interest, 87
Festival Kraton Nusantara IV, 25-26, 26n13
fitrah (Ar. *fiṭra*), 44, 44n3

Gadjah Mada University, 16, 115, 120
gambang, 135
Gambang Syafaat, 135, 145
gambyong, 85n4, 105-106
gamelan saron, 137
Gamping, 25n12, 60
Gedag-Gedig, 116
Geertz, Clifford, 4, 9, 12, 38, 45
Gelanggang Mahasiswa, 115
Gembira Loka, 82, 83n2
Gerebeg, 24-26, 99, 105, 115
ghaib, 55, 57-58, 74
Glagah, 82
Globalisasi Inrul, 118-119
globalization, 1, 8, 34, 101, 118-119, 128, 159-162
gotong-royong, 143-145, 154, 164
goyang, 84-86
goyangan setan, 90
goyang ngebor, 81, 84, 86, 88, 119
goyang ngecor, 86, 86n5
goyang patah-patah, 86, 86n5
Great Mansion, 18
Grobogan, Central Java, 82
gunungan, 22, 25-26, 95
Gunungkidul, 23, 25
Gus Dur, *see* Wahid, Abdurrahman

Gusti Murdokusumo, 23

Habeb, Kaji, 128-129
Habibie, B.J., 167
ḥadīth, 8, 40, 75, 100, 125
hadrah, 102, 105, 138, 150
Hartoyo, Methol, 125
Hawa (Eve), 129
headscarves, 93, 117
healers, 56-62, 64-80
healing,
free alternative medicine, 23; televised *ustadz* on Islamic form of, 55; revivalist criticism of traditional Javanese forms of, 66; contests over proper Islamic forms of, 78-80; from *gamelan* instruments; expectations Cak Nun can supernatural form in Sulawesi, 136
Hindu Buddhist, 36, 39
Hindu kingdom, 36, 39
hukum, 38
Hingga Perbatasan Hari, 128-129
Hurgronje, Snouch, 38

Ibn Taimiyyah, 100, 103n3, 142n2
ideological models, 2, 9-10; of charismatic leader and *Pancasila* democracy, 28-29; of Islamized Indonesian society, 30; of radical transformation, 30, 144, 153; various models, 41-42, 48, 163-166; *syari'ah*-oriented, 44; contested, 66, 79-80, 158-162; of reformists and populists, 91-92; of liberal reformists, 92n9; populists, 123; of Neo-Marxists, 126; post-Suharto expression of, 130; of Teater Eska 128-130; secular model and Maiyah, 140; of Maiyah, 144-147
ilham, 41, 70, 79, 96
ilmu, 41, 65, 69, 73, 77, 79, 128
ijtihad, 7, 101, 103, 107, 110, 148
i'tikaf, 41
Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), 87, 134-135, 164
Idul Adha, 24
Idul Fitri, 24
ilham, 41, 79
ilmu, 41, 73, 77, 79
Imlek, 167n3
Imogiri, 22
incomes, 31
Indonesian Arts Institute, 126
Indriyana, Hasta, 126
Ingkung, 47
Institute for Social Transformation (INSIST), 118-120, 120n2
Irama, Rhoma, 84, 87-88
Islamization, 20-21, 24, 27-28, 47-48, 66, 90-91, 97, 100-102, 108-109, 129, 138-140, 143, 148, 153, 161; broad history of, 36; representations of, 37-40
Izroil, 135
Izroil Wonosobo, 135

jaipong, 84
Jakarta, 10, 135, 137
jampi, 55, 61, 64, 64n2
Japan, 84, 168
jathilan, 22, 42, 60, 82, 93, 115
Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), *see* Liberal Islam Network
Javanism,
and alternative models of "democracy" and desirable futures, 8; and traditional beliefs and values, 22; and symbolism and cognition, 26-27; and fusion of notions, 27-28; and ideological model, 29; and relationship to palaces, 31n16, and Indonesian nationalism, 32-33, as mystical variant in Woodward representation, 39; and traditionalist Muslim performances, 42; multiple meanings and contests over, 48-51; and alliances across variants, 53; and healers, 56-66; and revivalist criticism, 66; and diagnosis of possession, 77; and Muhammadiyah interpretations of local arts and culture, 104-107; and a Muhammadiyah leader on cultural *dakwah*, 108-109; and religious pluralism, 159; and various ideological models, 48, 163-166

Jibril, 73
jihad, 90; against Inul-style *dangdut*; Muhammadiyah form of, 100-101; Maiyah form of, 141-142; and Communitas; *Maiyah* approach, 152
joglo, 61
Joko, Pak, 60-62, 78
Jumat Kliwon, 22
juru kunci, 98
Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), 75, 77

Kaharingan, 32n18
Kailani, Najib, 165
Kaliurang, 82
Kambali, Mbah, 65
kakak, 62-63
karawitan, 20, 23, 105
Kartarejasa, Butet, 117
kasidah(an), 7, 22, 99, 113, 138
Kauman santri, 48-49
kebatinan, 44
kebaya, 84
kedaulatan rakyat, 7, 164
Kediri, 22
kejawen, see Javanism
kemenyan, 71, 98
kendhi ijo, 22, 26
kenduren, 45
Kenduri Cinta, 135, 146
keramat, 23-24, 26, 73, 77, 79, 98, 109
keris, 69
Kesaksian Orang Biasa, 118
Kesaktian, 65
kesurupan, 42
ketoprak, 20, 99, 116-117, 121
khurafat,
and founding of Muhammadiyah, 100; and shift in Muhammadiyah approach, 101; and dominant Muhammadiyah interpretation of local arts and culture, 104-106; and alternative interpretations, 106-107; and a Muhammadiyah leader on cultural *dakwah*, 108-109
Kiai Kanjeng, 118, 135, 137, 142
kiblat, 100
Kiemas, Taufik, 89
King of Mount Merapi, 19, 27
KKN (Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism), 87, 117
klenik, 51, 57, 71
Konyoh, 25-26
Korea, 84
Kota Gede, 24, 41, 74-75
Krapyak *pesantren*, 71
Kristina, 85
Kretek, 67
kuda kepang, 22
Kulonprogo, 16, 25n12
kyai, 21, 52, 55, 61, 65, 75, 77, 97, 136
Kyai Daruno-Nyai Daruni, 21-22, 35
Kyai Gunturmadu, 97-98, 97n2
Kyai haji, 12, 71
Kyai Manggolo Murti, 23
Kyai Nagawilaga, 97-98, 97n2

Labuhan, 23-24, 104, 115
Lakoni, Pak, 62-64
Lamongan, 102, 105
Lemper, 47
lesung, 121
Liberal Islam Network (*Jaringan Islam Liberal*, JIL), 52, 66n3, 92n9, 125
linguistic competence in Javanese, 115
LKiS (Institute for Islamic Social Studies), 52
ludruk, 85n4, 116, 127

Maarif, Syafii, 101
Macapat Syafaat, 135-137
Magelang, 57
Maiyah,
Kenduri Cinta of, 10, 135; and sybolism and cognition, 133-134; background of, 134; *Macapat Syafaat* of, 135, 137; pamphlet (*Salam Maiyah*) of, 136, 139-142; circle of, 137; and cultural arts, 138; and open dialogues, 138; nine basic principles of, 140, schema of, 140, root paradigm of, 141; music and obligatory acts, 142-143; and nationalism, 144-145; and democracy, 146-147; and liberation

theology, 147-148; and dynamic interface with broader society, 148-151
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), 87
Majapahit, 36, 51, 79
Malam Pekan Gemilang Yogya, 20-21
Malioboro Street, 18, 25, 31
malu, 57, 93
Mangiran, 82
Masjid Agung Kauman, 25, 95, 109, 113
maslahah, 145, 164
mass media, 1, 55, 66, 82, 84-89, 135, 137, 151, 157-158, 165
masyarakat madani, 163-164
Mataram, 19, 24, 36, 41, 51
Maula, M. Jadul, 124
Mbah Demang, 21, 22
Mbok Sri, 105
Mecca, 29
mental representations, 19, 26-27, 33, 55, 64-66, 113, 123, 126-127, 136, 140-141, 148
military, 18, 53, 119, 168
Ministry of Education and Culture, 32n18
modern Indonesian theatre, 115, background of, 116-120; student theatre, 120-132; and individual, 130; and concern for material conditions, 131; and Islamic framework, 131; and globalization, 131
modernist Muslims,
broad distinction and history, 6n1; criticism of traditional ceremonies, 29-30; and secularism, 30; and *ziarah* practices 40-41; and entering trance states, 44; and ritual meals, 45n5; and forming alliances across variants , 52-54; and Islamized model, 30; and *syari'ah*-oriented model, 44; and various ideological models, 41-42, 48, 163-166; and contested discourses, 66, 79-80; reformists, 91-92; and founding of Muhammadiyah, 100; and shift in Muhammadiyah position, 101; and interpretations of local arts and culture, 104-109; and participation in *Maiyah*, 149;and American scholar-administrators, 159
Modin Karok, 121
Mubeng Beteng, 23
mufakat, 7, 164
Muhajirin, *see Sahabat*
Muhammadiyah, 6, 12, 53, 73, 95, 97, 100, 117, 129, 149
Muharram, 22
MUI, *see* Majelis Ulama Indonesia multi-dimensional crisis, 1, 66, 87, 107, 119, 134-135, 139, 158-159
musik Melayu, 83
musyawarah, 7, 146, 164
musyrik, 29, 64, 71

Nadjib, Emha Ainun, 89, 116, 118, 134
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 6, 52, 97, 102, 124, 129, 149
Nakamura, Mitsuo, 26n13, 100
Nasida Ria, 112, 157n1
nafs(u), 73, 88, 90, 96
nasyid, 113
National Islamic Institute (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN), 124, 127
neo-modernist Muslims,
broad distinction and orientation, 7n1; and trance states , 44; and *syari'ah*-oriented and "Islamic state" models, 44, and ritual meals, 45; and forming alliances across variants, 52-54; and healing, 74-78; and contested discourses, 66, 79-80, 158-162; and PKS, 77-78; and criticism of *dangdut*, 88; and participation in *Maiyah*, 149; and views on *Maiyah*, 150; *Maiyah* member's criticism of, 150
New Order, 11, 15, 56, 66, 86, 115, 130, 134, 139, 144
ngalap berkah, 22-24, 32n19, 97
NGOs, 7, 52, 117-119, 124, 130, 137, 155, 164
Nida Ria, 112
northern coast of Java, 49, 49n7, 102
NU, *see* Nahdlatul Ulama
Nugroho, Catur, 127
Nusantara*, 25*
Nyai, 21-22
Nyai Roro Kidul, *see* Queen of Southern-Sea

obat fikiran, 69
Old Order, 19, 50, 164,167
Orang-orang Batu, 126
Orang-orang yang Bergegas, 119-120
orang pintar, 78
Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (OTB), 66

Padhang Bulan, 135
Pajang Kingdom, 25
Pak Kanjeng, 135
Paku alam, 22, 28
Palace religious officials (*penghulu*), 25
Palembang, 62
Pancasila, 15, 29-30, 112, 116, 130, 140, 162
Panembahan Senopati, 24
pangkur jenggleng, 109-110
Papuan, 11, 146
Parangkusumo, 23
Parangtritis, 82
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), 53, 101, 109
Partai Coro, 125-126
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), *see* Justice and Prosperity Party
Peh Cun, 32, 32n19, 166
Pekan Gemilang Yogya, 20
Pemandian Clereng, 23
pencak silat, 104, 106
pengajian, 70, 95, 96, 106, 135
Permatasari, Uut, 86
Persatuan Artis Musik Melayu Indonesia (PAMMI), 88
Persik, Dewi, 86
Pesisir, 28n15
pesantren, 6, 64, 71, 102, 105
Pisowanan Agung, 121
pornography, 87n7, 87-89, 90
Potret Perjalanan Emha Ainun Nadjib, 135
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), 87
preman, 60, 137
pribumi, 32n19
prihatin, 22, 25n12, 40
priyayi, 12, 30, 32, 38, 48-51, 55, 71
Prophet Muhammad, 25, 28, 41, 47, 69, 73, 90, 95-96, 99, 105, 136, 141, 149
Prophet Musa, 136
Prophet Sulaiman, 77
Prophetic theatre, 129, 131
Protestants, 23, 39
puasa bicara, 23, 28
puasa geni, 69
puasa mutih, 61
puasa ngebleng, 58
pujian, 105
Purawisata, 82, 83n2, 84
Purna Budaya, 120
pusaka, 21, 25-26, 40, 98, 127
Pusaka ceremonies, 25

qiyās, 79n5
Queen of Southern Sea, 19, 23, 27, 29
Qur'an, 8, 40, 44, 68, 69, 71-72, 75-76, 79, 90, 96, 99, 100, 103, 113, 128-129, 138, 146

Raffles, Thomas Stamford, 37
Rais, Amien, 53, 101, 109
rajah-rajah, 41, 61
Ramadan, 4, 61, 137
Ratu Kidul, *see* Queen of Southern Sea
Rawa Jombor, 82
Rebo Pungkasan, 25, 25n12
Reformasi (Reformation), 5, 9n2, 65, 78, 87, 107, 117, 119, 121, 139, 155, 158
regional autonomy, 19, 151, 167
regional theatrical competition, 126
religion, 2
  anthropological approach to, 3-5; and local discourse, 29-30, 32
religious humanism, 150, 166
religious movements, 32n18, 38, 49-50,66, 77-78, 91, 100-102, 133, 150, 155; and communitas, 153-155; and dynamic interface, 148-153
Rendra, W.S., 116
Reog, 42, 82
Republic of Indonesia, 28
Rida, Rashid, 100
rohani(ah), 96, 142
ronggeng, 84
rukun, 45, 47, 59
Runtuh, 118
rupiah, 31, 59, 68, 70

ruqyah, 56, 75-77
Ruwah, 40

Sahabat, 73, 96, 143, 143n3
Salad Hamdy, 126, 128-129
salafi, 12, 56, 56n1, 66, 74-75, 78, 100, 103, 113, 159-160
samrah, 105, 138
Sanggar Shalahuddin, 117
santri, 12, 38, 48-51, 55, 64, 83, 102, 105, 108, 137
Sapar, 25n12, 40n1
Sardjito Hospital, 71
sarong, 84
secularization, 30, 109, 161, 140, 148, 161
Sedekah Laut, 23, 25, 104
Sekaten, 82, 95, 105, 109
Selasa Kliwon, 22
selawat(an), 22, 27, 42, 69, 71, 79, 102, 105, 111, 138, 142
Semarang, 31, 112, 135, 137, 158
semedi, 27, 59, 69
sesaji (*sesajen*), 23, 27-28, 40, 47, 97, 104, 106
silat, 61-62
silsilah, 51
sinden, 105, 109
Siswanto, Zuhdi, 124
Sketsa Rezim, 125
skripsi (undergraduate thesis), 85
slamet, 46
slametan, 22, 40, 45-47, 55, 64, 106, 159
Sleman, 16, 25n11
social drama, 81, 86, 89, 160
Societet Militer, 18
Solo, *see* Surakarta
sorcery, 12, 57, 59, 60, 70, 75-78
Special Territory of Yogyakarta, *see* DIY
street children, 18
Subandi, Pak, 56-60, 78
Sudarmanto, Heri, 121
Sufism, 6, 12, 27, 28, 36-37, 39, 48, 56, 66, 73, 77-78, 136, 159-160
Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 88-89, 92, 167, 167n3
Suksesi, 117
Sultan,
  Hamengku Buwono X, 18-19, 21; Hamengku Buwono IX, 19; and Islamized political position, 28; and political appointment, 19, 28; and *Peh Cun*, 32; and multiculturalism, 32, 166; and *masyarakat madani*, 163
Sumarsih, Doctor, 71-75
Sumatra, 38
Sunan, 28n14
Sunan Merapi*, see* King of Mount Merapi
Sunnah, 75, 79, 96, 100, 103
Supajar, Damardjati, 39
Surakarta (Solo), 17, 33, 79, 82n1, 83n2
Suro, 23
  Malam Satu Suro, 23; Festival Suran, 40
Susuhunan, 28n14
Swara, Ira, 85-86
syafaat, 73
Syafaat Rasul, 149, 155
syari'ah, 13, 44, 48, 80, 100, 104, 107, 11, 142, 164
Syekh Siti Jenar, 49, 155
syirik (Ar. shirk),
  and traditional Javanese activities, 29-30, 51; and *kyai haji* healer, 69, 71; and *ziarah* practices, 41,73; and *ruqyah* recitation, 75n4; and founding of Muhammadiyah, 100; and dominant Muhammadiyah interpretation of local arts and culture, 104-106; and alternative interpretations, 106-107; and a Muhammadiyah leader on *dakwah cultural*, 108-109
syncretism, 4, 12, 49n7, 36, 102

tahayul,
  and *kyai haji* healer, 71; and founding of Muhammadiyah, 100; and shift in Muhammadiyah approach, 101; and dominant Muhammadiyah interpretation of local arts and culture, 104-106; and alternative interpretations, 106-107; and a Muhammadiyah leader on *dakwah cultural*, 108-109*Tahlilan*, 22, 44, 64, 102, 105-107
Taiwan, 84

taklid (Ar. *taqlīd*), 7, 100, 103
Tanda Tanya, 124-125
tandhakan, 105-106
tapa, 27, 43, 59, 69, 104
tarekat, 36
taṣawwuf, 6n1, 135, 149
Tauhid, 27, 29, 41-42, 66, 74, 100, 103, 128, 143, 148, 155
tayub, 84, 84n4, 106, 106n4
Teater Eska, 124, 127, 131
Teater Gadjah Mada, 115, 121-123
Teater Gandrik, 117-119
Teater Gapit, 117
Teater Jagat, 117
Teater Jeprik, 117
Teater Jiwa, 117
Teater Koma, 117, 125
Teater Lobby Dua, 125, 130
Teater Manggar, 127
Teater Surakarta, 116
telur cemani, 70
tenaga dalam, 43-44, 60-61, 68-69, 71, 73, 78
terbangan, 102
Thalia, Nita, 85-86
Toghout, 128
traditional Javanese fasts, 58, 61, 69
traditionalist Muslims,
  broad distinction and history, 6n1; and participation in traditional Javanese ceremonies, 22; and secularism, 30; and overlap with Javanism, 42; and *Nyadran* ceremonies, 30; and ideological models, 42; and *ziarah* practices, 40-42; and trance states and *tenaga dalam*, 42-44; and food and *berkah*, 47; and *sesajen*, 47; and controversial *fatwa* on female political leader, 52; and alliances with other Muslim variants, 53-54, and healers, 67-74; and various ideological models, 41-42, 48, 163-166; and US funding, 88; and norm of *taklid*, 100; and *dakwah* style; traditional culture arts and *bid'ah*, 105; and participation in *Maiyah*, 149
trance, 42-44, 82-82, 136, 159
Trisik, 83
tubuh, 44, 90
Tuhan (*Ketuhanan*), 23, 140
tumpeng(an), 26-27, 47, 105
tutup layang, 104

United States, 6, 50, 52, 84, 88, 168
Unity in Diversity (*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*), 15, 144, 167
UNY (National University, Yogyakarta), 126
ustadz (Ar. *ustadh*), 12, 55, 65
Unstradt, 126

Vanderbosch, Amry, 38, 100
Vredeburg Museum, 18

wahabi, 100, 102
Wahid, Abdurrahman (Gus Dur), 89, 91-2, 160, 167n3
wahyu, 41, 71, 73, 79
Wahyu Kusumaning Manggar, 127-128
wali, 70, 160
wali songo, 8, 73, 95-96, 109, 123, 129
waria, 84-85, 84n3
Waria Luwes Grandfinal 2003, 84
wayang, 20, 23, 104, 115
wibawa, 79
women, 52, 75, 81, 83-86, 93, 112, 124, 137-138, 146, 160, 168
Women's Domestic Worker's Association (Pembantu Rumah Tangga, PRT), 124, 129
Wonokromo, 25n12
Wonosobo, 135-136
Woodward, Mark, 27, 39, 45, 159

yakin (Ar. *yaqīn*), 57, 59
YASANTI, 52
Ya-Sin (surah), 40
Yogya Expo Center, 151
Yogyakarta,
  Regencies of, 16; population of, 16; palaces, 18, 21, 95, 98, 102, 109; *Mubeng Beteng* ceremony of, 23; Festival Kraton Nusantara IV of, 25, palace servants, 25, 25n11, 96; meanings of city, 18, 19, 31, 158; and Muhammadiyah, 102; and Maiyah, 135

Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 87n7

zamzam water, 69

ziarah (Ar. *zi'arah*), 40-41, 55, 69, 159
zikir (Ar. *dhikir*), 27, 42-44, 47, 58, 60, 71-74, 79, 138

STRA
UB

HOFSTRA

UNIVERSITY

ISLAMIC SPECTRUM IN JAVA

Timothy Daniels, Hofstra University, USA

This empirically grounded work explores the emerging aspects of cultural politics in the world's most populous Muslim nation. It engages with complex issues of cultural translation, localization and globalization from various perspectives through analyzing a diverse range of cultural forms, including government or palace-based celebrations, ceremonies and rituals, modern student theatre, and Islamic revival sessions. With its discussion of both old and new Islamic movements, alongside the contested religious interpretations of public cultural events, this book will be of interest not only to anthropologists, but also to scholars of religion, culture and sociology.

Daniels' Islamic Spectrum in Java *explodes and enriches common conceptions of Islam by fine-grained description of the Yogyakarta region of the largest Islamic nation, Indonesia. Healing, politics, arts, sexuality and transsexuality are revealingly discerned in company with Islamic doctrine and organizations such as the 35 million-member Muhammadiya. Daniels' book carries forward a century of study of Islam in Indonesia, ranging from Snouck Hurgronje to Koenjaraningrat, Geertz, Hefner, and Woodward, to contribute importantly to understanding Islam in relation to cultural context during the twenty-first century.*

James Peacock, University of North Carolina, USA

Daniels draws on his ethnographic fieldwork in the Central Javanese capital of Yogyakarta to examine the contemporary flourishing of Islamic cultural forms, from Sufi-inspired healing practices, to dangdut song styles promoting female sexuality, to Islamic "prophetic theatre". He provocatively asks how new Islamic cultural forms might reshape debates on the future of democracy and reform in Indonesia.

John R. Bowen, Washington University in St. Louis, USA

an **informa** business

ISBN 978-0-367-88251-8

9 780367 882518

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
www.routledge.com